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ABSTRACT
Classic studies have examined the factors that influence the way in which people can solve
difficult “insight” problems, which require creative solutions. Recent research has shown that
guiding one’s eye movements in a pattern spatially congruent with the solution improves the
likelihood of formulating a spatial solution. The authors in this line of research argued that
guiding eye movements in a pattern spatially equivalent to the solution of the problem yields an
embodied cognitive benefit that aids problem solving. Specifically, guiding eye movements
leads to the generation of a mental representation containing perceptual information that helps a
problem solver mentally simulate the problem features, increasing likelihood to generate a
solution to the problem. However, evidence from a small but critically relevant area of research
supports that this embodied effect may be more simply a creativity-priming effect. The proposed
research aimed to disentangle these ideas while addressing other research questions of interest:
do embodied problem solving benefits transfer to later problem solving? Do individual
differences in spatial ability influence how people solve these problems? The present study
combined previously established methodologies in problem solving and analogical problem
solving to investigate these research questions. Results of the present work tentatively support
the embodied priming effect, mediated by a creativity-priming effect that influences problem
solving performance. Both effects emerged after manipulating problem solvers’ eye movements.
There is also modest support for a link between spatial ability and analogical problem solving,
but not initial problem solving. These results are interpreted through the lens of embodied
cognitive theory, providing tentative support that guiding eye movements can influence
reasoning through an enhancement of creativity.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
When faced with a novel and challenging problem, individuals often draw upon past
experiences to generate a solution. These past experiences consist of mental representations of
similar scenarios holding information that can aid in solving new problems. For example,
students who must write an APA-style paper for a class assignment may remember another
APA-style paper they had previously written and adapt that paper’s format to satisfy their new
assignment requirements. A plumber fixing a leaky toilet may draw upon past experiences
fixing leaky sinks to aid in his repair job. An elementary school teacher dealing with an unruly
student may recall prior experiences with unruly students and apply previously successful
classroom management techniques to keep that student well-behaved. Young children learning
to read may infer pronunciation rules for new words based on words they have already learned
(e.g., pronouncing “cleat” and “meat” based on knowing the word “cheat”). These examples all
highlight the usefulness of applying existing knowledge to new problems.
One way that psychologists have studied this transfer phenomenon is through an
analogical problem solving paradigm (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980). In this paradigm,
participants are often presented with an initial story and its solution and then tasked with solving
a new problem. This new problem is completely different at a surface level, but the underlying
solution is the same. The studies using this paradigm have identified that, even when people
have access to knowledge that is helpful for problem solving, they rarely retrieve it without an
explicit hint to use it. Understanding when previously acquired knowledge is retrieved and how
to facilitate its transfer to novel situations is the main problem in this body of research. To
elaborate, researchers have been interested in answering research questions with the following
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general themes: 1. What kinds of prior knowledge can be used to help solve new problems? 2.
What characteristics of the individual influence whether prior knowledge is successfully
transferred to new problems? 3. What perceptual factors influence whether prior knowledge is
successfully transferred?
Solving Problems with Analogies
To answer these research questions, analogical problem solving studies have used
Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem as a testbed (text from Gick and Holyoak, 1980; pp. 307308):
“Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his
stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is
destroyed, the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy
the tumor. If the rays are directed at the tumor at a sufficiently high intensity, the
tumor will be destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity, the healthy tissue that the
rays pass through on the way to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower
intensities the rays are harmless to the healthy tissue, but they will not affect the
tumor either. What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the
rays, and at the same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue?”
One solution to this problem is to use multiple weak x-rays that converge on the tumor.
The weak rays individually do not harm the healthy tissue, but their combined power is sufficient
to destroy the tumor. Early research identified that analogies could improve the rate at which
problem solvers provide this convergence solution (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983). For example,
before seeing the radiation problem, one might view an analogous story of a military general
who must send his troops along multiple paths to capture a fortress, or a story of a firefighter
who must put out an oil rig fire by surrounding it with fire hoses from multiple directions. In
each story, the problem is solved using a converging forces solution, and these solutions can be
retrieved to help solve the radiation problem.
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In essence, the main task in an analogical problem solving paradigm represents a
microcosm for observing analogical transfer of knowledge from one situation to another.
Participants receive a source story, and they are tasked with solving an analogous problem. In
the literature, the process of retrieving an existing mental representation and applying it to
answer a new problem is known as analogical transfer (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). This process
follows Sternberg’s (1977) account of the component processes of analogical reasoning, where
underlying structural features of previously solved problems are “mapped” to the problem at
hand, and the novel problem is analyzed within the framework of the original problem.
Essentially, the underlying structure is discovered by learning the solutions to analogous
problems, which become synthesized into a problem schema. After recognizing corresponding
structural features between the problem schema and the novel problem, this problem schema is
applied to the novel problem. If the underlying structures match, a solution is generated.
Early research in analogical problem solving (Gick & Holyoak, 1980) investigated
whether narrative source stories could aid in solving new (but analogous) target problems. The
general idea from these studies was to provide problem solvers with prior knowledge (a source)
and test whether they could apply that knowledge to a new problem (a target). This target
problem was structurally analogous to the source story, but this work identified that problem
solvers were not very likely to apply the solution from the source to the target (specifically, only
about 10% were successful; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983). Hinting problem solvers to consider
using the source to solve the new problem resulted in increased success rates (to between 30%
and 50%), but many problem solvers still remained unsuccessful (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983).
Gick and Holyoak argued that the resulting increase in success rates indicated that analogical
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transfer was possible, but they and many others became interested in finding ways to improve the
rate at which spontaneous (i.e., non-hinted) analogical transfer could be fostered.
Later studies spanning several decades continued this line of research by examining the
attributes and quantity of source analogies (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak & Koh, 1987), by
providing illustrated diagrams (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Gick, 1985; Gick & Holyoak, 1983;
Pedone, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2001), or by providing animations (Pedone, Hummel, & Holyoak,
2001; Kubricht, Lu, & Holyoak, 2017). These studies largely involved the use of visual or
narrative aids and unveiled some general patterns that suggest the key to spontaneous analogical
transfer is high quality encoding that results in a high quality mental representation of the
problem.
Incorporating Embodied Theories of Cognition into Analogical Problem Solving
Barsalou’s (1999) theory of perceptual symbol systems (often more broadly referred to as
“embodied cognition” or “grounded cognition”) sparked a paradigm shift to incorporate
embodied aspects into analogical problem solving research. Pedone and colleagues (2001)
tangentially discussed that animations could foster the acquisition of relevant perceptual
information, but the earliest mention of an empirical test of embodied cognitive principles in
analogical problem solving can be found in Craig, Nersessian, and Catrambone (2002). Below, I
briefly review the relevant claims from Barsalou (1999), and discuss how they have been tested
in studies on problem solving and analogical problem solving.
Barsalou (1999) offered a perceptual account of human cognition, arguing that cognition
does not consist of purely abstract and amodal processes, but is heavily influenced by perceptual
information and processes. Instead of viewing the brain as a processor of abstract symbols, he
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argued that the brain instead processes perceptual symbols. He used the analogy that the brain
serves as a kind of recording device, where the perceptual processes involved in human
interaction with the world are recorded. When retrieving from long term memory, or processing
information in working memory, this recorded perceptual information is processed through a
modal simulator, which functions as a replay mechanism. To illustrate these ideas, he described
an example of perceptually simulating a chair. When seeing the word “chair,” one might
visualize a chair’s components (e.g., has four legs, a seat, and a back), and one might recall
activities associated with chairs (e.g., sitting, standing, pushing). Both of these acts could be
considered modal perceptual simulations. By visualizing a chair’s components, one draws upon
the visual system to simulate the way the chair looks. By recalling activities associated with a
chair, one draws upon the motor system to simulate kinesthetic interactions with a chair (e.g.,
how it “feels” to sit in a chair). Thus, one’s mental representation for a chair inherently contains
relevant perceptual information. Characteristics and interactions with chairs are encoded within
various modalities, and when they are retrieved from memory, those modalities are activated in
the brain through simulation during the retrieval process. Barsalou noted that modal simulations
are incomplete recreations of the original recorded perceptual information (e.g., motor system
activation during simulation is a fraction of the activation during encoding), but that they are
nonetheless inherent mechanisms for cognitive processing.
Shortly after Barsalou’s (1999) paper was published, researchers in the problem solving
literature became interested in testing whether forcing problem solvers to encode relevant
perceptual information could aid in problem solving. The general idea is that, when encoding
problem features, encoding relevant perceptual information enriches one’s mental representation
of that problem beyond what can be encoded from simply reading the problem. In particular,
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Pedone and colleagues (2001) argued that a spatial and kinesthetic perceptual understanding of
the radiation problem is critical to solving it. During the solution-forming phase of problem
solving, mental representations consisting of perceptual information should be more likely to
foster a perceptual simulation of the problem, which should improve problem solving success
rates. For example, if one re-enacts a converging-forces analog by crashing several blocks
together from multiple directions, one should be more likely to produce a convergence solution
to the radiation problem than someone who only verbally recalls that converging-forces analog.
By encoding the perceptual information in the source analogy, the problem solver would form a
richer mental representation for the converging forces solution and be more likely to apply it to a
new problem. The studies discussed below primed the motor system during the encoding
process.
The earliest example of analogical problem solving research incorporating embodied
cognitive themes is discussed in Craig, Nersessian, & Catrambone’s (2002) book chapter, where
they detail experimental results they would later publish in Catrambone, Craig, & Nersessian
(2006). They supported that perceptual information encoded alongside the source analogy aided
in solving the radiation problem. Specifically, they found that participants who physically reenacted the source analogy by crashing blocks together at a central point were more likely to
provide the convergence solution for the radiation problem, compared to those who verbally
reenacted the source analogy, or those who sketched the source analogy. Craig and colleagues
(2002) argued that physically re-enacting the converging forces solution accentuated the
kinesthetic structure of the convergence solution (i.e., converging forces colliding at a central
location), which led problem solvers to be more likely to generate that solution in an analogous
problem.
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Other studies have tested embodied cognitive research questions by using the radiation
problem as a testbed. Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) discovered
that guiding problem solvers’ eye movements around a simple diagram influenced solution
success rates. Specifically, when participants’ eyes were guided in a pattern spatially congruent
with a problem’s solution (e.g., repeated in-and-out eye movements crossing a central point of
the diagram), they were more likely to solve the radiation problem. The main explanation for
these results is that guiding problem solvers’ eye movements serves to foster a perceptual
simulation of the solution. In essence, the guided eye movements helped problem solvers to
more easily imagine the solution of multiple beams of x-rays converging at a central point.
Similar research was inspired by these findings and tested embodied cognitive effects in
an analogical problem solving paradigm with gesture (Cooperrider & Goldin-Meadow, 2014;
Hostetter, Wieth, Foster, Moreno, & Washingon, 2016; Trowbridge, 2016). Their studies
investigated whether gesturing a source solution (e.g., having hands coming together from
opposite directions onto a central target) could aid in solving an analogous target problem, with
the assumption that gesturing about a source story would foster a more comprehensive mental
representation that could be more readily applied to a target problem. Unfortunately, none of
these studies were able to directly support that gesture conferred any benefit to later problem
solving or analogical transfer.
Other Considerations: Attention and Creativity
Altogether, the previously mentioned studies provide mixed evidence that embodying the
solution aids in problem solving, but there is an alternative explanation that coincides with Grant
and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) eye movement studies. Thomas and
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Lleras (2009) specifically were able to support that attention shifts (a component of the guided
eye movements) were the main source of improvement in problem solving rates. If the
embodied improvement is attentional in nature, it is worth considering correlates of attention that
may relate to problem solving. In particular, creativity has been considered to be a predictor for
success in solving insight problems (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Dow & Mayer, 2004), and some
research suggests that creativity is related to one’s “breadth of attention” (Eysenck, 1995; Kasof,
1997; Mendelsohn, 1976; Schooler & Melcher, 1995). Further, other studies support that
creativity can be primed by subjecting problem solvers to visual tasks that elicit broad visual
attention (Friedman, Fishbach, Foerster, & Werth, 2003; Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky,
Kounios, & Beeman, 2012).
Conceptually, these studies may seem only somewhat relevant to the present work, but
they are important to consider as the eye movement manipulations in Grant and Spivey (2003)
and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) are undoubtedly visual attention tasks. Across these three
studies, the experimental manipulations had problem solvers move their eyes in broad and
narrow patterns, and these manipulations led to differences in problem solving success rates.
Although Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) volunteered a
perceptual simulation explanation, it is possible that the effects they saw were due to a potential
link between breadth of attention and creativity, which influenced problem solvers’ ability to
solve Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem. The present study attempts to disentangle these
competing accounts by modifying Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) paradigm to assess whether
their manipulation actually fostered a perceptual simulation of Duncker’s (1945) radiation
problem, or whether it resulted in a boost of creativity that improved problem solving success.
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Other Considerations: Individual Differences in Spatial Ability
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that several studies have examined individual differences
with analogical problem solving that may also be relevant for the initial stage of problem
solving. Some have focused on cognitive ability (e.g., Antonietti & Gioletta, 1995; Corkill &
Fager, 1995; Kubricht, Lu, & Holyoak, 2017) as a predictor for success in analogical problem
solving. Antonietti & Gioletta (1995) and Kubricht et al. (2017) both used Raven’s Progressive
Matrices (e.g., Raven, 2000) as their measure of cognitive ability, but were unable to find a
direct relationship between cognitive ability and success in analogical problem solving. One of
the main research goals in Kubricht et al. (2017) was to assess the usefulness of animated
diagrams as an analogue for problem solving. They found an indirect relationship; such that
cognitive ability was predictive of analogical problem solving success only when animated
diagrams were not presented. Corkill and Fager (1995) did find a relationship between both
creativity and verbal ability independently predicting analogical problem solving success, and
Antonietti and Gioletta (1995) found males and biomedical students to be more successful
analogical problem solvers than females and non-biomedical students, respectively. Although
there are only a few studies that found individual differences in analogical problem solving
ability, they still must be assessed to better understand the nature of the emergent differences in
problem solving success, both initially and through analogy.
That being said, there is a critical individual difference measure worth considering:
spatial visualization ability. In the Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007;
2009) studies, solving Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem is the main focus. This same problem
is utilized in essentially all of the analogical problem solving studies (e.g., Antonietti & Gioletta,
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1995; Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Catrambone, Craig, & Nerssessian, 2006; Craig, Nerssessian,
& Catrambone, 2002; Corkill & Fager, 1995; Gick, 1985; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Gick &
Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Kubricht, Lu, & Holyoak, 2017; Pedone, Hummel, &
Holyoak, 2001), and it is noted for the spatial structure of its convergence solution (multiple
beams focusing inward on a central location). In these studies, participants receive analogies in
various forms (e.g., diagrams, animations, narratives) that match the radiation problem’s spatial
structure, with the assumption that they aid in participants’ formation of a convergence solution
schema to be applied when solving the radiation problem. The intricacies of these studies are
discussed in more detail later, but it is worth recognizing that spatial ability has not been
analyzed with respect to Duncker’s radiation problem or in the context of analogical problem
solving.
The studies using Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Antonietti & Gioletta, 1995; Kubricht et
al., 2017) perhaps proximally assessed spatial ability (as there are spatial components to the
RPM task), but a purer measure of spatial ability may be more directly relevant to the spatial
nature of solving Duncker’s radiation problem and its analogues. Specifically, a spatial
visualization measure of spatial ability may be particularly applicable, due to its role in mental
animation (Hegarty & Sims, 1994). Hegarty and Kozhevnikov (1999), Kozhevnikov, Hegarty,
and Mayer (2002), and Lohman (1996) argued that people with higher spatial ability are more
likely to construct schematic or structured representations of problems they try to solve, which
further supports the need to assess spatial ability when assessing initial problem solving and
analogical problem solving. It is worth noting that mental imagery (of which spatial ability is a
subset; Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988; Kosslyn, 1990; Logie, 1995) is considered
to be a primary mechanism for mental simulation (Barsalou, 2008; Mandler & Cánovas, 2014),
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and if perceptual simulation is key to solving the radiation problem, it follows that spatial ability
may be a relevant factor that predicts problem solving success.
Other Considerations: Incubation Effect
The present study includes methodological features (by nature of replicating previous
research) that may give rise to an incubation effect. The present work modeled previous studies
(e.g., Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009) where participants were presented with the radiation
problem, provided a seemingly irrelevant visual attention task, and then attempted to solve it
again. This feature matches Smith and Blankenship’s (1991) description of an incubation effect
– an effect that arises when one is faced with a problem and cannot initially solve it, and after
time away from the problem, the problem solver returns and is more successful in solving it.
Segal (2004) claimed that insight problems are particularly susceptible to an incubation effect,
due to the initial impasses they cause upon initial attempts. Segal (2004) further suggested that a
period of incubation facilitates a mental restructuring of the problem representation and
facilitates the problem solver’s success by seeing the problem from a new perspective. To
properly examine success rates on the present study’s insight problem solving tasks, incubation
effects must be assessed to verify they are independent of any potential embodied effects.
Although some have noted that studies on the incubation effect have returned mixed
results (e.g., Segal, 2004), a meta-analysis of the incubation effect indicated that incubation
effects tend to be small but generally significant (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). In particular, Sio and
Ormerod noted that incubation effects tend to be larger for tasks requiring divergent thinking (a
construct related to creativity; e.g., Piffer, 2012), and for tasks that require low cognitive effort.
The attention-priming paradigms in Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007;
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2009) included conditions that functioned essentially as incubation conditions of minimal
cognitive effort, but they had no condition without an incubation. The present study used a
modified version of the paradigm used in Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009), including a condition
where no incubation takes place to account for this effect. This permits the comparison of any
potential embodied or attentional priming effects against smaller incubation effects.
The Present Study
The previous paragraphs have briefly introduced studies that have examined ways to
increase the likelihood of solving Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem. Traditionally, it has been
used in analogical problem solving paradigms (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980), where Duncker’s
radiation problem and analogous problems are presented to understand analogical transfer. At
the time of this writing, there have been no investigations into whether guided eye movements or
attention priming techniques influence analogical transfer in later problem solving. Do these
manipulations only result in fleeting improvements in problem solving, or are there latent
benefits for solving subsequent problems through analogy? According to those supporting
embodied cognitive effects on problem solving, attention guidance congruent with the problem
solution should facilitate higher quality encoding that leads to the generation of more robust
mental representations that lead to better problem solving success (perceptual simulation
hypothesis). The literature on visual attention and creative thinking would support that the same
attention guidance would facilitate a boost in creative thinking that leads to better problem
solving success (attentional priming hypothesis). It is entirely possible that any benefits seen
from eye movement guidance on problem solving could be mediated by creativity, and this
possibility is tested in Study 2. Although these accounts both represent embodied cognitive
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effects, the former is more specific to the radiation problem, whereas the latter is more
generalizable to a broader range of problems. Lastly, are these effects greater in magnitude than
an underlying incubation effect? It is possible that previous studies’ support for embodied
attentional guidance could be more simply explained incubation (incubation hypothesis).
Furthermore, what is the role of spatial ability in solving spatially structured problems?
Spatial ability should aid in the construction of spatially structured mental representations during
problem solving, which are necessary to solving the radiation problem. Spatial ability also
should be associated with a greater ability to mentally simulate the problem, which should result
in increased problem solving rates. Lastly, no research has examined how spatial ability relates
to analogical problem solving. If spatial ability aids in the generation of spatially structured
mental representations, these mental representations should be easier to transfer to new problems
with similar structure. The present study aims to combine the attention priming paradigms from
previous work with analogical problem solving paradigms to address these research questions.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Based on Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies,
guiding eye movements in a broad pattern mirroring the spatial structure of the convergence
solution fosters a perceptual simulation of the radiation problem, leading to increased problem
solving success. Relating this more broadly to problem solving, this should aid mental
representation construction during the encoding phase, adding perceptual information that can
aid in solving the problem. With consideration to the idea that visual attention and creativity are
linked (e.g., Friedman et al., 2003; Kasof, 1997; Wegbreit et al, 2012), there is a possibility that
the guided eye movements of Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009)
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primed creative thinking. Creative thinking is considered to be integral in solving problems like
Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem (Dow & Mayer, 2004; Gick & Holyoak, 1980), thus, it is
possible that guiding eye movements primes creative thinking that leads to greater problem
solving success. These effects could be additive, such that there is a basic improvement in
problem solving success due to creativity priming, and an additional improvement in problem
solving success due to fostering a perceptual simulation. It is also possible that these effects are
one and the same; such that there is only an improvement in problem solving due to creativity
priming, which is incidentally induced with guided eye movements. The major focus of the
present study is to address the research question of whether these effects are distinguishable from
one another, yielding two competing embodied cognitive hypotheses:
1) Perceptual simulation hypothesis: guided eye movements foster a perceptual simulation
that improves problem solving success rates, above and beyond any effects due to an
attentional priming effect of creativity, and beyond any benefits that can be attributed to
incubation.
2) Attentional priming hypothesis: guided eye movements only prime creativity that
improves problem solving success rates.
a. Flexibility hypothesis: guided eye movements prime divergent thinking which
results in a greater quantity of solutions generated, improving the likelihood of
solving the problem.
Both of these effects can be considered embodied in nature (to the extent that eye
movements influence thought), but Hypothesis 1 is a specific hypothesis that may only be
applicable to Duncker’s radiation problem and its analogs. Hypothesis 2 has much broader
applicability and is more parsimonious. It is also possible that neither of these effects could
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occur, which could suggest that the embodied effects from previous studies (Grant and Spivey,
2003; Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009) may not be as strong as they have been argued to be.
Because of the relationship between spatial visualization ability and problem solving
processes (e.g., Hegarty & Kozhevnikov, 1999; Kozhevnikov et al., 2002), and the radiation
problem’s spatial emphasis, an additional goal of the present work is to examine how spatial
ability is related to problem solving success for the radiation problem and its analogs.
Furthermore, because of spatial ability’s association with creative thinking (e.g., Shepard, 1978)
and its association with mental simulation (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Mandler & Cánovas, 2014),
spatial ability may share variance with any embodied effects in predicting problem solving
success. This research question yields the following hypothesis with two sub-hypotheses (a la
Mayer & Sims, 1994):
3) Spatial ability hypothesis: due to the spatial nature of Duncker’s radiation problem,
problem solvers who achieve higher scores on a measure of spatial visualization ability
should be more likely to solve the radiation problem and its analogs.
a. Spatial ability as enhancer hypothesis: the aforementioned performance benefits
of higher spatial visualization ability will be independent of any other effects
(e.g., embodied/attentional priming; incubation), such that spatial ability serves as
a direct covariate of problem solving success.
b. Spatial ability as compensator hypothesis: the aforementioned performance
benefits of higher spatial ability will be less pronounced in conditions where an
embodied/attentional priming methodological aspect is present. Specifically, the
relationship between spatial visualization ability and problem solving success will
be stronger in conditions without guided eye movements. That is, higher spatial
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ability will compensate for a lack of methodological aid (i.e., guided eye
movements) in predicting problem solving success.
These hypotheses were tested at the initial problem solving stage and later problem
solving of analogical problems. It should be noted that, due to the presence of hints throughout
the analogical problem solving process, the predictive strength of spatial ability may diminish for
the second and third problems. In these cases, performance may be better predicted by an
individual’s ability to make use of hints, rather than spatial ability. Hints were provided in Study
2, but Study 3 did not provide hints to better observe the effects of spontaneous transfer that may
be explained by spatial ability.
Although not a major focus of the present study, the proposed methodology may result in
problem solving success differences due to incubation. Previous research indicates that simple
cognitive tasks can foster an “incubation effect,” such that an initial exposure to a problem that
results in an impasse is overcome by removing oneself from the problem, and then re-attempting
that problem a few moments later (Segal, 2004; Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Smith & Blankenship,
1991). In order to more accurately assess the aforementioned hypotheses, it is prudent to ensure
that any benefits that may be due to perceptual simulation are not confounded with incubation.
4) Incubation hypothesis: problem solvers who view the problem prior to receiving a guided
eye movements (or fixed eye movements) intervention will show better problem solving
success than those who do not view the problem before receiving such an intervention.
All four of these hypotheses have the potential to conflict with one another, or potentially
combine with one another. The way these hypotheses were tested is discussed in chapter three
and four.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The present studies aim to better understand the nature of an embodied aid to problem
solving and seek to extend its investigation into the paradigm of analogical problem solving.
This chapter reviews the literature on problem solving before discussing the research on
analogical problem solving. In its review of the analogical problem solving literature, this
chapter also highlights a variety of different ways of aiding analogical transfer. Over the course
of the past 35 years, researchers have been interested in seeing what factors can improve
attempts to solve Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem. A modern translation of this problem,
used in Gick & Holyoak’s (1980; 1983) research, reads as follows:
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his stomach.
It is impossible to operate on the patient’ but unless the tumor is destroyed, the patient will die.
There is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy the tumor. If the rays are directed at the tumor
at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity, the
healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower
intensities the rays are harmless to the healthy tissue, but they will not affect the tumor either.
What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time
avoid destroying the healthy tissue?
One possible solution to this problem is to use multiple separate rays of weaker intensity
that converge on the tumor. The weaker intensity rays are weak enough that they do not destroy
surrounding healthy tissue, but when they reach the tumor, their intensities are collectively
strong enough to destroy the tumor. This solution has been coined the “convergence solution”
(due to the theme of converging forces on a central point; Gick & Holyoak, 1983) and many
studies have focused on ways to increase the likelihood that participants respond to the radiation
problem with this solution. A variety of research over the past 15 years in this area has begun to
examine embodied effects of problem solving. Specifically, they test the idea that by doing
something physical (e.g., moving blocks, gesturing, moving eyes) that is relevant to the problem
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(i.e., matching the solution spatially or perceptually) one can implicitly improve solution rates
for the radiation problem.
Some recent work by Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009)
identified a low-level implicit means of accomplishing this by guiding participants’ eye
movements in ways congruent with the convergence solution. The effect they found in their
studies is the primary inspiration for the present work. Prior to these studies, research on this
topic has identified that narrative analogies, diagrams, simple animations, and physical
interactions could increase the likelihood of participants generating the convergence solution.
The Grant and Spivey and Thomas and Lleras studies discussed an embodied cognitive
explanation for their results, such that eye movements that embodied the convergence solution
(i.e., repeated converging in-and-out eye movements crossing a diagram of the tumor problem)
fostered a perceptual simulation of the radiation problem, which increased problem solvers’
propensity to arrive at the convergence solution. The ending sections of this chapter review
these studies in detail and the theoretical explanation behind their results.
The proceeding sections review the pertinent theoretical perspectives and studies leading
up to the present work. First, I provide a brief review of literature on problem solving, and then
discuss a specific type of problem solving – analogical problem solving, which includes a review
of key literature on analogical reasoning ability. After reviewing the problem solving and
analogical problem solving literature, I review three key studies that are directly relevant to the
present research. Following that discussion, I review studies that pose an alternate explanation
for embodied effects on problem solving – attentional priming of creativity. Finally, I discuss
individual differences relevant for analogical problem solving and spatial thinking.
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Problem Solving
Problem solving is one of the most complex expressions of human intelligence that
occurs in everyday life (Chi & Glaser, 1985; Holyoak, 1995). Chi and Glaser (1985) described
problem solving as a process that requires an initial encoding phase, where a problem solver
“takes in” information about the problem at hand and attempts to form a mental model of that
problem. Problem solvers construct these mental models by interweaving problem features with
mental structures existing in their long-term memory, which may include knowledge relevant to
the problem at hand, similar problems that may have been attempted previously, or other
experiences that may emerge during mental model construction. How well a problem is encoded
into a mental representation determines the steps a problem solver will take toward finding the
solution. They argue that encoding is the most critical step of problem solving, and a key
determinant of problem solving success because encoding determines the quality of the mental
representation of the problem (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi & Glaser,
1985).
How does one determine whether a situation is a problem that needs to be solved?
Duncker (1945) defined problems as arising when one desires a goal but is unsure of how to
reach it. Holyoak (1995) echoed this idea, claiming that problems emerge when one aims to
reach a goal, but the means of reaching this goal are unclear, or not obvious. Chi and Glaser
(1985) simply described a problem as a situation in which one must find a way of reaching a
goal. Duncker further explained that when simple actions were insufficient for reaching this goal
state, thinking was required before the goal could be reached. This process of thinking to bridge
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the gap between the initial state and the goal state of a problem can be considered the act of
problem solving.
Newell and Simon (1972; as cited by Holyoak, 1995) portrayed the problem solving
process with the use of a spatial metaphors. They claimed problem solvers begin at a starting
point – the ‘initial state’ – and must journey through a multitude of pathways to attain the ‘goal
state’. Many of these pathways lead the problem solver to a dead end, but the goal state can only
be reached by a few pathways – sometimes only one pathway. The pathways can be navigated
through the use of ‘operators,’ which facilitate the journey from ‘initial state’ into the ‘goal
state.’ These pathways can vary in complexity because of problem features that induce ‘path
constraints,’ or conditions under which the problem must be solved. They described that these
features, and the possible paths that may be taken toward reaching the goal state of the problem,
were located within a ‘problem space.’ According to Holyoak (1995), the process of searching
through this problem space for a way to reach the goal state is a metaphorical characterization of
problem solving.
Chi and Glaser (1985) also described these components of problems, using similar
terminology to Newell and Simon (1972) – claiming that all problems have an ‘initial state’ and
a ‘goal’. Reaching the goal must be accomplished through ‘operations’, but there are generally
‘constraints’ that dictate how the operations are to be used. Chi and Glaser also described three
types of problems that humans typically face: puzzles, classroom problems, and real-world
problems. They defined puzzles as being problems that require little background knowledge to
solve, tend to be simple and rule-based, but can still be very difficult. An example of a
classroom problem would be a physics problem, whereas an example of a real-world problem
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would be navigating a city. Unlike puzzles, classroom problems and real-world problems tend to
require background knowledge.
Chi and Glaser (1985) further classified problems as being well-defined or ill-defined.
They described that well-defined problems are identified by how easily a solution can be
identified as correct, and thus, how easily the problem can be recognized as having been solved.
Ill-defined problems, on the other hand, involve problems where one or more aspects of the
problem are not clearly specified. Of relevance to the radiation problem, Chi and Glaser
describe one feature of ill-defined problems as a general ambiguity with regard to how the
problem is to be solved. In the radiation problem, the initial state, goal state, and operations are
well-defined, but the means of using the operations to reach the goal state are unclear (i.e., it is
unclear precisely how the rays should be used to destroy the tumor). Conversely, in a welldefined problem like the Tower of Hanoi (e.g., Lucas, 1882), the operations are well-defined
(moving discs from one peg to another), and the means of reaching the goal state are also welldefined (moving discs from one peg to another in a specific order), the problem solver only
needs to discover the specific order in which the discs must be moved. Notably, ill-defined
problems are often solved when “looking at the problem in a new light,” (Holyoak, 1995, p. 285)
or by restructuring a mental representation of the problem (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Holyoak,
1995; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001), which
results in the solution “popping out” to the problem solver.
Incidentally, it is worth discussing that Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem is often
defined as an insight problem (e.g., Dow & Mayer, 2004; Grant & Spivey, 2003; Knoblich,
Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009; Gick & Holyoak, 1980),
which is an ill-defined problem where the solution is not immediately apparent to the problem
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solver; rather, it “pops-out” to the problem solver in a moment of insight (Novick & Sherman,
2003). Schooler and Melcher (1995) argued that insight problems are particularly likely to
create feelings of impasse in problem solvers (compared to well-defined, analytical problems),
and Grant and Spivey (2003) and Knoblich and colleagues (2001) identified that one key way of
overcoming these impasses is by restructuring one’s mental representation of the problem
(incidentally, insight is another term for this process; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), or by retrieving
a different mental representation that is more suited to solving the problem. Ormerod,
MacGregor, and Chronicle (2002) identified that insight problems often lead problem solvers
astray during their first attempts at problem solving. Similarly, Dow and Mayer (2004) argued
that insight problems prime inappropriate solution representations that lead the problem solver
astray, and that creative thinking was required to overcome these inappropriate representations
and approach a solution. Thomas and Lleras (2007) cited Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) and
Weisberg and Alba (1981) to further specify that insight problems are particularly difficult, and a
problem solver cannot use metacognitive strategies (e.g., monitoring their problem solving
performance; Davidson & Sternberg, 1998) to help solve the problem. Instead, Thomas and
Lleras argued that the impasse must be overcome before insight problems can be solved. In
essence, an insight problem shares the characteristics of ill-defined problems, with the addition
of an ‘insight’ component (i.e., sudden realization of the solution after other attempts have failed;
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Novick & Sherman, 2003).
Duncker’s radiation problem can be understood within Newell and Simon’s (1972)
spatial metaphor and Chi and Glaser’s (1985) characterization of problem solving. The initial
state is presented such that the problem solver is a surgeon and must destroy an inoperable tumor
inside a patient’s stomach. The operators are the variable-intensity rays that the surgeon can use
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to destroy the tumor. The path constraints are that the tumor cannot be operated on (thus, the
rays must be used), and the tumor can only be destroyed with a strong intensity of rays.
Additionally, at this strength, the rays will destroy surrounding healthy tissue. If weaker rays are
used, the healthy tissue will not be affected, but neither will the tumor. The goal state is where
the tumor is destroyed without destroying healthy tissue. When faced with this information,
problem solvers must encode all of this information, and begin to generate a mental
representation of the problem. Once participants generate a mental representation of the
problem, they proceed to attempt solving it, by searching the problem space and testing different
pathways. The aforementioned descriptions of ill-defined and insight problems would support
that problem solvers will not initially see the pathway to the goal state. In fact, Duncker (1945)
identified that many problem solvers do not immediately reach the goal state, but those who
eventually reached the goal state generally searched several different pathways before producing
a solution.
In Duncker’s (1945) study of the radiation problem, he employed think-aloud protocols
in an effort to understand the problem solving process. While attempting to solve the radiation
problem, participants described their thoughts by speaking them to the researcher. Duncker
discovered that participants essentially generated propositions, which they then evaluated in
reference the problem constraints, and generated another proposition if that evaluation revealed
that the proposition did not reach the goal state. Duncker identified that participants tended to
provide propositions in a variety of categories. One of these categories involved various ways to
avoid the rays contacting the healthy tissue, and going straight to the tumor (for example, by
sending rays through the esophagus into the stomach; by removing healthy tissue to irradiate the
tumor, or by moving the tumor outside of the stomach tissue). These solutions, however,

23

violated the problem constraint that operating on the patient was impossible. The next category
he identified concerned immunizing the healthy tissue or protecting it somehow from the rays
(for example, through a chemical application that altered the state of the healthy tissue).
However, chemical applications were not available as operators for the problem. The final
category he observed involved reducing the intensity of the rays on their way to the tumor.
Propositions in this category were acceptable within the problem constraints and were a correct
solution to the problem if they incorporated multiple weak rays that centered on the tumor.
Duncker described his participants’ think aloud protocols such that they shifted repeatedly
between these three categories of solution propositions until the goal state was reached.
Considering Newell and Simon’s (1972) spatial metaphor, this process of shifting between
propositions reflects the process of searching the problem solving space.
Metacognitive Aspects of Problem Solving
In addition to the aforementioned depictions of the problem solving process, there are
also metacognitive aspects worth noting that influence an individual’s problem solving
performance. To describe how metacognition influences the problem solving process, Davidson
and Sternberg (1998) characterized problem solving in terms similar to Chi and Glaser (1985),
Holyoak (1995), and Newell and Simon (1972). They described problem solving in terms of
givens, goals, and obstacles, which could be mapped onto the operators, goal state, and path
constraints, respectively. Davidson and Sternberg also noted that the problem solving process
contains an initial encoding phase, during which a problem solver takes in the features of the
problem and constructs a mental representation of the problem. Over the course of searching for
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the solution, the problem solver may undergo representational change, where they change their
mental representation to view the problem from a different perspective.
Although these processes may be natural for most problem solvers, Davidson and
Sternberg (1998) note that the regulation of these processes (i.e., metacognitive aspect of
problem solving) is not always automatic. Throughout the problem solving process, there are
potential metacognitive aspects to consider that can benefit problem solving. When first faced
with a problem, the problem solver may be aware of a need to effectively encode a problem, and
further, they may monitor their encoding to judge whether or not it is satisfactory. When
constructing mental representations, Davidson and Sternberg cited Newell & Simon’s (1972)
spatial metaphor to argue that mentally representing a problem consists of four steps. Problem
solvers mentally represent the initial state, then the goal state. Next, they test the problem
operators on the initial state to see how to transform the initial state into the goal state. The final
step involves incorporating the path constraints into the mental representation before finding the
solution. Metacognitive influences at this stage may involve monitoring and evaluating mental
model construction, and awareness of the need for representational change when appropriate. In
moving toward the goal state, problem solvers often generate plans to attain the goal state.
Problem solvers employing metacognitive strategies may, for example, monitor these plans as
they attempt to reach the goal state and modify them where appropriate.
The aforementioned metacognitive aspects of problem solving relate to the encoding and
solution-searching components of problem solving. But Davidson and Sternberg also described
several aspects that shape how these processes are carried out. They argued that problems tend
to be domain-specific, and that a problem solver’s domain knowledge strongly influences the
quality of their mental representations of the problem. Specifically, they cite Chi, Feltovich, and
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Glaser (1981) to clarify that experts tend to represent problems in a more abstract manner,
whereas novices focus on concrete and potentially irrelevant details. Davidson and Sternberg
noted that a lack of appropriate knowledge can often lead to an impasse, where a problem solver
is completely unable to generate a solution.
When selecting strategies, good problem solvers (as well as those of greater intellectual
ability; Sternberg, 1985) are often better able to notice the relevance of previously learned
strategies and transfer them to novel problems. Poor problem solvers are less likely to transfer
previously learned strategies, or to notice their relevance in novel problems. Strategy use during
problem solving can sometimes result in stereotypy, which is where a problem solver gets
“stuck” using a strategy that does not work. A metacognitive awareness of when one has
reached stereotypy can lead to problem solvers freeing themselves from fixating on a failing
strategy, but Davidson and Sternberg note that problem solvers with poor metacognition often
fail to break such a fixation. In general, metacognition can influence how a problem solver
attempts to solve a problem, but Davidson and Sternberg argue that a general metacognitive
ability to monitor and evaluate one’s knowledge about the problem, one’s progress toward
reaching the solution, and one’s mental representations, strongly predicts success in problem
solving.
Representing the Problem
Although Chi and Glaser (1985) use the terms “representation” and “mental model”
relatively interchangeably, another term relevant to the mental representation of knowledge is
“schema” (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Lakoff and Johnson’s schema theory asserts that
conceptual and perceptual knowledge about the world is organized into units called “schemata.”
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Schemata are constructed over time, through experience, and inform an individual how to
process present information. Norman (1986) describes schemas as being flexible structures that
constantly change with experience, allow for generalizations from past experiences, and shape
one’s interpretations of immediate circumstances. For the purposes of the present work (and to
mitigate terminological confusion with the most closely relevant research), I use the term
“schema” to describe mental representations of problems that participants construct during
problem solving.
Research in the expertise literature has identified that problem schemas can vary as a
function of individual differences. Chi et al. (1981) discovered that physics experts approached
different physics problems in a distinctly different way from physics novices and argued that
experts are more likely than novices to have developed schemas for the underlying problem
structures of different types of physics problems. They argued that the knowledge structures of
experts and novices are characteristically different – showing that experts were better able to
categorize physics problems by their underlying structure, whereas novices tended to categorize
physics problems by their surface features (and also tended to be less successful at solving
problems). Though expertise appears to affect how problem solvers represent their knowledge,
important work has examined how to increase the rate at which people generate structural
schemas for problems. Considering Chi and Glaser’s (1985) work, these studies have essentially
examined either ways to influence the encoding phase of problem solving, or ways to influence
the retrieval of prior knowledge, by providing analogical problems. Several characteristics of
analogical reasoning have been discovered through problem solving paradigms where
participants are provided some variation of a problem and its solution, then tasked with solving a
novel problem containing the same structural solution as the previous problem. Ideally,
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analogical transfer occurs, and the problem solver maps the analogy to the problem at hand and
forms a solution. However, this is not always the case. The key research questions addressed by
previous work involve understanding the ways in which this process, analogical transfer, can be
facilitated, induced, or enhanced to improve solution rates for novel problems. Prior to
discussing these studies, it is imperative to review theoretical work on analogical reasoning.
Analogical Reasoning
In general, analogical reasoning is claimed to be a multi-step process (Gentner, 1983;
Sternberg, 1977) that is closely linked with creative thinking (Dow & Mayer, 2004; Gentner,
Brem, Ferguson, Wolff, Markman, & Forbus, 1997). Craig, Nersessian, and Catrambone (2002)
characterize it as a three step process involving mental representations – retrieval, alignment, and
mapping. When faced with a novel problem, a problem solver undergoes a retrieval process,
where multiple source mental representations are selected that are systematically relevant to the
target problem. Next, these source representations are aligned with the target problem, such that
their features are judged as to their relevance to the target problem. Lastly, features of the source
representations are mapped onto the matching features of the target problem. During mapping,
the existing source mental representation’s structure is applied to the actively forming mental
representation of the target problem. Applying the structure of a source representation to a target
problem results in successful analogical transfer. It can be helpful to think of this process with a
visual analogy. Below, an illustration of the process as described by Craig et al. (2002) is
provided.
In the images below (Figures 1-4), assume each symbol represents an element of a mental
representation. Each line connecting these elements represent structural relations between these
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elements. Consider the following target problem: “How are the ‘T’ elements structurally
related?”

Figure 1. Analogical target problem example depiction.
Assume the solution for this problem is a structural relationship such that each of the
elements are connected in the shape of a triangle with a point at its top. How would a problem
solver carry out the analogical problem solving process? First, several relevant source mental
representations are retrieved, which are assumed to contain underlying structure.

Figure 2. Depiction of retrieval process.
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Next, source representations are then aligned to the target problem based on similar
features.

Figure 3. Depiction of alignment process.
In this example, the problem solver aligns source representations to the target problem on
the basis that they also contain three elements.
Finally, in the mapping phase, the problem solver imposes the structural relationships of
the aligned representations onto the target problem. When the underlying structure of a source
representation is successfully mapped onto the target problem, the problem solver has discovered
a solution to the target problem.
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Figure 4. Depiction of mapping process.
This illustrated example is based on Gentner’s (1983) structure mapping theory of
analogy which, generally speaking, involves the retrieval of source representations that must be
aligned to a target problem, and then mapped to generate a solution to the analogy. Sternberg
(1977) offers a similar theoretical perspective describing similar processes but is cited more
frequently in the analogical problem solving literature. In Sternberg’s (1977) theory, solving an
analogy requires an initial encoding phase, where the features of an analogy are encoded (i.e., the
source and target analogies). Next, the problem solver must infer the relationship between the
encoded features of the source analogy and the target analogy. Then, the problem solver maps
the relationship between the source analogy’s features and its solution. This mapped relationship
is then applied to the target problem’s features, and a solution to the target problem can be
generated. These theories are similar to one another, but their differences can be more easily
understood using a simple semidegenerate analogy metaphor (i.e., A1:B1::A2:B2; see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Analogical problem solving steps for a semidegenerate analogy, according to Gentner
and Sternberg.
Note: The steps for “Encode” and “Respond” were added to Gentner’s (1983) theory.
The outline provided in Figure 5 illustrates minor differences in Gentner and Sternberg’s
theories, but ultimately, each theory leads to a similar result through a similar process (e.g.,
“map” in Gentner vs. “apply” in Sternberg). However, Gentner’s structure mapping theory
involves the retrieval of source representations, one of which may be the A1:B1 relationship. The
features of the source representations are aligned to the target problem, at which point source
representations that do not fit with the target problem features are discarded. Any remaining
source representations are then mapped to the target problem. During the mapping process, if a
source representation is successfully mapped to the target problem (e.g., mapping features and
solutions), then a solution to the target problem can be generated.
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Considering Sternberg’s theory, the analogical problem solving process begins with
encoding the features of the analogical relationship altogether. Next, the relationship between
the features of the source problem and the features of the target problem are inferred. Then, the
relationship between the source problem features and its solution is mapped. Finally, the
mapped relationship is applied to the target problem, and the feasibility of this solution is
evaluated. If the solution is deemed feasible, then the problem solver responds with their
proposed solution.
Taken together, these theories both offer a similar account of how analogical thinking is
used to solve problems. Gentner’s theory is perhaps better suited to solving novel problems,
where source representations may not be readily available, and must be retrieved from memory.
For these novel problems, retrieved source representations are essentially tested within the frame
of the target problem. On the other hand, Sternberg’s theory is probably better suited more
directly to solving problems by analogy, where a source problem and its solution is available to
guide the search for a target problem’s solution. With consideration to analogical problem
solving paradigms (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980), the concept of spontaneously transferring an
analogy (i.e., solving a novel problem using a recently viewed analogy) can be better accounted
for by the processes in Gentner’s theory, whereas the concept of cuing analogical transfer or
“mapping” the analogy (after hint provision, as per Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983) can be better
accounted for by the processes in Sternberg’s theory. It is critical to consider both of these
theories, as they offer reasonable explanations for the component processes that underlie the
pertinent outcomes (e.g., spontaneous transfer or cued transfer) in analogical problem solving
paradigms.
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It is worth mentioning that all the aforementioned steps are internal, mental actions,
except for the final step of responding. While these mental operations are carried out, it is
possible that the problem solver runs mental simulations of the source knowledge that they
retrieve and submit the attributes of the source knowledge to another simulation when attempting
to apply the solution to the target problem. As more studies have been conducted on analogical
problem solving, the idea that mental simulations are key to successful problem solving has
become more prevalent. The following section discusses key studies in analogical problem
solving review these studies, as well as other pertinent studies that support and fail to support
this idea.
Analogical Problem Solving
Analogical problem solving is considered to be a particular type of problem solving that
involves components of analogical reasoning, where a problem solver retrieves analogically
related source knowledge, and applies it toward solving a novel target problem. Extending from
the literature of problem solving, Gick and Holyoak (1980) pioneered the early research into
analogical problem solving. In their work, they studied whether or not narrative analogies could
improve the rate at which people solved a structurally similar target problem, Duncker’s (1945)
radiation problem. Solution rates for this problem are abysmal without hints. Duncker (1945)
identified 2 out of 42 participants were able to solve the radiation problem with hints, whereas
more modern studies (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983; Thomas & Lleras, 2007) have found
non-hinted solution rates of around 10%. However, Gick and Holyoak’s early work
demonstrated that narrative analogies could be used successfully to increase the solution rate of
Duncker’s radiation problem, and further work has demonstrated the utility of other kinds of
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analogies, such as diagrams (e.g., Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Gick & Holyoak, 1983, Pedone,
Hummel, & Holyoak, 2001) and manipulation of physical objects (e.g., Catrambone, Craig, &
Nerssessian, 2006; Craig, Nerssessian, & Catrambone, 2002). The key ability studied in this
body of research is analogical transfer – an individual’s ability to retrieve a source analogy and
apply its structure toward solving a novel problem.
In the real world, the process of analogical problem solving can be illustrated with a
student-teacher metaphor. Consider students in a classroom learning a general principle during a
lecture. As they encode the information from their lecturer, they construct a mental
representation of that principle. During this encoding process, the teacher may demonstrate an
application of this principle (e.g., by solving an example problem). When the students are tested
with a new problem using the same principle, ideally, they will retrieve the mental representation
they had constructed earlier (source) and identify corresponding features between the mental
representation and the target problem. Once those features are identified, they should transfer
the solution from the source representation and use it to solve the target problem. However, this
is not always the case. A problem solver may have access to one or more source representations,
but they are not always spontaneously retrieved when solving a new problem. Furthermore, if a
source representation is successfully retrieved, it may not always be applied to the target problem
correctly – particularly if the source was not correctly encoded or if the problem solver becomes
distracted by irrelevant features in source representations. In traditional analogical reasoning
problems (e.g., A1:B1::A2: ? ), the source (A1:B1) is always present, and thus retrieval is not
necessary. However, in analogical problem solving paradigms (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980), the
source (e.g., a narrative story) is typically unavailable during attempts to solve a target problem,
and solution rates for target problems tend to be rather low without hints to retrieve the narrative
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story. If the source is not retrieved while solving the target problem, the problem solver would
perceive the problem as being completely new. If the source is retrieved, however, the problem
solver would more readily notice the correspondences between source and target and have a
greater chance of solving the target problem. Gick and Holyoak’s (1980) work (and others that
followed it) elaborates this process and is discussed in more detail in later sections.
Between the theoretical work of Sternberg (1977) and Gentner (1983), solving simple
analogies is comprised of basic beginning and ending stages; encoding and responding,
respectively. In all cases, a problem solver must encode the features of a problem before
attempting to solve it. Similarly, once a problem solver has found a solution, a response is
required to indicate that a solution has been found. With the contemporary literature, Sternberg
(1977) identified that the in-between steps are generally disagreed upon. Gentner’s (1983) steps
are somewhat similar to Sternberg’s (1977) steps, with the only differences being which aspects
of the analogical relationship are linked together.
Task Analysis for Analogical Problem Solving Paradigm
In analogical problem solving studies, the usual experimental paradigm is based on Gick
and Holyoak’s (1980) experiments, where a problem solver is provided with a source story and
its solution, then tasked with solving a target problem in a different domain. This target problem
can be solved analogously to the source story and solving the target problem in such a way is
considered to be analogical transfer (i.e., the problem solver saw the analogical relationship
between source and target and transferred the source’s solution to the target). With consideration
to the literature on problem solving (e.g., Chi & Glaser, 1985; Davidson & Sternberg, 1998;
Holyoak, 1995; Newell & Simon, 1972), as well as the literature on analogical reasoning (e.g.,
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Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Gentner, 1983; Sternberg, 1977), one can construct a task analysis for
the processes a problem solver experiences during an analogical problem solving paradigm (e.g.,
Gick & Holyoak, 1980). The example below outlines this process with the radiation problem as
the source analogy and “Red Adair” as the target problem.
Receive Source Problem
1. Encode source problem features (radiation problem)
•

Encode initial state – Must remove a cancerous tumor from a patient

•

Encode operators – x-rays

•

Encode path constraints – cannot x-ray with full force or will destroy healthy tissue,
cannot operate on tumor

•

Encode goal state: “How do you kill the tumor without harming the patient’s healthy
tissue?”

2. Encode solution to problem
•

Solution is to send multiple weaker x-rays to converge at the central tumor. The weak
rays are weak enough to leave the healthy tissue unharmed, but their summative power at
the central location is enough to destroy the cancerous tumor.

Throughout this process, the problem solver has generated a mental representation of the
radiation problem.
Solve Target Problem
1. Encode target problem features (Red Adair)
•

Encode initial state – must put out a fire in an oil well

•

Encode operators – fire hoses
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•

Encode restrictions – cannot spray the fire all at once or it will spread to surrounding
parts of the oil well

•

Encode goal state – “How do you put out the oil fire without causing more damage to the
oil well site?”

2. Devise solution(s) to the problem
•

(Retrieval) search through long term memory for potentially relevant information
o One piece of relevant information may be the mental representation of the radiation
problem
o Other relevant information may be domain-specific knowledge, such as how grease
fires react to water (e.g., they spread easily)

•

According to Gentner’s (1983) steps, the problem solver will:
o Attempt to align the retrieved source representation features to the target problem
features. Assuming the radiation problem was retrieved, its features (e.g., initial state,
operators, path constraints, and goal state) will be aligned with the features of the
target problem. For example, the x-rays and fire hoses would be aligned with one
another.
o Next, assuming the alignment process was successful, the problem solver would map
the source representation (which consists of a solution) to the target problem. In this
mapping process, the solution from the source representation is tested on the target
problem. If this stage is successful, a solution to the target problem will be formed.
▪

Gick and Holyoak would consider this result spontaneous analogical
transfer, where a problem solver spontaneously transfers the previously

38

encoded analogical story and volunteers an analogous solution to the
target problem.
•

If spontaneous analogical transfer does not occur, the participant may be cued
to refer to the earlier encoded source problem. Upon retrieving that cued
source representation, a problem solver would then follow Sternberg’s (1977)
analogical reasoning steps, as they now have access to the source problem and
target problem for the analogical relationship.

o They must first infer the relations between the features of the source representation
and the solution of the source representation.
o Then, they must map the features of the source representation to the features of the
target problem. Mapped relationships may be…
▪

(mapped initial state) Must get rid of cancerous tumor > must put out fire

▪

(mapped operators) x-rays > hoses

▪

(mapped path constraints) do not damage healthy tissue > do not spread
fire

▪

(mapped goal state) “How do you kill the tumor…” > “How do you put
out the fire…?”

o If inference and mapping are successful, then the problem solver must apply the
solution understood from the source representation to the target problem.
o However, Sternberg (1977) notes that these processes are repeated in a selfterminating fashion, until success is reached (or the problem solver gives up)
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▪

If inference is initially unsuccessful, the problem solver may need to reevaluate the relationship between the features and solution of the source
knowledge.

▪

Similarly, if mapping is initially unsuccessful, the problem solver may need to
retry based on newly inferred relations.

o If application (and all subsequent steps) is successful, then the problem solver has
discovered the solution to the target problem and recognized the analogical
relationship between their source representation(s) and the target problem.
o If application is unsuccessful, the problem solver may need to retry based on a newly
mapped relationship between source knowledge features and target problem features.
It should be noted that Sternberg’s (1977) steps could also be considered relevant for
cases of spontaneous analogical transfer, but Gentner’s (1983) steps were selected for this task
analysis because Gick and Holyoak often argued that problem solvers were not always aware of
the analogical relationship until they were cued to try and apply the source problem to the target
problem. Thus, Gentner’s steps more closely account for spontaneous analogical transfer (the
analogical relationship is not laid out explicitly for problem solvers), but Sternberg’s (1977)
steps are better suited to cued analogical transfer (where the analogical relationship is more
clearly explicated for problem solvers).
The following sections review the literature using this paradigm to explore factors that
influence problem solving success through analogy.
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Improving Problem Solving Success Rates
Around World War II, Duncker (1945) introduced the world to the radiation problem.
Notably, this problem was incredibly difficult, and Duncker’s analysis of 42 problem solvers
found that only 2 of them were able to solve it successfully. This problem received very little
attention in the literature for several decades, save for a brief mention in Resnick and Glaser
(1976). After Gick and Holyoak (1980) reintroduced the radiation problem, the past few decades
have seen its extensive use in experiments examining problem solving and analogical problem
solving (incidentally, it maintained a baseline difficulty rate such that around 10% of problem
solvers get it right on their first try; Bassok, 2003). With respect to the studies on problem
solving, participants’ solution rates increase when their attention or eye movements are guided in
a spatial arrangement congruent with the convergence solution (Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras,
2007; Thomas & Lleras, 2009). With respect to analogical problem solving, solution rates
improve with the use of narrative analogies (e.g., analogous stories; Craig, Nersessian, &
Catrambone, 2002; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Holyoak & Koh, 1987), illustrated analogous
diagrams (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak; Kubricht, Lu, &
Holyoak, 2017; Pedone, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2001), and analogous physical interaction with
objects (Catrambone, Craig, & Nersessian, 2006). The explanations as to why these features aid
in problem solving is that they facilitate the formation of a “convergence schema” (an amodal
mental representation of the convergence solution), or, the schema represented by a convergence
of forces onto a single target. This schema is deemed critical to solving Duncker’s (1945)
radiation problem (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983). It is worth noting that several of these studies
refer to the convergence schema as a mental representation that can be induced (e.g., Gick &
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Holyoak, 1983), whereas others refer to the convergence schema as being something that is
simply activated during encoding and utilized during problem solving (e.g., Craig et al., 2002).
The following sections review these studies.
Early Work using Analogies to Improve Problem Solving Success
The seminal work on analogical problem solving (Gick & Holyoak, 1980) outlined a
paradigm that has been used in a multitude of studies, employing minor alterations to answer
different kinds of research questions. The basic paradigm is to provide a problem solver with a
source analogy of some kind – be it a story, illustration, or animation – and then present a target
problem in a new domain that shares many of the underlying features of the source analogy. By
varying features of the source analogies and examining solution success rates on the target
problem, one can infer the underlying cognitive processes that relate to analogy use and
analogical thinking. In a series of five experiments Gick and Holyoak (1980) employed
Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem as their target problem, which they note requires a degree of
creativity to solve. Duncker (1945) originally identified that the radiation problem was difficult
to solve without any hints, and Gick and Holyoak (1980) were interested in testing whether
analogical reasoning processes could be used to aid in solving the radiation problem; a process
they dubbed “analogical problem solving.”
In these experiments, Gick and Holyoak (1980) utilized a story about a military general
as the source analogy that they presented to problem solvers. The story concerns a military
general that must overthrow a dictator by sending his army to capture his fortress. The general
learns that the roads leading up to the dictator’s fortress are laden with weight-sensitive land
mines that would explode if he sent his full force down one road at once; however, the full force
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of his army would be required to overthrow the dictator. All variations of this story had this
same information (i.e., initial state, path constraints, goal state), but a variety of solutions were
provided in the first experiment. The solutions were (1) that the general sent his army down an
open (and mine-free) supply route, or (2) he dug a tunnel (beneath the mines) that led to the foot
of the fortress, or (3) he separated his army into smaller units that travelled across multiple roads
and met at the fortress. All of these solutions are feasible for the general problem, but only one
of these is suitable as an analogous solution to the radiation problem. The third solution mirrors
the convergence solution of the radiation problem – using multiple, weaker rays to attack the
tumor without risking damage to the healthy tissue. The other solutions were crafted based on
some of the typical responses Duncker (1945) identified – the open supply route and tunnel
solutions most closely mirror the solution propositions that involve sending the rays down an
alternative path (e.g., the esophagus or intestines), but these solutions violate the constraint that
the patient cannot be operated upon.
Because different problem solvers received different solutions in their source analogies,
Gick and Holyoak’s (1980) first experiment examined differences in solution rates for the
radiation problem based on the different solutions. In general, the solution participants received
in the general problem determined which solution they provided for the radiation problem. For
example, those who received the tunnel solution or the open supply route solution were more
likely to offer solutions that required operation (e.g., cutting open the stomach; or sending rays
through the intestines). A significantly greater amount of convergence solutions (using multiple
weaker rays focused on the tumor from different angles) were provided by those who received
the solution where the general divided his military along multiple roads. In the first experiment,
it should be noted that participants were prompted to refer to the general problem that they had
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previously received while attempting to solve the radiation problem. Within the frame of
analogical reasoning, the previously mentioned results accounted only for analogical mapping
(i.e., participants were prompted to try to use the general problem story they had read before),
however, 2 of 42 problem solvers spontaneously volunteered the convergence solution, using the
general problem as an analogy. These results largely suggested that the kind of information
available in a source analogy strongly influences way target problems are solved, and more
importantly, that analogical transfer from a recently learned source problem to a seemingly novel
target problem was possible.
Their second experiment further explored how alterations in source analogy content
influenced solution rates for the radiation problem. Like the first experiment, participants
received a variety of stories to use as source analogues (as well as there being a control group
who received no source analogy), but one of these stories had a completely different problem
statement. One of the general problem stories was changed to be about throwing a parade for the
dictator, rather than attacking his fortress. The result was the same (the dictator wanted a parade
with portions of the army marching down all roads leading to his fortress), but because the
problem was different, Gick and Holyoak (1980) were interested in assessing whether a source
analogy with some elements of dissimilarity would lead problem solvers to the convergence
solution on the radiation problem. Results indicated that both groups volunteered the
convergence solution more frequently than a control group, and there were no differences
between people who received the general story (with the separated army solution) and people
who received the parade story. These results suggested that analogies with dissimilar elements
could still foster the use of the convergence solution for solving a later problem, providing that
the underlying structure of the solutions is analogous to the target problem.
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In both experiments, the provided solutions held a strong influence on later solution
generation; however, Gick and Holyoak (1980) noticed that that this influence was not absolute.
Often, participants volunteered completely different solutions on their own. In fact, a few who
did not receive the general’s split army solution in their source story spontaneously volunteered
the convergence solution in the radiation problem. For their third experiment, Gick and Holyoak
were interested in exploring whether self-generated solutions for source problems could
influence the solutions that are generated in later problems. As in both prior experiments,
participants received the general problem, but in this experiment, participants had to come up
with their own solutions. When faced with the radiation problem, they were hinted that the
solutions they generated for the first problem may be helpful for the radiation problem, but that
they were not necessarily needed to be able to solve the radiation problem. Gick and Holyoak
identified that 22 of 45 subjects (49%) volunteered the convergence solution for the general
problem. Of those 22, 9 (41%) produced the convergence solution for the radiation problem, and
of the other 23 who did not initially provide a convergence solution, only 3 participants (8%)
spontaneously produced the convergence solution on the radiation problem. Gick and Holyoak
noted that, because these results were not experimental in nature, that there could be some
underlying problem solving ability that led people to be more likely to volunteer a convergence
solution. This would have emerged when comparing the two groups on the radiation problem –
the ones who volunteered the convergence solution on the general problem may have also been
more likely to volunteer the convergence solution on the general problem due to some
underlying factor. However, there was another solution to the general problem that appeared to
influence solutions for the radiation problem. Several participants (24 of 45) suggested that the
general could send several small groups down the same pathway to avoid setting off the mines,
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but still have the full force available at the dictator’s fortress, albeit later. Interestingly, a large
portion of these participants (10 of 24; 42%) volunteered a solution to the radiation problem that
was analogous to this one. Their solutions involved shooting weaker rays at the tumor over an
extended period. Although this solution would be infeasible for the radiation problem (the
effects of the weaker rays would still accumulate on the healthy tissue, as well as the tumor),
these results indicate that self-generated solutions to an initial problem do influence solutions
generated for novel problems, even when the initial solutions are not particularly suitable for the
novel problem.
To further explore the third experiment’s findings, they empirically evaluated how
problem solving was affected by the provision of multiple stories, each with different solutions.
One story was the general problem with the convergence solution, and the other two were
designed to be as mismatched to the radiation problem as possible, while still being similar in
length and form to the general problem (i.e., describing problems, constraints, and providing
solutions). After reading these stories, participants were divided into two conditions – one where
they were hinted that one of the stories they had read would help in solving the radiation
problem, and another where they received no such hint when attempting to solve the radiation
problem. There were stark differences in performance; 11 of 12 in the hint condition generated a
convergence solution to the radiation problem, but only 3 of 15 in the ‘no-hint’ condition
generated a convergence solution. Gick and Holyoak were interested in whether the ‘no-hint’
participants had considered using the stories, and whether any participants considered any
specific story to be useful for solving the radiation problem. Among the ‘no-hint’ participants,
12 of 15 had not considered using the previous stories, but 2 of those 12 participants
spontaneously volunteered the convergence solution. Interviews with those 2 participants
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indicated no clear link between the earlier problems and volunteering the convergence solution,
overall indicating that spontaneously noticing an analogy between source and target problems to
be a rare occurrence. For the participants who did receive hints, Gick and Holyoak argued that
this experiment evinced that it was possible to search through memory to retrieve helpful
information encoded from previous problems (even among distracting information) and use it as
an analogy to help solve a novel problem.
Gick and Holyoak noted that the performance differences they saw in experiment 4’s
‘hint’ and ‘no-hint’ conditions indicated that analogical problem solving is not usually a
spontaneous process: it usually requires a nudge from an experimenter. The final experiment
aimed to understand whether spontaneous analogy use under more optimal conditions. One
group (“story first”) received only the general problem and its solution prior to seeing the
radiation problem, and another group saw the radiation problem prior to seeing the general
problem and its solution (“story second”). In both cases, there were no distractor stories that
could negatively impact retrieval of source knowledge from memory, but the “story second”
condition emulates situations that occur in everyday life, where one happens upon useful
information while trying to solve a different problem. In both of these conditions, when
participants received the radiation problem, they were given a ten minute period to attempt
solving it. Afterward, they received a hint to try using the general problem to solve the radiation
problem. However, the key difference in the “story second” condition was that there was an
additional 10-minute attempt to solve the radiation problem prior to ever seeing the general
problem. Gick and Holyoak noted that having initial exposure to the radiation problem, and then
solving it again a few moments later could be argued as an incubation effect, rather than
emulating situations where one happens upon useful information during problem solving. To

47

address this, they added an incubation control condition, which was identical to the “story
second” condition, except they received an unrelated distractor problem instead of the general
problem. Interestingly, results indicated that both the “story first” and “story second” conditions
nearly equally generated the convergence solution both before receiving a hint (41% and 35%,
respectively) and after receiving a hint (35% and 30% respectively). Additionally, 10% of
participants in the “story second” condition spontaneously produced the convergence solution
after their first exposure to the radiation problem (prior to receiving the general problem). The
“incubation only” group was drastically different: only one participant volunteered the
convergence solution upon first viewing the radiation problem. The remaining participants in the
“incubation only” group never provided the convergence solution. In essence, problem solvers
who received a helpful source analogy were about 3 to 4 times as likely to spontaneously transfer
that analogy to a novel problem, as compared to a control group that did not receive a helpful
source analogy. In addition, these results indicated that incubation alone was simply not enough
to increase the likelihood that someone would volunteer the convergence solution to the radiation
problem.
All five of Gick and Holyoak’s (1980) experiments demonstrated that problem solvers
can retrieve knowledge from memory and apply it to solve analogous problems, even when both
problems are from drastically different domains (e.g., military strategy vs. surgery). They
defined this process as ‘analogical transfer,’ and explored under which circumstances analogical
transfer could be fostered. Most simply, providing guidance to use previous knowledge as an
analogy generally leads problem solvers to transfer source analogues toward solving a novel
problem. However, there remained unanswered questions about how spontaneous analogical
transfer could be fostered. Gick and Holyoak noted several times throughout their experiments
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when participants spontaneously transferred their source analogy to the target problem, but only
in experiment 5 did they have a compelling case for spontaneous transfer being fostered by
initial source analogue presentation. Generally, most of their experiments explicitly stated to use
a source story to solve the target problem, eliminating the chance for a problem solver to transfer
the source story spontaneously. Further, in their closing remarks, they acknowledge the spatial
nature of their source and target problems, and suggest that spatial representations (e.g.,
diagrams or illustrations) may be able to be used as analogies. They also note that a broad
cognitive mapping process may play a role in noticing similarities across different domains,
which could lead to improved performance on analogical problem solving. They further
suggested that, if someone was exposed to a large number of analogous stories, they might
develop a “convergence schema” that improves the likelihood of spontaneous analogical transfer.
Their next major study in this research area explored ways to induce a convergence schema (by
narrative as well as spatial means) that could increase the likelihood of spontaneous analogical
transfer.
Exploring How to Induce the Convergence Schema
Gick and Holyoak (1983) produced follow-up work that expanded upon questions they
had posed in their 1980 paper. In six experiments, they explored how best to induce a
“convergence schema” to improve solution rates on Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem, based
on the aforementioned conjecture that forming a general schema should foster spontaneous
analogical transfer. In this work, Gick and Holyoak (1983) varied how many source stories
problem solvers received or the way they interacted with the source stories (i.e., summarizing,
assessing underlying principles, or viewing diagrams of the source stories). Once problem
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solvers were exposed to the source material, they were assessed on their performance of the
radiation problem. In general, they were not able to support that diagrams were helpful for
forming the convergence schema (c.f. Beveridge & Parkins, 1987), but that being exposed to two
relevant source stories (instead of only one) was particularly helpful for performance on the
radiation problem.
It should be noted that Gick and Holyoak (1983) acknowledged that “schema” is a vague
term with a multitude of applications in cognitive psychology. For their purposes, they use
“schema” to mean an abstract structural knowledge representation of some concept (e.g., the
various convergence problems). In the frame of their analogical problem solving paradigms,
they consider that a convergence schema may begin form during the encoding phase of the
source story. Considering the general problem, one encodes the initial state (need to overthrow
dictator), goal state (capture the dictator’s fortress), operators (army), and constraints (weightsensitive land mines on all roads, but full force required to capture fortress). Lastly, the solution
is presented (splitting army along multiple roads leading to fortress). Once these aspects are
encoded, Gick and Holyoak argued that, if a problem solver were to abstract these features of the
general problem, they would be able to form a “convergence schema” that could be applied to
other analogous problems. Such a schema would consist of the same elements mentioned above
in the general problem, but in an abstract form. For example, they argued that the initial state
could be abstracted to “need to overcome a central target,” and the goal to “use force to
overcome a central target.” The operators would be the “force” to be used, and that a large
amount of that force is required to reach the goal state. The constraint would be that one cannot
apply the force needed all along a single path, but instead, the solution would be to use multiple
paths to converge on the central target with weaker forces.
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In their experiments, Gick and Holyoak (1983) tested different circumstances
hypothesized to foster the abstraction of this convergence schema, arguing that “mapping” (a la
theories of analogical reasoning, e.g., Sternberg, 1977) the convergence schema onto a novel
target problem (which could be solved with a convergence solution) would lead to success.
Further, they argued that the schema itself could be a means by which analogical transfer could
occur. If the schema is activated when attempting to solve the radiation problem, it may
subsequently trigger the retrieval of other instances of that schema (e.g., source analogies). More
simply, they also suggested that the schema itself may be sufficient to solve the problem. That
is, instead of serving as a cue to retrieve concrete exemplars of that schema, the abstract qualities
of the schema itself may be sufficient to discover the solution to the target problem. However, it
is worth considering that many factors may affect an individual’s ability to abstract a schema,
which may or may not also be affected by the quality of initial problem encoding. Similarly,
when faced with a target problem, there may be individual difference factors that impact one’s
ability to recognize that prior knowledge or schematic knowledge may be useful in the first
place. Although individual differences likely play a role in analogical problem solving
performance, they are beyond the scope of Gick and Holyoak (1983) but are discussed in later
sections. In this work, Gick and Holyoak focused on methodological (i.e., stimulus
presentation/interaction) means by which analogical transfer could be fostered. In this paper, the
general methodology was mostly similar to Gick and Holyoak (1980), except that the initial
source analogy presentation was disguised as a recall or story comprehension task. The second
phase was deemed the problem solving phase, where they were faced with a target problem.
After that initial attempt, they had a final attempt, with an explicit hint to try using the story from
the recall task.
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In the first experiment, Gick and Holyoak (1983) noted that there may be some
differences in whether an abstract schema is formed based on whether one is tasked to recall a
source story verbatim or summarize it at a higher level. The assumption was that a higher-level
summary would be more likely to contain abstract elements that might lend themselves toward
later transfer, whereas a verbatim summary would necessitate a more concrete representation that
may prevent transfer to a novel problem. Thus, they tested these two conditions to assess
analogical transfer on a different set of problems related to Maier’s (1930; 1931) cord problem.
In this problem, a problem solver must tie two cords together, but they are too far apart that they
cannot be reached with both hands. There are several items in the room that may be used to help
tie the two cords together: “poles, clamps, pliers, extension cords, tables, and chairs.” There are
a variety of solutions to the problem, but one solution was of particular interest for the present
study: tying an object to one of the strings and throwing it toward the other string, like a
pendulum. They note that this pendulum solution has a higher base success rate (39%) than they
had found in their radiation problem and suggested that this problem might be more suited to
testing the difference between verbatim recall and summary on analogical transfer (Gick, 1981
could not support that there was a difference for transfer on the radiation problem). They created
an analogous “Birthday Party” story with two distant ribbons, where the solution was to tie a pair
of scissors to one of the ribbons to use it as a pendulum to reach the other ribbon. They noted
that this story had additional details to it to match the cord problem, and argued that, if verbatim
recall hindered one’s ability to abstract the pendulum solution, recalling these details would
hinder performance on the cord problem. To assess how instructions dictating how to “encode”
the source analogy, they compared three conditions: one where they had to recall the birthday
party story verbatim; one where they had to summarize the birthday party story; and one where
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they had to summarize an unrelated story (control). Results supported that summarization
actually did not foster abstraction. Both the summary group and control group were relatively
equal in performance (20-25% success rate), whereas the verbatim recall group had an initial
60% success rate. Providing a hint offered a further improvement to solution rates for the recall
and summary groups (but not the control), but these improvements were statistically equivalent.
They tentatively concluded that there was no difference for recall compared to summarizing but
posed that ceiling effects may have been at play, given the close semantic relatedness to the two
problems (ribbons and cords are similar to one another). Thus, in experiment 2, they returned to
their traditional paradigm, but more directly tested a related assumption to that which was tested
in experiment 1.
In experiment 2, Gick and Holyoak (1983) explained that understanding an abstract
underlying principle to the convergence problems may be all that is necessary to foster
analogical transfer. They noted that this should have emerged in the summary group of
experiment 1, but by allowing participants to volunteer their own summaries, they might
inadvertently miss the underlying abstract principle. In experiment 2, they sought to avoid this
variability by providing one group with the abstract underlying principle to the general problem
and assessed their performance on Duncker’s radiation problem. The underlying principle was
provided as such: “If you need a large force to accomplish some purpose, but are prevented from
applying such a force directly, many smaller forces applied simultaneously from different
directions may work just as well.” They tested three groups: one that received the general
problem with the underlying principle; one that received the general problem alone; and one that
received the underlying principle alone. Interestingly, all groups performed relatively equal in
both phases – before and after receiving a hint. Although they did not test a control condition
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that solved the radiation problem cold, they noted that even the principle only condition had
about three times greater performance than their previously identified base rate of about 10%.
However, they tentatively concluded that encoding a basic underlying principle did not aid in
analogical transfer.
In experiment 3, they posited that the abstract principle may be better conveyed in a
spatial form (due to the spatial nature of the problems), as opposed to the narrative format used
in experiment 2. So, Gick and Holyoak instead provided a visual diagram illustrated in two parts
(see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Visual diagrams used in Gick and Holyoak (1983; p. 18).
The first part had one large arrow pointing in one direction, and the second had six
smaller arrows, all pointing toward a central location. This diagram was intended to illustrate the
principle that one large force could be split into smaller, converging forces. Similar to
experiment 2, they tested three groups: one that received the general problem with the diagram,
one that received the general problem only, and one that received the diagram only. Both groups
with diagrams were expected to redraw the diagram from memory. The results were comparable
to experiment 2, where groups were ultimately equivalent, with the exception of the diagramonly group. Their performance was significantly worse than the other groups at the before-hint
stage (statistically equivalent to the aforementioned base-rate performance) but approached
equality to the other groups in the after-hint stage. They concluded that an initial exposure to the
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diagrams was insufficient to abstract a convergence schema from them, but when a hint was
given, the drastic increase in performance for the diagram-only group (up to 67% successful)
indicates that it is still possible to map the non-semantic properties of the diagram to the
semantic properties of the target problem. So, diagrams may be useful as analogies for solving
target problems, but only when prompted.
Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) first three experiments largely provided null results for
summaries, underlying principles, and diagrams’ contribution toward solving the radiation
problem. However, they noted that only providing a single analogue minimizes the likelihood
for the development of a convergence schema. Such a schema would have to be developed on
the fly while solving the target problem. Instead, in the next three experiments, they provided
participants with two source analogies, based on the assumption that both sources could be
mapped to one another, and an abstract convergence schema could be deduced from both of
them.
In experiment 4, they tested performance on the radiation problem using a variety of
analogies. They discussed that mapping two source analogies that were of different domains
would be more likely to result in the formation of a more abstract schema, which could be more
readily mapped to an analogous target problem. They utilized the general problem, as before,
but created another military analogy (the commander problem) which involved a military capture
of a fortress on an island, using multiple bridges. To utilize a different domain, they generated
two additional stories related to firefighting: “Red Adair,” where a firefighter had to suffocate a
fire on an oil well with hoses from multiple directions to prevent it from spreading; and “The
Fire Chief,” where the same goal was accomplished using a team of firefighters with buckets. In
this experiment, they tested three different groups: One received two similar analogues (either
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two military or two firefighting); one received two dissimilar analogues (one from military and
one from firefighting); and one received a random military or firefighting analogue, and a control
story that was unrelated to all problems. In general, the results indicated that two useful
analogues were better than one (solution rates were 45% vs. 20%, respectively; similar and
dissimilar groups were statistically equivalent. After a hint, these numbers were 80% vs. 53%).
In this experiment, Gick and Holyoak also had participants describe similarities between
the two source problems, in efforts to foster convergence schema development. The schemas
were categorized into “good” (containing a description of forces converging from multiple
directions, or multiple smaller forces and a centrally located target), “intermediate” (containing
only one of the aforementioned descriptions), and “poor” (which contained none of the
aforementioned descriptions). Results indicated that schema quality was a primary determinant
of whether the problem would be solved successfully, and whether a hint was required. Of 51
participants, 11 were classified as having “good” schemas, 10 as “intermediate,” and 30 as
“poor.” Prior to receiving a hint 10 (91%) of those with “good” schemas solved the problem, 4
(40%) of those with “intermediate” schemas solved the problem, and 9 (30%) of those with
“poor” schemas solved the problem. These numbers increased after a hint was provided, and
ultimately, only 1 participant with an “intermediate” schema, and 9 participants with “poor”
schemas never solved the problem. These results appear to support that a higher quality schema
is key to spontaneous analogical transfer, but Gick and Holyoak (1983) note that there may be
some underlying individual difference at play. It is possible that an outside factor influences
both schema quality and problem solving ability. In experiment 5, they attempted to mitigate the
effects of poor schema quality construction (and therefore, mitigate the effects of a supposed
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underlying individual difference in schema quality construction) by providing an underlying
principle, as they did in experiment 2.
Experiment 5 sought to more firmly support the causal link between good schema
construction and analogical transfer, as fostered by the presentation of two source analogies. In
this experiment, they assessed solution rates before and after receiving a hint, and they also
assessed solution rates by schema quality. They tested two groups – both receiving two
analogies – but one group read an additional statement about the underlying principle of both of
their analogies. Results indicated that reading the underlying principle significantly aided in
success on the radiation problem, particularly before receiving a hint (62% were successful,
compared to 40% who did not receive the principle). Further, those receiving the underlying
principle generated significantly more “good” schemas (44% vs. 10%), and significantly fewer
“poor” schemas (23% vs. 60%). Similarly, higher quality schemas led to a greater likelihood of
solving the radiation problem, particularly for the condition that received the underlying
principle. Thus, providing an underlying principle for the two analogues seems to improve
schema quality that results in better performance on a target problem. Although there may still
be individual differences at play that could explain additional variance in these results, these
results lend more support to the causal link between schema quality and spontaneous analogical
transfer.
In their final experiment, Gick and Holyoak (1983) sought to reevaluate the use of
diagrams as a schematic aid. This experiment was designed similarly to experiment 5, where
participants received two analogues either with or without the diagram used in experiment 3.
Further, they varied source analogy similarity as in experiment 4, to test whether analogy
similarity played any role in schema quality. As before, they mentioned that abstracting general
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principles from dissimilar instances usually leads to a more robust schema that can be more
readily applied to target problems, and they sought to test this assumption again in experiment 6.
In general, analogy similarity did not seem to affect whether the radiation problem was solved
successfully before or after a hint but providing diagrams did result in greater solution rates both
before and after hints were provided. Interestingly, providing diagrams resulted in overall
greater schema quality as compared to when diagrams were absent, nearly doubling the
percentage of those producing “good” schemas, and halving the percentage of those producing
“poor” schemas. Further, they noted that, in the absence of diagrams, analogy dissimilarity did
not affect schema quality, but when diagrams were provided, those receiving dissimilar
analogues produced a small but significantly greater quantity of “good” schemas (65% vs. 44%),
but this did not necessarily translate to differences in performance on the target problem (“good”
schemas were integral to solving the radiation problem, regardless of whether they were fostered
with similar or dissimilar analogues). They note that, under optimal conditions, dissimilar
analogues with an underlying principle provided should lead to the formation of a high-quality
convergence schema, but providing dissimilar analogues also engenders the risk that a problem
solver will not notice the correspondences between the two analogues. Such problem solvers
would be more likely to form a poor schema, which would reduce their likelihood of solving the
target problem. They attributed this factor to the lack of differences in solution rates between the
similar and dissimilar analogues conditions.
Overall, Gick and Holyoak (1983) suggested that underlying principles and diagrams
alone could not be useful analogues, rather, they should be used to help frame the relationships
between two source analogies to foster high-quality schema development. By fostering highquality schema development, the likelihood of solving an analogous problem in a different
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domain increases drastically. At a more basic level, their results highlight the importance of
having a good quality mental representation (or schema) for solving target problems through
analogical transfer. Features that guide schema construction (e.g., diagrams; underlying
principles) seem to aid in the mapping process between two source analogies, but these features
do not seem to aid in spontaneous mapping from source to target without assistance. The results
from Gick and Holyoak (1983) offer empirical evidence to support the link between schema
quality and analogical transfer, and also support that a proper mental representation is necessary
for successful problem solving. Gick and Holyoak (1983) suggested that a more abstract
representation would be key to problem solving success, and this sentiment was echoed by Chi et
al. (1981), who identified that expert problem solvers tended to represent their knowledge about
problems in a more abstract form (compared to novices). In essence, it does not seem to matter
how much source knowledge is available, but rather, how that source knowledge is represented.
Extensions of the Early Work in Analogical Problem Solving
Gick and Holyoak’s (1980; 1983) two papers are perhaps the most influential works in
the analogical problem solving literature (as indicated by Google Scholar citations at the time of
this writing), but several studies have followed that expanded the methodology to examine other
manipulations that can increase the likelihood of solving analogous target problems. Gick and
Holyoak essentially established the analogical problem solving paradigm that these future studies
employed, but further work has countered some of their results (e.g., Beveridge & Parkins, 1987;
Pedone, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2001), and tested other avenues for increasing solution rates that
Gick and Holyoak had not considered (Catrambone, Craig, & Nersessian, 2006; Cooperrider &
Goldin-Meadow, 2014; Hostetter, Wieth, Foster, Moreno, & Washington, 2016; Trowbridge,
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2016). Other important work has examined relevant individual differences in analogical problem
solving (Antonietti & Gioletta, 1995; Corkill & Fager, 1995; Kubricht, Lu, & Holyoak, 2017),
although there are some inconsistencies across this small set of studies. Furthermore, the Grant
and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) studies could also be considered a
tangentially related extension of Gick and Holyoak’s early work if one considers guided eye
movements to be an analogy. In the following section, I describe the aforementioned studies and
their contributions to the literature in analogical problem solving.
Revisiting Diagrams and Exploring Animations as Analogues
Gick (1985) conducted a brief experiment intended to build on Gick and Holyoak’s
(1983) results and tested whether diagrams could be used as a retrieval cue for spontaneous
analogical transfer. In this study, she presented participants with the same general problem and
diagrams used in Gick and Holyoak (1983; see Figure 6 above), but included a cue referring to
the diagram in some conditions. The diagrams were initially presented in two parts. Part A
depicted a large arrow facing in a single direction, intended to represent the problem constraint
(cannot use full force along a single path). Part B depicted multiple converging smaller arrows,
intended to represent the convergence solution. Participants were cued while attempting to solve
their target problem with diagram part A and the following written cue above: “If the rays reach
the tumor all at once at a sufficiently high intensity, as illustrated schematically below, the tumor
will be destroyed” (Gick, 1985 p. 462). Gick compared four conditions in a 2 (diagram
only/diagram + story) by 2 (cued/uncued) design to assess whether the cues aided in analogical
transfer, and whether they were useful in absence of an analogical story.
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Participants who received the story read over the general problem, and beneath it were
the diagrams used in Gick and Holyoak (1983). The solution text for the general problem was
associated with the diagrams in this study, with part A described as the general’s initial plan, and
part B his solution. Those who did not receive the story only saw the diagrams. Before viewing
the material, participants were instructed there would be a recall task following it, including
redrawing the diagrams from memory and recalling the general’s solution (if they received the
general problem). After the recall task was complete, participants were faced with the radiation
problem. Those in the cued conditions received part A of the diagram beneath the problem text
alongside the previously quoted cue; otherwise, no cue was displayed. Results indicated that the
cue helped drastically, roughly doubling success rates compared to those who did not receive
cues (19/37; 51% successful cued participants vs. 10/44; 23% successful uncued participants).
Interestingly, the differences were minimal for the main effect of diagrams vs. diagrams with the
story, and there were no disproportionate benefits for any combination of cue and story
presentation.
After providing answers to the radiation problem, participants were then asked a few
questions about whether or not they considered using the prior information (i.e., story+diagram,
or diagram only) when trying to solve the radiation problem. Afterward, they were instructed to
use the prior information they had seen before to try answering the radiation problem again, even
if they have to repeat their answer. After a hint was provided, the number of people volunteering
the convergence solution for the radiation problem was statistically equal across conditions
(approximately 80% of participants in every group were successful). These results indicated that
even though performance was poor without a cue, providing a hint allowed people to transfer
even the simplest forms of source knowledge (i.e., diagrams only) to be predominantly
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successful at providing the convergence solution. In essence, it is possible to map visual
features of a diagram to help solve transfer problems, but a strong cue is necessary. Gick (1985)
notes that many educational techniques rely on the use of cues to refer to prior knowledge, but
from her results, she argues that they may not be helpful for all learners. Instead, it appears that
references to use prior knowledge must be explicit to foster the transfer of source knowledge to
novel problems.
Critiques of Gick and Holyoak (1983)
In one of Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) experiments, they were unable to find a beneficial
effect of a diagram (presented alone) that represented the convergence solution. The diagram
they used consisted of simple, solid-colored arrows converging on a central point. This diagram
was spatially congruent with the convergence solution, but they could not support that the
diagram was helpful and concluded that they could not be used as an analogy. However,
Beveridge and Parkins (1987) criticized Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) diagrams for being too
simple and ambiguous. Instead, when using more detailed diagrams, Beveridge and Parkins
found a beneficial effect. They included an intensity component in their analogous diagrams,
which was missing from Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) diagrams. They argued that, by failing to
illustrate the multiple lowered and summating ray intensities, Gick and Holyoak’s (1983)
diagrams were failing to impart the critical element of intensity for the convergence solution.
Beveridge and Parkins based their diagram features on the attributes that were included in Gick
and Holyoak’s (1983) classification of a “good” convergence schema and illustrated intensity in
two different diagrams (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Two new sets of diagrams used in Beveridge & Parkins (1987).
The top set of diagrams depicts summative intensity with lasers, the bottom set of diagrams
depicts the fanned translucent colored strips. Image source: Beveridge & Parkins (1987) pp. 231232
One diagram had multiple rays shooting from multiple outside locations, converging on a
central point, with lightly shaded rays that became very dark where their beams crossed at a
central point. Another diagram was provided with blue colored semi-transparent strips. When
closed together, the strips formed a dark blue rectangular shape, but when fanned apart, the blue
strips appeared lighter on the outside, and very dark at their central crossing point. Beveridge
and Parkins (1987) compared five groups’ performance on the radiation problem after receiving
one of their two summative intensity diagrams (rays and strips), Gick and Holyoak’s (1983)
converging arrows diagram, a narrative analogy, or a control condition (receiving no diagram or
analogy). Their results indicated that radiation problem solution rates were roughly equal for the
control group and those receiving Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) simpler diagrams (approximately
60%), but there were significant improvements in solution rates for those who received the
narrative analogy (75% successful), the rays diagram (80% successful), and the colored strips
diagram (95% successful). Thus, although Gick and Holyoak (1983) concluded that diagrams
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were not useful analogues for the radiation problem, Beveridge and Parkins (1987) demonstrated
that diagrams could serve as useful analogues. Further, illustrating intensity in diagrams appears
to be critical for inducing the convergence schema. Beveridge and Parkins compared their
diagrams to Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) diagrams which lacked an intensity component and
found that the newer diagrams resulted in substantially higher success rates.
In effect, Beveridge and Parkins (1987) extended Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) work to
show that diagrams by themselves could be successfully used as analogies for solving a target
problem. Although Beveridge and Parkins are quite critical of Gick and Holyoak’s argument that
visual diagrams alone are not useful, it is still worth recognizing that Gick and Holyoak (1983)
supported that diagrams could be helpful when mapping relations between two source analogues
and forming a mental representation of the two problems. Furthermore, Gick (1985; which
Beveridge and Parkins did not cite), indicated that, in order to effectively use diagrams as
analogies, fairly strong cues are required. It is possible that this recommendation may not apply
if the more elaborate diagrams from Beveridge and Parkins (1987) were used. Gick’s (1985) cue
could have served the same functional purpose of a hint, as it was intended to cue problem
solvers remember the diagram from earlier, which should have triggered recall for part B of the
diagram. If recalling part B of the diagram was successful, it should have facilitated mapping of
the diagram to the target problem, and the results support this.
Shortly after Beveridge and Parkins offered their critique, Gick (1989) published a book
chapter reviewing much of the work with analogical problem solving and diagrams. In it, she
acknowledges the potential usefulness of good diagrams like the ones in Beveridge and Parkins
(1987) and describes that they have two major functions for analogical problem solving. One is
that diagrams can be used as “schema-highlighting devices,” which facilitate the schema
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acquisition process (demonstrated in Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Another function is that they can
serve as a recall cue for earlier encoded information, which she demonstrated in Gick (1985).
Gick (1989) indicated that Beveridge and Parkins (1987) did not test their diagrams with stories
as source analogues and contended that the comparatively more abstract diagrams from Gick and
Holyoak (1983) would be better at facilitating convergence schema acquisition.
Several years later, Pedone, Hummel, and Holyoak (2001) expanded on the earlier work
with diagrams, testing whether embedded perceptual properties within diagrams could facilitate
spontaneous analogical transfer, and elaborating how diagrams are understood in analogical
problem solving. With this approach, the diagrams themselves are considered to be source
analogues, although they discussed that they schematically represent convergence, and could
also be considered to be schemas. Nevertheless, they argued that the mapping process of a
source or a schema toward a target problem is functionally the same (citing their earlier work,
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). That said, they mentioned that it is difficult to spontaneously notice
the relevance of a diagram and map it to a target problem. One of the reasons they conjectured is
that the diagrams are not interpreted with any semantic meaning. Therefore, when solving target
problems in the semantic domain, there is no semantic meaning that can be easily mapped onto
the target problem. However, when hinted to use a diagram to solve an analogous target
problem, they argued that the mapping process happens “backward,” such that the features of the
target problem are mapped onto the diagram, and in that way, the diagram is used to transfer the
solution to the target problem. As with previous studies, Pedone et al. (2001) were interested in
ways to improve spontaneous analogical transfer (i.e., without a hint) from diagrams by
incorporating perceptual features (see Figure 8). They investigated how this could be
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accomplished with a series of four experiments, adding features to the diagrams used in Gick and
Holyoak (1983).

Figure 8. Diagrams used in Pedone, Hummel, & Holyoak (2001), incorporating perceptual
features (arrows).
In several experiments, these arrows varied in which direction they pointed, and whether they
were static or animated. Image source: Pedone et al. (2001), p. 215.
Pedone and colleagues’ (2001) first experiment compared enhanced versions of Gick and
Holyoak’s (1983) diagrams, depicting multiple smaller arrows along the pathways. They used
the original single, large pathway, and a final convergence diagram consisting of 8 converging
pathways (instead of Gick & Holyoak’s 6 pathways). They also included two intermediate steps
– one containing two converging pathways, and one containing four converging pathways. The
groups receiving the Gick and Holyoak (1983) diagrams and those receiving the intermediate
diagrams did not fare any better than a control group in providing the convergence solution.
After receiving a hint, both diagram groups had about 50% more participants volunteering the
convergence solution, suggesting it possible to map diagrams to the target problem, but not
providing evidence for a benefit of intermediate diagrams.
Their next experiment tested convergence and divergence depicted in the diagrams.
Divergence was depicted with arrows pointing along the pathways, except pointing away from a
central point. In addition to testing convergence against divergence, their participants were also
assigned to either an animated or a static condition. The animated condition saw the arrows
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along the pathways in their appropriate direction (either toward the center or away from the
center). Pedone and colleagues suggested that animations may be particularly helpful for
facilitating spontaneous transfer, and their results strongly suggested that this was the case. All
conditions that received diagrams saw all intermediate steps of the diagrams (as described in the
first experiment). The group who received the animated converging diagrams had a before-hint
success rate of 55%, compared to all other groups, whose success rates were only between 5%
and 15%. After receiving a hint, those receiving the converging diagrams improved their success
rates substantially (55% additional problem solvers for the static group, and 35% for the dynamic
group), but those in the divergence groups barely improved (between 5% and 10% additional
participants were successful). Those in the control group received no hints and had to solve the
problem immediately; only 2 of 19 participants in that group were successful (consistent with a
solution rate of around 10% in previous studies). These results suggest that animations are a
significant boon to spontaneous analogical transfer, and further, that misleading diagrams and
animations do not appear to offer any improvements to solution rates. Additionally, providing a
hint typically facilitates mapping source analogues to target problems, but this was only the case
for the diagrams depicting convergence. Those receiving diagrams depicting divergence did not
exhibit in a substantial increase in convergence solution rates after a hint was provided.
Pedone and colleagues’ (2001) third experiment sought to examine whether a multimedia
learning effect (a la Mayer & Gallini, 1990) might aid in spontaneous analogical transfer. They
argued that providing a principle alongside the diagrams would help problem solvers abstract the
convergence solution. Gick and Holyoak (1983) provided evidence that abstracting the
convergence solution does improve spontaneous analogical transfer, at least when two analogies
are provided, but Pedone and colleagues sought to test whether diagrams with principles aid in
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abstraction. Additionally, they speculated that providing a principle would enhance spontaneous
transfer for those receiving the static diagrams. The principle they provided to participants was
the same as in Gick and Holyoak (1983): “If you need a large force to accomplish some purpose,
but are prevented from applying such force directly, many smaller forces applied simultaneously
from different directions may work just as well.” To test these research questions, they provided
this principle to one group receiving static diagrams against another group receiving animated
diagrams. When comparing convergence solution rates, both groups were statistically equivalent
for spontaneous transfer (45% vs. 50% successful), but the animated diagram condition was
more successful after a hint was provided (25% vs. 45% additional successful participants).
These results indicated that providing an abstract principle alongside the diagrams aided in
spontaneous analogical transfer, presumably because it aids in convergence schema formation.
Although spontaneous analogical transfer was statistically equivalent between groups, the
animated condition showed greater additional success after providing a hint, indicating that
animated diagrams are still superior to static diagrams overall.
In their final experiment, Pedone and colleagues were interested in testing diagram
animations more purely. Whereas in the prior experiments, each of the diagrams contained
arrows pointing in a particular direction, the final experiment eliminated this perceptual cue.
Instead of arrows, they provided small blocks that were located along the converging pathways
in the diagrams. By removing the perceptual affordances of arrows in the diagrams, they argued
that they could test the benefits of animation more directly. They compared two groups
receiving the diagrams with blocks instead of arrows, where one group received static diagrams,
and the other group received animated diagrams. Results suggested a substantial benefit for
animation; 30% of participants who received animated diagrams volunteered the convergence
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solution compared to only 5% of participants who received the static diagrams. After a hint was
provided, the increases were roughly equivalent (40% additional successful participants for the
animated group; 30% additional for the static group). However, combining these numbers yields
a stark difference in total success rates – 35% of participants in the static group ultimately
volunteered the convergence solution, compared 70% of participants in the animated group.
Based on these results, Pedone and colleagues argued that animations facilitated transfer more
comprehensively than static diagrams.
Pedone and colleagues’ (2001) experiments provide strong evidence that introducing
perceptual features into diagrams improves their usefulness as an analogy for spontaneous
transfer to target problems. Animations that depict the convergence solution seem to function as
an implicit aid to spontaneous transfer. They noted that the perceptual qualities they tested in
their experiments may explain why the more detailed diagrams in Beveridge and Parkins’s
(1987) studies were exceptionally successful in fostering spontaneous transfer. They also noted
that, compared to previous research, the spontaneous transfer rates for their animated diagrams
were greater than the spontaneous transfer rates in previous studies using distantly related
analogues (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983), indicating that the animations are more robust at
facilitating spontaneous transfer than narrative analogues. It is worth noting that the narrative
analogues have a greater quantity of features that could be mapped onto the target problem, but
perhaps the perceptual information inherent in animations is simply a more salient means of
fostering the convergence schema? Pedone and colleagues (2001) suggest that the diagrams may
enable a problem solver to represent the perceptual information that is needed to solve the
radiation problem. They further clarify that successfully solving the radiation problem (and
other convergence schema problems) requires a physical and perceptual understanding of how
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the converging forces interact with other objects. Thus, animations that foster these perceptual
representations may prime problem solvers to represent the perceptual aspects of the problems
they later try to solve.
Although Pedone and colleagues do not cite any embodied cognitive theoretical work, it
is possible to consider their closing arguments as relating to theories of embodied cognition. In
essence, the perceptual cues in the animated diagrams may serve to foster perceptual simulations
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 2008; Wilson, 2002) of the convergence schema, particularly when a
verbal principle is included. This is the main argument for Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas
and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) eye movements results, although it is worth noting that Pedone and
colleagues did not introduce their participants to the problem before showing them the diagram,
so the solution rates across these studies cannot necessarily be directly compared. It should also
be noted that the nature of the diagrams in these studies are rather different – Grant and Spivey
(2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) showed an abstract diagram of the tumor and
surrounding healthy tissue and had participants move their eyes in a converging pattern.
Although their arguments are similar, it is possible that the factors that led to increased solution
rates (i.e., animated diagrams, Pedone et al., 2001; spatially congruent eye movements, Grant &
Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras, 2007, 2009) were due to a common underlying embodied
mechanism. In that same vein, animated diagrams may inherently afford eye movements that
facilitate perceptual representations of the convergence solution. Other studies have investigated
embodied effects in analogical problem solving more directly, albeit with mixed degrees of
success.
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Embodied Cognition in Analogical Problem Solving
After Barsalou’s (1999) theory of perceptual symbol systems was introduced, researchers
became interested in revisiting the radiation problem to address embodied questions about
problem solving. Similar to Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009)
studies that argued for an embodied cognitive effect in problem solving, Catrambone, Craig, and
Nerssessian (2006), Craig, Nerssessian, and Catrambone (2002), and Pedone and colleagues
(2001) supported that encoding perceptual information could also aid analogical problem
solving. The theoretical explanations of Catrambone et al. (2006) are discussed more thoroughly
in Craig et al. (2002), using the same data published in their 2006 study, alongside as other
studies that investigated ancillary research questions. They discuss some of the preliminary
theoretical rationale that led them to the results summarized in their 2006 study. They describe
that when reading about problems, a problem solver is likely to spontaneously activate various
schemas while they encode the problem. For example, reading the phrase “hammering a nail
into the fence” might elicit a schema for linear force. Along these lines, they sought to test
whether differences in the wording of narrative analogies and their solutions may differentially
elicit converging forces schemas (e.g., “pinching” or “squeezing” schemas) during encoding. In
this initial study, they provided one group of participants Gick and Holyoak’s (1980; 1983)
“General Problem” as the source analogy (an analogous problem used in much of the analogical
problem solving work following Gick & Holyoak, 1980), and compared them to a group of
participants who received an analogous problem about beehives. In the “General Problem,” a
military general must overtake a fortress by sending his army in small groups on multiple roads
so as to avoid setting off weight-sensitive landmines that would explode if the full force was sent
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down a single road. In this beehive problem, one must destroy the queen at the center of the hive
without disturbing too many bees in the process. The solution was to use multiple sticks and
press them all toward the center of the beehive, so the queen would be killed without disturbing
too many other bees (e.g., if one large stick was used). Craig et al. (2002) argued that the
wording of this narrative analogy of the beehive would be more likely to elicit a converging
forces schema (as opposed to the general problem, which had less concrete wording), and this
argument was supported by their results. Approximately twice as many people who received the
beehive problem (20/49) spontaneously produced the solution to the radiation problem, as
compared to those who received the general problem (9/44). These results supported that
perceptual information encoded from narrative source analogies may be helpful when solving
novel analogous problems.
Catrambone et al. (2006) reiterated that success in analogical problem solving is
dependent on successfully forming a mental representation of the problem’s structure, which
could then be mapped onto analogical problems to solve them. However, they suggested that
these mental representations could be enhanced with the encoding of perceptual information,
with the assumption that perceptually representing the problem structure would improve solution
rates for analogical problems. Specifically, they suggest that perceptually encoding the problem
may activate a converging force schema (e.g., “squeezing” or “pinching”), which should affect
how the problem is represented, and may further affect how that problem representation is
applied in later problem solving. In another experiment, they tested this using Gick and
Holyoak’s (1980; 1983) “General Problem” as the source analogy (an analogous problem used in
much of the analogical problem solving work following Gick & Holyoak, 1980), and Duncker’s
(1945) radiation problem as the target problem. They compared two traditional kinds of analogy
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(verbal analogies and sketched analogies) and compared them to an analogy that would impart
perceptual information to the problem solver (manipulating blocks to enact the analogy). All
participants received the general problem (as mentioned previously), and they had to re-enact the
problem either by verbally explaining it, by verbally explaining it while sketching a diagram of
it, or by verbally explaining it while moving blocks to demonstrate the solution. They argued
that the perceptual information that would be encoded by moving the blocks would enhance
participants’ likelihood of spontaneously mapping the solution to the general problem when
faced with the radiation problem. The results largely supported this argument, with roughly
twice as many problem solvers successfully solving the radiation problem when the general
problem was re-enacted with blocks (17/33), as opposed to the verbal (4/21) and sketch (10/33)
conditions. They argued that these differences signified that those re-enacting the problem with
blocks were more likely to spontaneously apply the general problem’s solution to the radiation
problem, and the relevant mechanism that could explain these differences was perceptual
simulation. That is, the participants who perceptually represented the problem structure (i.e., the
re-enactment with blocks group) were more successful in transferring that problem
representation to an analogous problem. Thus, perceptual representation during encoding of a
problem appears to be useful for analogical problem solving.
Interestingly, Grant and Spivey (2003), and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) did not cite
Craig et al. (2002) or Catrambone et al. (2006), when their primary manipulations concerned
very similar theoretical underpinnings – that perceptually representing problem features would
aid in problem solving. One key distinction could be that Craig et al. (2002) and Catrambone et
al. (2006) explicitly provided source analogies to be used in later analogical problem solving, but
it could be argued that Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) implicitly
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provided a perceptual source analogy by means of guided eye movements or guided attention. If
this is indeed the case, then the perceptual information encoded in a source analogy would no
doubt be a significant determinant of success in later analogous problem solving. Taken together,
these studies strongly suggest that embodied cognitive effects (i.e., perceptually
representing/simulating a problem) largely influence analogical problem solving. However, one
of the main embodied cognitive findings from Catrambone et al. (2006) could have been
confounded by arousal. Solution rates increased as participants had more interaction when
recalling the general problem (i.e., verbal only vs. verbal+sketch vs. verbal+blocks). Thus, it is
possible that the perceptual representation effects discussed in Catrambone et al. (2006) and
Craig et al. (2002) may in fact be due to arousal, and not due to an embodied cognitive effect.
Incidentally, there are a few studies that have tested embodied influences of analogical problem
solving and failed to demonstrate a beneficial effect on schema induction and problem solving.
Expanding from the embodied cognitive explanations posited by Catrambone et al.
(2006), Craig et al. (2002), Grant and Spivey (2003), and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009),
several researchers attempted to assess whether these embodied effects could be fostered through
the use of gesture. Of relevance to the present work, Alibali, Bassok, Olseth, Syc, and GoldinMeadow (1995), Hostetter and Alibali (2008), and Kirsh (2010) argue that gestures may function
as a means of externally representing internal mental processes and serve to guide cognition.
Although the previously mentioned studies argued that an embodied cognitive effect exists that
improves solution rates (either via enacting the convergence solution with blocks or mimicking
the shape of the convergence solution with eye movements), the following studies were unable to
find such an effect when using gestures.
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Cooperrider and Goldin-Meadow (2014), Hostetter, Wieth, Foster, Moreno, and
Washington (2016) and Trowbridge (2016) all conducted experiments examining whether
gesturing while summarizing source analogies (or comparing source analogies to target
problems) aided when attempting to solve an analogous, structurally similar problem. In these
studies, participants were instructed to provide the solution to the problem either by gesturing
with a verbal response, by specifically withholding gestures while verbally responding, or by
providing a verbal response without explicit instructions to gesture. Both Cooperrider and
Goldin-Meadow (2014), and Hostetter et al. (2016) found detrimental effects – if participants
gestured while summarizing or recanting the source analogy stories, they were actually less
likely to produce the convergence solution to the radiation problem.
Theories of embodied cognition would suggest that incorporating gesture would enhance
how the schema for the convergence solution was encoded, for example, by adding a perceptual
dimension to a narrative to be encoded. The results of Catrambone et al. (2006), Craig et al.
(2002), Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) would suggest that
participants were more successful when they embodied the convergence solution, either through
physical interaction with blocks, or through simple eye movements in the spatial arrangement of
the convergence solution. It is interesting that these effects did not manifest in Cooperrider and
Goldin-Meadow (2014), Hostetter et al. (2016), and Trowbridge (2016), as their studies
employed physical enactments of the convergence schema. If the effects found in previous
literature are truly embodied cognitive effects, then the use of gesture should certainly enhance
encoding of the convergence schema. However, this was not the case, and it is possible the
effects Catrambone et al. (2006) and Craig et al. (2002) observed were simply due to arousal –
the embodied condition interacted with physical objects, and the conditions to which their
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solution success was compared only used verbal summaries or drawings to summarize the source
analogy. The benefits conferred by the interaction with physical blocks may have only emerged
because that condition was the most engaging of the three conditions. Additionally, it is possible
that the effects that Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) observed were
due to attentional priming, rather than an embodied cognitive mechanism. Because Grant and
Spivey and Thomas and Lleras’s work is of more direct relevance to the present study, it is worth
exploring why the benefits they saw may have only been caused by an attentional priming
mechanism, rather than an embodied cognitive one.
Review of Eye Movement Studies with Problem Solving
The following sections will review in detail the most pertinent studies for the present
work.
Grant and Spivey (2003) – Eye Movements and Problem Solving: Guiding Attention Guides
Thought
Grant and Spivey (2003) conducted two experiments analyzing eye movements during
problem solving, arguing that an eye movement analysis could reveal underlying aspects of
visual attention that may be lost in traditional measures of problem solving success – solution
time and accuracy. They presented participants with a version of Duncker’s (1945) radiation
problem, including a very simple diagram (see Figure 9) representing a cross-section of a
stomach with a tumor represented inside. This diagram consisted of a circular outline, inside of
which was a smaller, concentric, dark-filled circle. The circular outline represented the skin, the
smaller dark-filled circle represented the tumor, the space between them represented the healthy
tissue, and the space outside the circular outline represented space outside of the stomach.
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Figure 9. Simple diagram of the radiation problem presented to participants in Grant and Spivey
(2003); as well as Thomas & Lleras (2007; 2009).
Image source: Thomas & Lleras (2009, p. 169)
While participants tried to solve the problem, Grant and Spivey (2003) were interested in
observing their eye movements about this diagram. In the first experiment, they hypothesized
that those who would be successful would spend more time looking in the outside area of the
diagram, as that is where multiple lasers would have to be imagined; a key feature of the
convergence solution of the problem. They recruited fourteen college student participants who
had not seen Duncker’s radiation problem and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Participants were instructed to provide verbal protocols for their solution to the problem, and to
draw out their solution on the diagram. The experimenter read the problem to participants but
remained silent while the participants attempted to solve the problem. If participants had not
provided the convergence solution within 10 minutes, they were provided one or more hints to
allow them to complete the task. Hint one was, “What if you could adjust the intensity of the
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lasers?” and hint two was, “What if you had more than one laser?” Participants were only coded
as being successful if they produced the solution without hints. The authors argued that nonhinted solutions represented solutions that participants implicitly embodied. Although eye
movements were recorded during the entirety of this solution process, Grant and Spivey only
analyzed the 30 seconds of eye movements after participants received the instructions, and the 30
seconds of eye movements immediately prior to participants providing their final solution to the
problem. In these recordings, independent coders classified the eye movements as being located
in one of five diagram locations: the tumor, the healthy tissue, the skin, outside the skin, or
irrelevant (e.g., participant looking away from the screen, or system error).
Using these codes, the authors sought to identify differences in eye movement patterns
between those who solved the problem (5 out of 14 participants) and those who did not solve the
problem (9 out of 14, who required hints). During the initial 30 seconds of the problem, there
were no differences between successful and unsuccessful problem solvers. However, during the
30 seconds prior to providing a solution, successful participants spent a significantly greater
proportion of time looking at the skin, compared to those who were unsuccessful (there were no
other significant differences). Contrary to their initial hypothesis, both groups spent a
statistically similar amount of time looking at the outside of the diagram – they concluded that
this must not be a critical area where the multiple lasers are imagined. Based on the results from
experiment 1, they argued that the skin region of the diagram must be the critical area for
participants to infer the convergence solution. In experiment 2, they tested the hypothesis that
repeatedly drawing participants’ attention to this critical area of the diagram would increase the
likelihood that participants would provide the convergence solution to the radiation problem.

78

To test this hypothesis, 81 college students were randomly assigned to one of three
groups: view diagram without any attentional cues; view diagram with attentional cues to skin
(which they deemed a critical region); or view diagram with attentional cues to the tumor (which
they deemed a non-critical region). Aside from the attentional cuing of the diagram, the method
was identical to experiment 1. The animations were facilitated by causing the diagram to “pulse”
three times per second. In these “pulses,” the relevant diagram feature would increase in size by
1 pixel, then immediately return to the initial size.
Although there were more participants per group in experiment 2, the rates for solving
the problem were nearly identical – 10 out of 27 who viewed the non-animated diagram were
successful, which is only 1 percentage point greater than those who solved the problem in
experiment 1. Key differences emerged in the animated conditions. Those who viewed the
diagram with the pulsing tumor were roughly equally as likely to generate the solution (9 out of
27 participants) than those who viewed the non-animated diagram. However, those who viewed
the skin-animated diagram were nearly twice as likely to generate the solution (18 out of 27
participants) than all other conditions; confirming their hypothesis that drawing attention to this
critical area would increase their likelihood of solving the problem.
Their explanation for this phenomenon was largely that the eye movements themselves
guided the problem solving process, by mirroring the eye movements of those who would
normally solve the problem without any help. They also argued that it may not necessarily have
been fixations on the skin that mattered, but rather, eye movements across the skin from the outer
to the inner sections of the diagram. To assess this, they re-examined the eye movement data
from experiment 1 to assess whether or not this was the case. Indeed, participants who were
destined to solve the problem made significantly more saccades across the skin than those who
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were not successful. Interestingly, when the unsuccessful participants received hints, their skincrossing saccades significantly increased just prior to providing the convergence solution. It is
worth noting that these skin-crossing saccades tended to be saccades that were triangular in
fashion, such that they began outside the skin, moved across the skin toward the tumor, and then
moved back out, across the skin, to a different area outside of the diagram (in the shape of a
triangle).
Grant and Spivey (2003) interpreted their results within the framework of an embodied
cognitive perspective. Citing seminal work on embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999) they argued
that the eye movements of participants who were ultimately successful might have fostered a
perceptual simulation of the multiple lasers firing inward toward the tumor. They indicated that
these eye movements were spatially congruent with the spatial nature of the solution, and that
they engendered sensorimotor processes that enhanced participants’ mental representation of the
problem. In essence, they claimed that eye movements themselves facilitated problem solving
success by introducing perceptual information that was spatially congruent to the solution.
Building upon this work, Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) more specifically tested the
hypothesis that guided eye movements facilitated perceptual simulations of the radiation problem
by explicitly guiding eye movements around a similar diagram. In the 2007 paper, Thomas and
Lleras tested several different combinations of guided eye movements, and in the 2009 paper,
they examined whether similar benefits could be observed with covert attention (i.e., by directing
attention in and out of the diagram without moving one’s eyes).
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Thomas and Lleras (2007) – Moving Eyes and Moving Thought: On the Spatial Compatibility
between Eye Movements and Cognition
Directly extending from Grant and Spivey’s (2003) work, Thomas and Lleras (2007)
tested participants’ ability to solve Duncker’s radiation problem while guiding their attention in
various related and unrelated patterns to the convergence solution via a digit-tracking task. This
digit-tracking task required participants to attend to letters and numbers appearing at various
locations inside and outside of a diagram of the tumor problem (similar to the one used by Grant
& Spivey; 2003). The letters and numbers appeared eight times over a period of four seconds,
and in this sequence, a random letter would instead be replaced by a number. Whenever
participants saw a number appear, they would have to hit a button to indicate that they had seen
the number appear. After this four second sequence had passed, participants had a “free-viewing
period” for 26 seconds, during which no letters or numbers would be presented. The digittracking portion and free-viewing portion were repeated a total of 20 times, for a duration of 10
minutes.
Prior to undergoing the digit-tracking task, participants were presented with the radiation
problem, and a diagram of the skin and tumor. After verifying whether participants previously
had seen the radiation problem, they began the digit tracking task in one of four randomly
assigned groups with differing letter and number sequences. The “embodied-solution” group
tracked letters and numbers that appeared in and out of the diagram in a triangular fashion –
appearing in areas outside of the skin of the diagram, then appearing in the center of the diagram,
on the tumor, and then again appearing outside of the skin in a new location. The “areas-ofinterest” group tracked letters and numbers outside and inside of the diagram, except the letters
and numbers appeared outside of the diagram four times, before appearing inside of the diagram
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for the remaining four times. The “repeated-skin-crossing group” tracked letters and numbers
repeatedly appearing outside and inside of the diagram, except without changing location (i.e.,
similar to the “embodied-solution” group, except without appearances at other outside locations).
Finally, the “tumor-fixation” group conducted their digit tracking task by tracking letters and
numbers appearing in the center of the diagram, solely on the location of the tumor.
Participants were instructed to try to come up with a solution for the radiation problem
while they performed the digit-tracking task. Thomas and Lleras (2007) argued that, by
analyzing differences in problem solving success among groups, they could assess the extent to
which the guided eye movements (facilitated by the digit-tracking task) influenced cognition.
Specifically, they argued that, if skin-crossing saccades from multiple outer locations were key
to solving the problem (as Grant & Spivey suggested), then the “embodied-solution” group
would show the best performance. They noted that it was also possible that participants only
needed to view key areas to help infer the solution – if this was the case, then the “areas-ofinterest” group and the “embodied-solution” group would show better performance than the
other two groups. They also argued that, if skin-crossing saccades were the only necessary
guidance to improve solution rates, then the “repeated-skin-crossing” group and the “embodiedsolution” group would have better performance than the other groups. It should be noted that
one of the intermediate assertions from Grant and Spivey’s (2003) studies was that the skin was
the critical area of the tumor diagram, which the “repeated-skin-crossing” group would be guided
to repeatedly view. Lastly, they argued that if eye movements had no influence on problem
solving, that all groups would show equivalent performance.
To test these predictions, Thomas and Lleras (2007) recruited 99 undergraduate students
to participate in this study. A number of participants were excluded for either failing the
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tracking task (i.e., not responding when the number appeared), or indicating that they saw a
relationship between the digit tracking task and the radiation problem. Participants who saw a
relationship between the digit tracking task and the radiation problem were excluded so as to
analyze participants who were not explicitly aware of the purpose of the experiment (only 6 of
99 participants saw the relationship, and none of those six were in the tumor-fixation group). On
average, there were roughly 18 participants analyzed in each condition. As previously
mentioned, participants were provided instructions for Duncker’s radiation problem and
instructed to attempt to solve it while undergoing the digit-tracking task. This task could last up
to ten minutes, but participants were allowed to stop this task at any time that they thought they
had devised a solution to the radiation problem. To provide their solution, they had to draw it on
a piece of tracing paper held over the computer screen, in front of a display of the radiation
problem diagram. If participants provided a correct solution after interrupting the digit-tracking
task, the experiment finished; but if they were incorrect, they resumed the digit-tracking task
where they left off. Thus, the experiment ended whenever participants provided a correct
solution, or when participants completed the digit-tracking task and made a final attempt at
solving the problem. Solutions were coded as correct if the drawings contained at least two lines
drawn from the outside of the diagram, crossing the skin, and converging on the tumor. After
this was complete, participants indicated whether or not they noticed a link between the digittracking task and the radiation problem.
Results indicated that the different eye-movement pattern groups differed significantly
with regard to solution success rates. The embodied-solution group had the highest success rate
(at 50%), which was significantly different from the other groups, as indicated by a chi-square
test (areas-of-interest: 33%; repeated-skin-crossing: 19%; tumor-fixation: 22%). These results
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supported their prediction that eliciting skin-crossing saccades from multiple outer locations
would aid in participants generating the solution to the radiation problem. The guided eye
movements in the embodied-solution group influenced cognition to the extent that it improved
solution rates compared to the other groups. They also conducted a survivor analysis to compare
the solution rates for each group over time and supported that the embodied-solution group had
statistically better solution rates over time than the tumor-fixation group and the repeated-skincrossing group (but was statistically equivalent to the areas-of-interest group).
In sum, the results largely supported the hypothesis that guided eye movements that were
spatially congruent with the solution to the task provided the best aid to problem solving.
Interestingly, a majority of participants indicated that they did not recognize a link between the
digit-tracking task and the solution to the problem, and several of them believed it to be an overt
distraction from the radiation problem. Thus, Thomas and Lleras (2007) argued that the benefits
that the guided eye movements conferred toward problem solving were implicit, rather than an
explicit aid to problem solving.
Relating back to Grant and Spivey’s (2003) assertion that skin-crossing saccades from
multiple outer locations were the key to improving solution rates for the radiation problem,
Thomas and Lleras (2007) also assessed the number of skin-crossing saccades that participants
made during the tracking task and during the free-viewing period. Although by nature of the
design of the experiment, the embodied-solution group and repeated-skin-crossing group had
significantly greater skin-crossing saccades compared to the areas-of-interest group and the
tumor-fixation groups, which had relatively low skin-crossing saccades during the tracking task.
However, skin-crossing saccades during the free-viewing period were statistically equivalent
across all groups, indicating that eye movements elicited during the digit-tracking task were
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more likely the driver of any group differences. Thus, the particular pattern of skin-crossing
saccades may have been critical for the group differences that were observed (assuming no
confounding variables were to blame). Thomas and Lleras (2007) argued that guided eye
movements were most effective when they embodied the solution to the radiation problem.
Further, they asserted that skin-crossing eye movements initiated from different areas outside of
the diagram bring rise to a perceptual simulation of the solution of the problem. That is, the
embodied eye movement patterns led participants to mentally simulate lasers firing on the tumor
from multiple points, leading them to be more likely to solve the problem. Aligning with
embodied cognitive perspectives (e.g., Wilson, 2002), they argued that the eye movements and
diagram allowed problem solvers to off-load their cognition onto the environment, which aided
in problem solving. They further suggested that their results provide evidence that physical
interactions with the environment may not only influence cognitive processes but may also
generate cognitive processes. In essence, Thomas and Lleras (2007) demonstrated that low-level
guided movement of the eyes in a simple environment (the tumor diagram) enhanced cognition
as indicated by problem solving success on Duncker’s radiation problem.
Thomas and Lleras (2009) – Covert Shifts of Attention Function as an Implicit Aid to Insight
In this follow-up study, Thomas and Lleras essentially replicated their 2007 study, but
were interested in testing an additional research question: are physical movements required to
influence cognition, or could covert processes generate the same effect? To test this research
question, they modified their earlier methodology to include a condition similar to the
“embodied-solution” condition (a digit-tracking task with letters and numbers appearing
repeatedly outside and inside of the diagram from multiple points), except where participants
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were instructed not to move their eyes – to stay fixated on the tumor. They were still required to
respond to the digit-tracking task as before by hitting a button when a number appeared in place
of a letter. By not moving their eyes but still having to respond in accordance with the digittracking task, Thomas and Lleras (2009) argued that they were directing participants’ covert
attention movements, rather than their overt eye movements. In doing so, they were able to test
whether attention movements drove the embodied effect observed in Thomas and Lleras (2007),
rather than the physical eye movements themselves.
They acknowledged that there are many different views that attempt to disambiguate
attention movements from eye movements, citing some that have suggested attention movements
to be a precursor to saccades, with others suggesting attention movements to function as a
separate mechanism that does not necessarily drive saccades. They further cited other arguments
that eye movements tend to move in a smooth, analog fashion, whereas attention shifts occur in a
more discrete fashion, regardless of the distance between attention shift-points. A detailed
discussion of these perspectives is beyond the scope of the present work, but it is pertinent to
acknowledge the concomitant attentional aspects of eye movements. Recognizing the disparities
between eye movements and attention shifts, Thomas and Lleras (2009) admitted that it was
unclear whether the embodied eye movement effects claimed in Thomas and Lleras (2007)
would emerge through shifts of attention when eye movements were restricted.
Using similar rationale from their previous study, they sought to answer their research
question – whether eye movements (as opposed to only attention shifts) were necessary for
embodied effects to emerge – by examining solution rates to the radiation problem among
different groups. As in their previous study, they utilized the digit-tracking task with a 4 second
tracking period and a 26 second free viewing period, but the groups were slightly different. The

86

four groups were “eye-movement” (identical to the “embodied-solution” group from Thomas &
Lleras 2007), “Attention-shift” (identical to the “eye-movement” group, except with a restriction
for participants to keep their eyes on the center of the diagram during the tracking task), “tumorfixation” (all items for the digit-tracking task appeared in the center of the diagram; this group
was identical to the “tumor-fixation” group from Thomas & Lleras 2007), and “no-eyemovement” (same as the “tumor-fixation” group, except participants were instructed to never
move their eyes from the center of the diagram). Each group consisted of 23 participants, and no
participants needed to be excluded for tracking task failures or for noticing a relationship
between the tracking task and the problem’s solution.
As before, participants received instructions for Duncker’s radiation problem prior to
beginning the digit-tracking task. The same solution procedure was employed (where
participants were permitted to interrupt the digit-tracking task to provide a solution), and the
digit-tracking task lasted 10 minutes if they did not provide a correct solution before the 10minute mark. After participants provided their solutions, they were asked whether they noticed
any relationship between the tracking task and the solution to the radiation problem (for this
study, no participant noticed such a relationship).
Results indicated that both the “eye-movement” and “attention-shift” groups had superior
problem solving success (39% and 30%, respectively), compared to the “tumor-fixation” and
“no-eye-movement” groups (13% and 9%, respectively), supported by chi-square and survivor
analyses. Thomas and Lleras noted that, because the “eye-movement” and “attention-shift”
groups were not statistically different from one another, attentional mechanisms were the main
driver behind the embodied effect they observed. That said, their results also indicate that shifts
of attention are not completely divorced from eye movements, at least with respect to the
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benefits they confer for solving spatial problems like Duncker’s radiation problem. In essence,
Thomas and Lleras (2009) claimed that physical action is not necessary for an embodied effect to
emerge, and that something as small as shifts in attention can influence how people think.
Relating Previous Studies to the Present Work
The general explanation for the results among all three previously reviewed studies
(Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras 2007; 2009) is that the guided eye movements (and
concomitant attentional shifts) fostered a perceptual simulation where participants imagined
lasers firing on the tumor from multiple outside points. Perceptual simulations, and the interplay
between body movements, the environment, and cognition, are key components of theories of
embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, 2008; Wilson, 2002). The guided eye
movements (and to a similar extent, the guided attention shifts) were argued to cause participants
to embody the solution which improved their solution rates. When shifting attention or moving
their eyes around the environment (the diagram) in a pattern that embodied the convergence
solution, participants were purportedly more likely to perceptually simulate the convergence
solution to the problem. It is conceivable that problem solvers run mental simulations of the
problem features as they search for the solution. With regard to the Grant and Spivey (2003) and
Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies, those who received embodied guidance for their eye
movements arguably had their mental simulations enhanced or guided by the concomitant
perceptual information. This embodied effect resulted in the increased problem solving success.
However, there is a possible alternative explanation. It is possible that the effects
observed in these previous studies were due to an attentional priming of creativity effect (e.g.,
Friedman, Fishbach, Foerster, & Werth, 2003). According to this effect, it is possible that the

88

eye movements and attention shifts that guided participants to attend to a broader area led to
improved creativity (which increased solution success rates), rather than engendering a
perceptual simulation of the radiation problem. Creativity is suggested to be a requirement for
solving Duncker’s radiation problem (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Dow & Mayer, 2004), and for
solving insight problems in general (Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky,
Kounios, & Beeman, 2012). If Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009)
manipulations gave rise to a creativity priming effect, it may explain why they failed to see
significant differences between the “embodied-solution” and “areas-of-interest” groups in their
first study (2007), as well as the lack of significant differences between the “eye-movement” and
“attention-shift” groups in their second study (2009). As they claim in Thomas and Lleras
(2009), it was the guided attention shifting component that influenced cognition, not specifically
the embodied eye movements themselves. This may also relate to a limitation that Thomas and
Lleras (2007; 2009) mentioned: that their guided task does not specifically convey the direction
of the rays. That is, the eye movements could just as equally convey inward movement toward
the tumor from multiple points, or outward motion originating from the tumor and exiting at
multiple different points. Thus, it is possible that the effect observed in all three of these studies
was not driven by an embodied perceptual simulation effect, but rather, an attentionally-primed
increase in creativity that led to increased solution rates.
There are other possible effects and relationships to consider with respect to this
embodied or attentional priming effect. Duncker’s radiation problem has been used in classic
research on analogical problem solving (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980), but only a few of the
studies examining analogical problem solving have examined embodied effects, with mixed
results. To date, there are no studies that have tested whether guided eye movements can aid in
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analogical problem solving, and the present work aims to test this research question. Further, by
testing whether Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) effects are due
to fostering perceptual simulation or priming creativity with attention, the present work may be
able to clarify why other studies that have examined embodied mechanisms in analogical
problem solving have been largely unsuccessful in demonstrating an embodied effect (e.g.,
Cooperrider & Goldin-Meadow, 2014; Hostetter, Wieth, Foster, Moreno, & Washington, 2016;
Trowbridge, 2016). The present work expands on Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009)
methodology to address these missing pieces in the literature, and additionally combine their
methodology with a traditional analogical problem solving paradigm to assess whether embodied
effects (or attentional priming of creativity effects) confer any benefits for novel problems with
analogous solutions.
Attention, Creativity, and Problem Solving
Since creativity has been associated with success in solving the radiation problem, as well
as with analogical problem solving (Corkill & Fager, 1995; Dow & Mayer, 2002; Gick &
Holyoak, 1980), and Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) employed
attentional techniques for their “embodied” conditions, it is worth considering the
interrelatedness of attention and creativity. Previous work has identified a relationship between
attention and creativity (e.g., Vartanian, 2009; Zabelina, Saporta, & Beeman, 2016) such that
those who are more creative are more likely to possess a “broad attentional capacity,” which
enables them to combine two or more concepts with one another (Eysenck, 1995; as cited in
Vartanian, 2009) or similarly, a “wide breadth of attention,” which increases the probability that
distant concepts or stimuli will be brought together (Kasof, 1997). Empirical evidence has
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supported that people who are more creative tend to suffer when performing simple tasks where
attentional distractors are in place due to their wider breadth of attention, whereas those who are
less creative show lesser performance decrements in the face of attentional distractors due to
their narrower breadth of attention (e.g., Kasof, 1997; Vartanian, Martindale, & Kwiatkowski,
2007).
Understanding the existence of a link between attention and creativity, one line of
research has examined whether broad or narrow attentional focuses can be primed, leading to a
difference in creative performance. Friedman, Fishbach, Foerster, and Werth (2003) conducted a
series of experiments that identified that priming someone by having them focus in a relatively
narrow visual field, compared to a relatively broad visual field, facilitated participants’ creativity
as indicated by later tasks requiring participants to come up with creative uses for bricks and
generating unusual category exemplars. Those who focused on a broader visual field (as
compared to a narrower visual field) were more likely to come up with a creative use for a brick,
or a more unusual exemplar for a number of categories. They further identified that this effect
held when participants were asked to contract their muscles to raise their eyebrows (as if looking
in a broad visual field) compared to furrowing their brow (as if focusing on a small visual field)
when coming up with as many creative uses for scissors as they could think of – those who held
their eyebrows in a raised position while completing the task generated more creative uses for
scissors than those who furrowed their brows. Friedman and colleagues’ (2003) effects were
supported in a traditional laboratory visual attention experiment (a visual search task with broad
and narrow search areas) and a more applied visual attention task (viewing Rand McNally maps,
focus either on an entire state or a specific city within that state).
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Another study examined how visual attention affects problem solving strategies.
Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios, and Beeman (2012) examined problem solvers’
strategies for solving Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems before and after performing
a visual attention task. These problems are unique in that they can be solved either through a
search strategy, or through a more “creative” strategy: insight (Wegbreit et al., 2012). For
example, a problem solver may be presented with the words “wheel” “hand” and “shopping,”
and they must identify a word that can go along with the words presented to form compound
words or phrases. In this example, “cart” would be the remote associate that fits all three
presented words, yielding the compounds “cartwheel” “handcart” and “shopping cart.”
Adopting a search strategy, problem solvers could test different words through trial-and-error to
identify the compound remote associate that fits with all three presented words. Alternatively, a
problem solver could wait for a moment of insight, where the solution word suddenly “pops-out”
to the problem solver (Novick & Sherman, 2003).
Wegbreit and colleagues tested their participants with several CRA problems, and then
submitted them to either a narrow or broad visual attention task. The narrow visual attention
task was a simple flanker task (e.g., identify whether a T or S was in the center of a computer
screen, with two distractor stimuli presented to the left and right). The broad visual attention
task was a rapid identification task, where problem solvers saw a blurred greyscale image of an
animal, which they had to identify quickly. This was assumed to require broad attentional focus,
as opposed to the flanker task, which required narrow attentional focus. Both groups endured 80
of these trials in 4 separate blocks. Afterward, they solved a new set of CRA problems.
Interestingly, self-reported strategy use during the initial set of CRA problems was statistically
equivalent across groups. However, after undergoing the visual attention task, the groups
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showed different patterns of strategy use, such that the group receiving the broad visual attention
task reported using insight strategies significantly more frequently.
In short, these studies demonstrated that visual attention tasks can influence creative
thinking and creative problem solving, with the general idea that visual attention tasks that
require broader visual attention are more likely to elicit a behavioral change toward creativity.
Interestingly, these studies are not cited in the analogical problem solving literature (at the time
of this writing), which seems a missed opportunity of sorts. This literature is worth mentioning
due to the association of analogical reasoning and creativity, but it is particularly relevant in light
of the effects observed in Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009), whose
experimental manipulations explicitly involved the use of narrow and broad visual attention.
Their results may be more accurately explained by an attention-modulated creativity effect.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning how creativity is measured as a construct. Piffer (2012)
claimed that creativity as a broad construct is incredibly difficult to measure, but one subconstruct of creativity (divergent thinking) is of relevance to the aforementioned studies and the
present work. Divergent thinking as a construct is based on Guilford’s (1967) perspective of
creativity which emphasizes the generation of multiple ideas, originality of ideas, and detail of
ideas. Each experiment in Friedman and colleagues’ (2003) work employed a divergent thinking
task measuring either fluency or originality. Vincent, Decker, & Mumford (2002) identified that
divergent thinking was associated with creative problem solving in a military context, which may
be relevant to the creative aspects of solving the radiation problem and its analogies. For the
present study, participants were instructed to provide as many solutions to the radiation problem
and its analogies within a time limit. For this reason, this solution-generation aspect could be
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considered a divergent thinking task, and the number of solutions provided by participants was
analyzed to answer hypotheses about creativity priming and problem solving.
If creativity may be a key to successful problem solving or seeing the relationships
between problems (e.g., Corkill & Fager, 1995), it is possible that the priming effect Grant and
Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) observed was not entirely due to a
facilitation of a perceptual simulation of the radiation problem. Based on Friedman and
colleagues (2003) and Wegbreit and colleagues’ (2012) work, it is possible that the
aforementioned embodied effects were due to an attentional priming of creativity that led to an
increase in divergent thinking during problem solving, rather than facilitating participants
perceptually simulating the radiation problem. The present work aims to disentangle these
effects.
Individual Differences in Analogical Problem Solving
Corkill & Fager (1995) quote Anderson (1990), who claimed “it requires a little
sophistication to use analogy correctly…” arguing that ‘sophistication’ likely refers to individual
differences. Including Corkill & Fager (1995), only a few studies have examined analogical
problem solving from an individual differences standpoint, with evidence for differences
between gender, educational discipline, and cognitive style (Antonietti & Gioletta, 1995), and
various aspects of creativity and cognitive ability (Corkill & Fager, 1995; Kubricht, Lu, &
Holyoak, 2017). Interestingly, two of these studies have identified conditional relationships
where individual differences seem to make a bigger impact. For example, Corkill and Fager
(1995) discovered that most of the effects of individual differences to predict problem solving
success disappeared when participants received a hint when trying to solve the problem.
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Kubricht et al. (2017) observed that individual differences in cognitive ability were only
predictive in the absence of a visual animation. These effects suggest that there are ways in
which disparate levels of individual differences (e.g., cognitive ability) can be equalized through
instructional features or interventions. It is worth noting, that although Kubricht et al. (2017)
found evidence for a relationship between cognitive ability and problem solving, Antonietti &
Gioletta (1995) used the same measure (Raven’s Progressive Matrices, e.g., Raven, 2000) and
did not find such a relationship. The contributions of individual differences toward analogical
problem solving success are still not well understood, but it is possible that more basic measures
of cognitive ability are predictive of analogical problem solving success. Another aspect of
cognitive ability, spatial ability, has been associated with creative thinking (e.g., Shepard, 1978),
and schematic thinking (e.g. Hegarty & Kozhevnikov, 1999; Kozhevnikov, Hegarty, & Mayer,
2002; Lohman, 1996), which are of relevance to the present work.
Spatial Ability
Spatial ability has been classified as an independent component of intelligence that
involves the mental encoding, processing, and manipulation of spatial representations (Eliot &
Smith, 1983, as cited by Carroll, 1993). Spatial ability has been classified as a component of
mental imagery abilities, complementary to visual imagery (e.g., Farah, Hammond, Levine, &
Calvanio, 1988; Kosslyn, 1990; Logie, 1995). Farah et al. (1988) classify visual imagery as the
pictorial component of mental imagery abilities, responsible for the pictorial details of imagery,
whereas the spatial subcomponent of mental imagery relates to visualizing spatial relationships
among mentally imaged spatial components. Further, they defined visual imagery as being
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exclusively modal (e.g., the visual modality), whereas spatial imagery could be modal or amodal,
and represent more abstract relationships within mental images.
Within the broad domain of spatial ability, factor analytic studies have supported that
there are several sub-abilities which comprise spatial ability as a construct (Carroll, 1993). A
multitude of works have categorized spatial ability into multiple different sub-constructs (e.g.,
Carroll, 1993; French, 1951; Pellegrino, Alderton, & Shute, 2009; Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden,
1995), but there is one sub-construct that exists in nearly every discussion: spatial visualization.
Spatial visualization is the most pertinent to the present work and has been defined as the mental
manipulation of spatial relationships in two-dimensional and three-dimensional space, involving
imagined movements and manipulations of imagined objects (French, 1951, as cited by Carroll,
1993).
Several works have uncovered associations of spatial ability which may be integral for
problem solving. Lohman (1996), in a review of spatial ability and general intelligence,
identified that people with lower spatial ability tended to have difficulty constructing
“systematically structured images,” or, a spatial mental representation. Regarding problem
solving, Sternberg and Gardner (1983) suggested that spatial mental representations are helpful
when solving problems with spatial components (e.g., word problems where one must figure out
who is the shortest out of several comparative descriptions – “Bill is shorter than Bob, but taller
than Bryan. Bob is taller than Bryan. Who is the shortest?”).
In a study examining whether spatial ability was associated with successful problem
solving, Hegarty and Kozhevnikov (1999) explored the distinction between visual and spatial
imagery regarding children’s math problem solving. Those with higher spatial ability tended to
adopt more schematic, spatial strategies for solving the math problems, and tended to be more
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successful as compared to those with lower spatial ability, who tended to adopt a pictorial
strategy. Hegarty and Kozhevnikov’s work is perhaps the earliest that identified the role of
spatial ability in the formation of schematic mental representations, which aid in problem
solving. Later, Kozhevnikov, Hegarty, & Mayer (2002) identified that students who had higher
spatial visualization ability tended to construct schematic mental representations of learning
material they were presented, based on interviews about how students understood the material.
Due to the spatial, schematic nature of Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem and all of its
analogous problems, spatial ability should be a meaningful predictor of performance on these
problems and may prove beneficial for analogical problem solving as well.
Summary
This chapter has reviewed a multitude of factors that influence analogical problem
solving (e.g., narrative stories, diagrams, animations, enactments) and problem solving in general
(e.g., guided eye movements, visual attention tasks). Additionally, the rationale and justification
for alternative factors (e.g., attentional priming of creativity, spatial ability) have been
considered. The present study aims to combine the methodologies from the eye-movement
studies (Grant and Spivey, 2003; Thomas and Lleras, 2007; 2009) with traditional analogical
problem solving paradigms (e.g., Gick and Holyoak, 1980; 1983) to explore the nature of how
embodiment and spatial ability influence problem solving success and analogical transfer.
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CHAPTER THREE: STUDY 1
Method
To assess the factors that contribute to improvements in problem solving, the following
experiments investigated the effects of guided attention on problem solving, in addition to
evaluating the influence of cognitive abilities. This section describes three studies. The purpose
of the first study is to determine an appropriate duration of induction time that results in a
notable increase in problem solution rates, as previous research has not prescribed a set duration
for induction. Largely, the first study is a simplified version of Study 2, with the purpose of
providing a justification for methodological components of Study 2 (e.g., how long of an
induction period to use), and conducting preliminary testing of hypotheses to be assessed in the
second study. Study 2 delved deeper into the effects from previous research and systematically
examined whether the perceptual simulation effect occurred, or whether this effect was more
simply explained by an attentional priming effect of creativity. In addition, it also examined
whether there were any unique contributions or interacting effects of spatial ability on the
various experimental combinations of this study. It also expanded on the initial study by
including an analogical problem solving component, where participants attempted to solve
problems with structurally analogous solutions. This served to evaluate whether any initial
problem solving benefits confer latent effects on analogical problem solving, or if they are
merely temporary benefits for solving a single problem. The final study expanded on the results
of Study 2 to examine additional research questions relating to perceptual priming, drawing
solutions, and embodied cognition.
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The primary purpose of Study 1 was to establish the methodology for the forthcoming
studies. Participants underwent an induction phase with a varying duration of 4 minutes or 7
minutes, and performed one of three tracking tasks: Embodied eye movements, Fixed eye
movements, or Free Viewing (without tracking). These times were selected based on two
timepoints where Thomas & Lleras (2007; 2009) saw the most gains in success rates during their
problem solving task. These factors were to serve as an experimental vs. control comparison to
provide justification for the design of Study 2. In addition, in line with previous research, this
experiment also included a baseline condition, where no induction phase was performed. This
served to further differentiate the effects of induction by allowing a comparison from a control
group that attempts the problem in absence of induction or incubation. Thus, the major
conditions can be conceived as experimental (digit tracking with guided movements), incubation
(digit tracking with no guided movements), and control (attempt problem cold). Having these
major conditions also permits a more clarified analysis of the unique contributions of cognitive
abilities to problem solving success.
Participants
For the first study, 170 participants volunteered their time. The mean age was 19.38
years (SD = 2.24), and there were 70 males, 99 females, and 1 who preferred not to respond. The
ethnic makeup was 47% Caucasian/White, 30.3% Hispanic, 14.6% Asian, 11.7% Black/African
American, and 5.8% Other. Regarding major, 69% of participants in this sample were majoring
in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) areas, and 34.5% of participants
were majoring in a medical-related concentration. The class rank makeup of the sample was
64.1% Freshmen, 20.5% Sophomores, 11.8% Juniors, and 3.7% Seniors.
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Materials
Digit Tracking Task
Past research only used a 10 minute induction phase (Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009),
where there was a 30 second tracking task repeated 20 times. However, participants were able to
stop the tracking task whenever they felt prepared to solve the problem. Since needed induction
time could vary significantly among participants (not considering those who would not solve the
problem), one of the major aims of this initial study was to determine how many stimulus sets
would be suitable for a general sample to have sufficient induction. For this task, participants
saw a simple diagram representing a tumor and healthy skin tissue, related to the radiation
problem they are trying to solve. Around this diagram, participants saw letters appearing inside
and outside of the diagram in a particular orientations, intended to guide their eye movements.
While participants keep their focus on these appearing letters, at random points during the task, a
number appeared in place of a letter. Participants were instructed to click the mouse on the
screen when they see a number pop up instead of a letter, and their response time to this digit
appearance was recorded. This digit tracking task is nearly identical in design to the task used in
Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009), in efforts to more closely replicate their methodology. In
Thomas and Lleras (2007), participants sat 58 cm away from the computer, and viewed a large
image of the diagram (subtending a horizontal visual angle of 20.3° and a vertical visual angle of
14°). Each letter and number for the digit tracking task was comparatively small (subtending a
horizontal visual angle of 0.3° and a vertical visual angle of 0.5°). To ensure a similar visual
angle for all stimuli is subtended, participants were seated approximately 60 cm away from the
computer screen, and their chair was guided into place with reference marks on the floor. Those
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who are assigned to the experimental groups tracked letters and digits that appeared inside and
outside of the center of the diagram in a triangular fashion, which is congruent with the spatial
solution to the problems participants solved. Those who are assigned to the incubation groups
tracked letters and digits that appeared only in the center of the screen, in absence of a diagram.
Problem Solving
Participants attempted to solve Duncker’s (1945) Radiation Problem, as described in
Gick and Holyoak (1980, pp. 307-308):
“Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his
stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed
the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy the tumor. If
the rays reach the tumor all at once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will
be destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass
through on the way to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays
are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the tumor either. What type
of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time
avoid destroying the healthy tissue?”

All participants viewed this problem with a simple diagram illustrating the tumor and
skin, as in previous research (e.g., Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras, 2007;2009).
Previous research classifies this problem as an insight problem, which is traditionally very
difficult to solve using typical problem solving techniques (e.g., heuristics, trial-and-error, etc.)
(Weisberg & Alba, 1987). In line with previous research, participants also had scratch paper
available to them when attempting to solve the problems for their convenience. As previous
research has indicated that there may be issues with forcing participants to respond in a certain
way (e.g., gesturing, Cooperrider & Goldin-Meadow, 2014), the scratch paper was provided for
participants’ spontaneous use at their discretion. Although using the scratch paper was optional,
their responses were graded based on a written solution to the problem. All participants’ scratch
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paper was collected whether or not they used it. For this study, only two participants used the
scratch paper, and none of them used it on the radiation problem.
Spatial Ability
Participants completed two measures of spatial ability: the card rotations test (CRT),
hypothesized to assess basic spatial processing, and the paper folding test (PFT), hypothesized to
assess spatial visualization. Due to the spatial and schematic nature of the radiation problem’s
solution, and considering prior research suggesting that spatial ability (in particular, spatial
visualization) is associated with the use of schematic representations during problem solving,
these measures were selected to assess whether these aspects of spatial ability contribute to
problem solving success, and whether they interact with a schematic induction phase.
The CRT (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) is a 3-minute test containing ten
sets of items. For each set of items, participants see a prototypical “card.” Next to this card are
eight test cards, which are rotated or mirrored and rotated versions of the prototypical card.
Participants must make a judgment about whether each of these eight test cards are the same as
the prototypical card (e.g., rotated), or different (e.g., a mirrored image). Participants’ scores are
calculated by summing the number of correctly identified test items and subtracting the number
of incorrectly identified test items.
The PFT (Ekstrom et al., 1976) is also a 3-minute test containing ten sets of items.
Participants are presented an image of a square piece of paper that undergoes a series of one to
three folds, before a hole is punched through it on the final step. Participants must select from
among five choices representing what the punctured piece of paper would look like after being
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completely unfolded. Participants’ scores are calculated by summing the number of correctly
selected items and subtracting 20% of the number of incorrectly selected items.
Although the literature suggests that spatial visualization ability (a construct measured by
the PFT) is related to spatial thinking during problem solving (Hegarty & Kozhevnikov, 1999;
Kozhevnikov et al., 2002), a more basic measure of spatial ability may be of use in more broadly
assessing the relationship between spatial ability and problem solving success. Conceptually,
each measure assesses qualitatively different aspects of spatial ability, which may be disparately
related to problem solving success, or predict complementary aspects of problem solving success
which may not be detectable with only a single measure. Although spatial visualization
specifically is hypothesized to be related to problem solving success, a composite measure may
prove useful in predicting variance in problem solving success if elements of spatial relations
play a complementary role in problem solving.
Demographic Questionnaire
This questionnaire included basic demographic questions, including as age, school
classification (e.g., freshman, senior, etc.), gender, and ethnicity, as well as various questions
hypothesized to be related to problem solving success. Specifically, participants were asked
questions about their relevant experience, due to previous research suggesting that medical
students are more likely to solve the radiation problem due to its medical-procedural features. In
a similar vein, participants were also asked to provide their major, or the subject they were most
interested in if they had not yet declared a major. Participants also were asked if they had
previously seen any of the problems presented in the study (which naturally increases the
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likelihood of solving the problems). Lastly, participants were asked to self-report on a 5-point
Likert-type scale the degree to which they liked solving puzzles.
Design
To determine the appropriate length for the induction phase, this study was a 3
(condition) by 2 (digit tracking duration) between subjects design, with an additional baseline
condition that does not undergo an induction phase (for a total of 7 groups). These groups were
compared between each other at each time point, and individually against the baseline condition,
to determine which induction duration results in the most significant increase in solution success
rates. These results were intended to provide justification for the induction duration for the
proceeding study.
Procedure
For study 1, participants were provided a general overview of the study, using the
informed consent as a guide. They had an opportunity to ask questions before the study began.
Once any questions were answered to participants’ satisfaction, they were directed to a computer
where they began the study. First, they were presented with an informed consent form, after
which they were prompted to indicate whether they provide consent.
After participants have consented, all conditions viewed the radiation problem. They
were permitted to read it for as long as they liked and clicked a “next” button when they were
ready to proceed. Those in the guided eye movements, fixed eye movements, and free-viewing
conditions proceeded to do their digit-tracking tasks for an ‘induction phase’ of 4 or 7 minutes.
Those in the baseline condition did not undergo an induction phase but were immediately
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prompted to generate solutions for the radiation problem. Those in the other conditions
proceeded to the solution phase after they complete their induction phase.
For all conditions, during the solution phase, they saw the problem as described above,
with the same simple diagram they saw during the initial problem presentation. They did not
have a time limit to solve the problem. Once participants submitted their solutions to the
problem, they received a hint statement, saying “What if you had multiple lasers? It’s okay to
repeat a solution you gave earlier.” After they received this hint statement, they saw the
problem one final time, and were instructed to provide the solution again (even if they have to
repeat themselves). Afterward, they were shown the written form of the convergence solution
and queried if they noticed a similarity between the induction phase and the solution to the
problem.
After the problem solving portion of the study has concluded, the experimenter collected
participants’ scratch paper, and they proceeded to complete their spatial tests Once the cognitive
tests have been completed, participants completed the demographic questionnaire. This
questionnaire was presented last to minimize potential stereotype threat effects that may occur as
a result of having participants identify their gender or race prior to taking cognitive tests (e.g.,
Steele & Aronson, 1995). The average time participants spent in this study was approximately
40 minutes, for which they received course credit.
A figure outlining the procedure of Study 1 is presented below (see Figure 10).
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Figure 10. Outline of the procedure for study 1.
Different conditions are denoted by differently colored boxes. Note that the “Guided Eye
Movements,” “Fixed Eye Movements,” and “Free Viewing” conditions consist of 2 groups each,
separated by duration. Additionally, a baseline group went straight to attempting to solve the
radiation problem without performing any eye movement or free viewing task.
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Results
For an overview of the results addressing each study’s research questions, please refer to
Appendix D.
In this section, each hypothesis is listed with an analysis plan. A power analysis (through
G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) is provided for each analysis to be
conducted. As a general note, response times on the digit-tracking task were utilized as an
exclusionary criterion from any analyses. Participants whose response times were greater than 3
standard deviations above the mean response time on the digit tracking task were excluded from
analyses. Similarly, those whose accuracy was less than 75% on the digit tracking task were also
removed.
Data Prescreening
Participants Removed from Analyses
For this study, two participants were removed from analyses for the following reasons:
One participant Christmas-treed their responses on the individual difference measures, and both
participants did not complete the tracking task correctly. There were no participants who
reported having seen the radiation problem before. All other participants were retained for
analyses (remaining N = 168).
Tracking Task Reaction Times
Before analyzing Study 1’s data, participants’ performance on the tracking task was
assessed. Only those whose tracking accuracy was 75% or greater were retained for analyses.
Accuracy was determined by excluding participants whose reaction times were greater than three
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standard deviations above the mean value, which was roughly 1000 milliseconds after the
stimulus was presented. Participants were also excluded if their reaction was recorded prior to
the onset of the stimulus. As mentioned before, two participants were excluded from analyses
for this reason.
For the digit-tracking task, participants were required to react by clicking the mouse
when they saw a number appear on a diagram of the radiation problem. Their response times
were recorded when they clicked their mouse. In Study 1, there were only four groups that
underwent a tracking task that required reaction time (the free-viewing and baseline groups did
not have a tracking component in their version of the study). A two-way ANOVA on tracking
times with duration (4 minutes or 7 minutes) and eye movement guidance (embodied or fixed)
was performed but showed no significant differences across groups (F (3, 102) = 2.08, p = .107,
η2p = .06). These reaction times were consistent in pattern and duration with previous studies
(Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009), where the fixed conditions showed quicker reaction times than
the guided conditions, likely due to the guided tracking task requiring more eye movements
which increased their reaction time. Although the differences in the present study were not
significant, they were similar in direction from previous research. Tracking times for each of the
relevant conditions are provided below in Table 1.

Table 1. Tracking Task Reaction Times (Means and Standard Deviations) for Study 1
Condition
Guided, 7 min
Guided, 4 min
Fixed, 7 min
Fixed, 4 min

M
603ms
625ms
537ms
582ms

108

SD
105ms
131ms
162ms
121ms

Hypothesis Testing
The purpose of Study 1 and preliminary hypothesis tests are described in this section,
based on the conditions outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Groups in Study 1 with sample sizes and solution rates (provided as percentages)

4 min. tracking task 7 min. tracking task
Guided Eye Movements (1) n = 28; 17.9%

(2) n = 27; 11.1%

Fixed Eye Movements

(3) n = 26; 26.9%

(4) n = 25; 8.0%

Free Viewing

(5) n = 20; 20.0%

(6) n = 21; 23.8%

(7) Baseline Group n = 21; 14.2%
Note. These sample sizes were calculated after removal of participants, described in the results
section of this chapter.

In general, the purpose of Study 1 was to determine an appropriate tracking task duration
that results in notable differences in solution rates between the embodied eye movements and
fixed eye movements groups. Other measures were collected during Study 1 (e.g., spatial
ability), and were used to conduct preliminary tests of major study hypotheses.
The main comparison is a six-group chi-square test, comparing the solution rates of
groups (1) – (6) (this procedure is in-line with traditional comparisons of problem solving
success; Gick & Holyoak, 1980). The baseline group (7) was collected to identify a general rate
of solving the radiation problem without any aids. Using default values from G*Power (Faul et
al., 2007), a power analysis suggested a sample size of 127 is applicable, requiring roughly 20-25
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participants for each of the 6 groups (see Figure 11). The number of participants analyzed in
Study 1 was 168 total (147 when excluding the baseline group from analyses).

Figure 11. Power analysis for chi-square test used in Study 1.
Solution Rates by Condition
The solution rate for the baseline group was 14.2% (3 correct, 18 incorrect). A chisquare test comparing groups (1) through (6) showed that no group was statistically different
from any of the others; χ2 (5) = 4.55, p = .47. The chi-square tests comparing condition (Guided,
Fixed, Free Viewing) and duration (4 minute, 7 minute) were also not statistically significant; χ2
(2) = 0.86, p = .64 for condition; χ2 (1) = 1.58, p = .21 for duration. No single group was
statistically better than the baseline group (lowest p = .29).
Spatial Ability and Incubation
Because spatial ability measures were collected in Study 1, it is possible to preliminarily
test Hypotheses 3, 3a, and 3b. Hypothesis 3 (that spatial ability is associated with performance)
was tested using a logistic regression analysis, with convergence solution rates as the outcome
variable and spatial ability (as measured by the PFT or the CRT) as the predictor variable. The
result with the PFT was not statistically significant (χ2 (1) = 1.16, p = .28), and the result with the
CRT was also not significant (χ2 (1) = 0.05, p = .83).
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Hypotheses 3a and 3b were also tested using logistic regression, allowing the continuous
variable of spatial ability to interact with the categorical variable eye condition. Because there
were no significant differences between the 4 or 7-minute induction groups, this analysis was
performed inclusive of both durations. There were no significant main effects for spatial ability
or condition, and the interaction was not significant (overall model with PFT χ2 (3) = 3.68, p =
.30; overall model with CRT χ2 (3) = 1.46, p = .69).
Hypothesis 4 (incubation) was also preliminarily tested by comparing the fixed eye
movement groups against the baseline group. The fixed eye movement manipulation should
convey no benefit other than incubation of the problem. By comparing it to the baseline group,
an incubation effect can be estimated. This result was not statistically significant (χ2 (2) = 3.41,
p = .18), although this effect was in the hypothesized direction, with the fixed eye movement
groups showing slightly higher solution rates than the baseline group.
Creativity in Written Solutions
Aside from simple solution rates, there are also a variety of ways that creativity can be
assessed. Adapting Guilford’s (1967) ideas of divergent thinking, participants’ written responses
were analyzed in four different ways. Fluency, or the correctness of an answer; Originality, or
the idea that a response is rare compared to other responses; Flexibility, or the amount of
different kinds of solutions provided; and Elaboration, described as the amount of detail provided
in a response. Fluency was assessed by whether the participant provided a convergence solution
(results provided in previous section). Originality was scored using Guilford’s (1967)
guidelines, where answers provided by 5% of the sample earn 1 point, and answers provided by
1% of the sample earn 2 points. Higher points correspond to greater originality. Flexibility was
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determined based on the number of unique categories of solutions provided as indicated by an
answer coding scheme. Lastly, Elaboration was determined by counting the character length of
the typed responses.
In addition to these categories based on Guilford’s (1967) work, two other categories
were created to expand the present work’s ability to test how the experimental manipulations
may have affected participants’ problem solving behaviors. These variables were the total
number of solutions each participant generated (Total Solutions), and the total number of
redundant solutions generated (Redundant Solutions). Redundant solutions were calculated by
subtracting the number of unique solution types (Flexibility) from the total number of solutions.
A high number of redundant solutions could indicate that a problem solver has become fixated
on a type of solution and may represent a negative side to attentional priming. These variables
were included in the forthcoming analyses to better understand the potential effects of attentional
priming on creativity.
Prior to analyzing creativity dependent variables, a coding scheme for the written
solutions to the radiation problem was generated with one other independent coder. This coding
scheme was developed with both coders naïve to which condition each participant was randomly
assigned (see Table 3). Based on recent guidelines for interrater reliability from McHugh
(2012), Cohen’s κ scores of interrater reliability were excellent for each of the three studies
(mean κ = .82, .88, and .96 for Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively).
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Table 3. Coding Scheme for Solution Types to the Radiation Problem.

Coding Scheme
A Convergence solution
B Cut/Open up patient, then fire at tumor
C Consume something that alters tissue/tumor weakness/strength
D Strengthen/protect healthy tissue
E Variable intensity/High and Low intensities
F Let the tumor grow before attempting anything
G Go full intensity and hope patient recovers
H Medium Intensity
I
Send something through the body that shoots rays at tumor
J New technology (nanorobots, CRISPR, gene editing, etc.)
K Move/Replace healthy tissue
L Vague/nondescript/find another way
M Ignore/don't operate/do nothing
N Timing/Multiple sessions (brief high intensity or brief low intensity)
O Remove the tumor/move the tumor
P Send rays at areas/angle with least healthy tissue
Q Organ/Tissue Transplant
R Reflect/Refract rays using lenses/mirrors
S Chemotherapy
T Split the tumor up and then fire at it
U Sample the tumor to create a drug to fight it
V Use electric current

Rarity of solution
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
4.63% 9.54% 7.74%
10.69% 15.05% 13.81%
4.63% 1.83% 3.77%
4.15% 2.57% 4.18%
3.99% 8.07% 5.44%
0.64% 0.37% 0.21%
13.72% 15.96% 19.67%
6.38% 7.71% 7.95%
5.42% 3.49% 4.18%
1.12% 0.73% 0.42%
7.18% 7.71% 6.28%
10.53% 5.32% 3.56%
1.44% 1.65% 1.26%
10.37% 9.17% 11.30%
5.42% 3.30% 3.97%
5.42% 5.69% 2.93%
1.44% 0.55% 0.63%
0.80% 0.55% 0.42%
1.44% 0.55% 1.88%
0.32% 0.18% 0.42%
0.16% 0.00% 0.00%
0.16% 0.00% 0.00%

Note. Solution rarities were determined by dividing each solution’s frequency by the number of
all solutions provided in each sample. “Rare” solutions (<5% occurrence rate as per Guilford,
1967) are bolded. Note that solution category L was not counted as a “rare” solution because it
served as a “catch-all” category for solutions that were incomplete or did not make sense.
Solution category M was also not counted as a “rare” solution because it represents a lack of
attempt for solving the problem. Participants were instructed to provide as many different
solutions as they could think of to solve the radiation problem.

To assess whether duration or condition resulted in differences in creativity, five 2
(Duration) x 3 (Condition) factorial ANOVAs were performed on scores of Originality,
Flexibility, Elaboration, Total Solutions, and Redundant Solutions (see Appendix E for a
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MANOVA of these analyses). For Originality, there were no significant differences among any
of the variables or their interaction, F(5, 141) = 0.70, p = .63, η2p = .024 (see Figure 12).
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0
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Figure 12. Originality scores for each condition and duration. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean. There were no significant differences among the groups.
For Flexibility, there also were no significant differences among any of the variables or
their interaction, F(5, 141) = 1.38, p = .24, η2p = .047 (see Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Flexibility scores for each condition and duration. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean. There were no significant differences among the groups.
For Elaboration, there also were no significant differences among any of the variables or
their interaction, F(5, 141) = 1.18, p = .33, η2p = .040 (see Figure 14).
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Figure 14. Elaboration scores for each condition and duration. This score was measured using
character count length in participants’ responses. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. There were no significant differences among the groups.
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There also were no significant differences for Total Solutions among any of the variables
or their interaction, F(5, 141) = 1.09, p = .37, η2p = .037 (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Total Solutions generated for each condition and duration. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean. There were no significant differences among the groups.

Lastly, there was a significant difference in Redundant Solutions across the groups, F(5,
141) = 3.59, p = .004, η2p = .113. This difference was driven by a main effect for condition (F(1,
141) = 4.55, p = .01, η2p = .061), as well as an interaction between duration and condition (F(2,
141) = 3.46, p = .03, η2p = .047). The Free Viewing group had significantly more Redundant
solutions than all other groups (Least Significant Difference (LSD) ps for mean differences <
.05), and this was particularly more pronounced for the 7-minute duration (LSD ps for mean
differences < .01; see Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Number of Redundant Solutions for each condition and duration. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean. The Free-Viewing condition had significantly more
redundant solutions than the other two conditions, which was driven by those in the 7-minute
free-viewing condition.
It should be noted that the baseline group was excluded from the previous analyses
because they did not undergo a digit-tracking or free-viewing task. When compared against all
other conditions on the previously analyzed creativity variables, the baseline group was not
significantly different than any other condition on any variable (all ps > .15) except for
Originality and Redundant Solutions (LSD ps < .03). The baseline group had significantly lower
Originality than the 4 minute guided condition and the 7-minute free-viewing condition, as well
as significantly fewer Redundant Solutions than the 7-minute free-viewing condition (this is
parallel with the previous factorial ANOVA showing the 7-minute free-viewing condition had
disproportionately the most Redundant Solutions compared to all other conditions).
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Discussion
In general, these results do not support any proposed hypotheses, and the data do not
support any specific induction times for the digit-tracking task. Furthermore, there were no
differences in creativity scores observed with any of the conditions. Prior to proceeding with
Study 2, the methodology was re-evaluated in the context of the previous studies. There were
two main differences in Study 1’s methodology that may have contributed to why the effects
seen in Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies did not replicate
in Study 1’s similar conditions. These methodological factors are discussed below, with the
overall goal to more closely align the initial problem-solving aspect of the present work to that of
Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies. In doing so, the next
two studies should be better able to verify the existence of an embodied effect on problem
solving.
The first methodological factor is the impact of implicit feedback. In Thomas and
Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies, participants underwent the digit-tracking task while attempting to
solve the radiation problem simultaneously. When a participant attempted to generate a solution,
the digit-tracking task was interrupted. During this interruption, participants either exited that
phase of the study if their solution was judged to be correct, or they resumed the digit-tracking
task if their solution was incorrect. In cases where their solution was incorrect, this return to the
digit-tracking task could have served as a kind of implicit feedback. A participant might think
“my solution must be wrong, so I should think of a different solution.” The implicit feedback
inherent to their task design likely facilitated a metacognitive reflection of each participant’s
problem solving process, which could reasonably improve solution success rates (Davidson &
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Sternberg, 1998). The present study did not include this methodological feature, because
including it would preclude any possibility of answering relevant research questions about
incubation or embodied priming. Specifically, it would not make sense to have a participant
undergo a digit-tracking task while simultaneously attempting to solve a problem if they had
never seen it before.
The second methodological factor is the impact of drawing solutions. In all three
previous studies, participants’ only way of providing the solutions was by tracing their solution
on the computer screen in which they performed the digit-tracking task. Successful solutions
involved multiple lines converging on the tumor from different angles. Although participants in
Study 1 were permitted to use scratch paper at their convenience, they were not required to do
so. This methodological aspect was adopted based on previous research that indicated that
forcing problem solvers to respond in a certain way could restrain their responses, risking that
they would not express a solution that they could generate (Cooperrider & Goldin-Meadow,
2014; Hostetter et al., 2016). Incidentally, even though participants in Study 1 had scratch paper
available to them, only three of them used it while solving the radiation problem. In Grant and
Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies, their participants only solved the
radiation problem through drawing their solutions, so it is possible that the embodied effects they
found were spatial in nature and may not emerge through written answers. To address this, all
participants were required to draw their solutions on scratch paper in the forthcoming studies.
Prior to beginning data collection for Study 2, the digit-tracking task’s duration and type
was also re-evaluated. Although there were no statistical comparisons that supported the 4minute or 7-minute durations compared to the Baseline Group, the 4-minute digit-tracking task
duration was selected for the proceeding studies. Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) saw the
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largest increases in solution rates at the 4-minute mark of their digit-tracking tasks, and those
benefits diminished thereafter for the remainder of the 10-minute task. Taken together, these
criteria were used to justify the use of a 4-minute tracking task in Study 2. Regarding the eye
movement guidance, participants anecdotally appeared to experience frustration and discomfort
when doing the free-viewing task. Those in the free-viewing condition stared at a diagram of the
radiation problem for 4 or 7 minutes with no eye movement guidance or other interaction with
the computer. It is possible that this lack of interaction did nothing to help participants incubate
their solutions to the radiation problem, but rather increased boredom due to a lack of interaction.
Furthermore, its primary purpose in Study 1 was to serve as a preliminary comparison condition
against the pure baseline group to test the incubation hypothesis. It was not supported as being
any better than the baseline group, nor was it statistically better than any of the other conditions.
For these reasons, and because the incubation hypothesis was tested in a different fashion for
Study 2, the free-viewing condition was not included in any proceeding studies.
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY 2
Method
Considering the null results of Study 1, Study 2’s design sought to match previous work
(i.e., Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009) to more accurately verify the
existence of any embodied effects on problem solving. This study’s design also expands Study
1’s procedure, extending the embodied problem solving paradigm into analogical problem
solving to answer research questions regarding whether embodied problem solving effects
transfer into later problem solving.
The primary research questions of Study 2 are an extension of those in Study 1. First,
does embodied priming lead to an increase in problem solving success rates, and furthermore,
does this effect also emerge when solving structurally similar transfer problems? Second, is
incubation a better explanation for the effects observed in previous work? Additionally, are
these effects reliably predicted by spatial ability? And lastly, are any of these effects better
explained by an attentional priming of creativity? Although some of these research questions
were not supported in Study 1, Study 2’s criteria for evaluating problem solving success changed
to allow drawings to be judged for correctness. Therefore, this change allows for these research
questions to be tested in a new way.
Participants
For the second study, 173 participants volunteered their time. The mean age was 19.64
years (SD = 1.97), and there were 94 males and 79 females. The ethnic makeup was 49.1%
Caucasian/White, 32.3% Hispanic, 9.9% Asian, 13% Black/African American, and 6.1% Other.
Regarding major, 70.8% of participants in this sample were majoring in STEM (Science,
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Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) areas, and 28% of participants were majoring in a
medical-related concentration. The class rank makeup of the sample was 62.1% Freshmen,
13.7% Sophomores, 16.1% Juniors, 7.5% Seniors, and 0.6% 5th year or higher. Participants were
randomly assigned to 1 of 4 groups, described below in Table 4.

Table 4. Groups and Sample Sizes in Study 2

Problem Before + After

Problem After

Embodied Eye Movements

n = 39
(1) Perceptual Simulation Group

n = 39
(2) “Attentional Priming” Group

Fixed Eye Movements

n = 40
(3) Simple Incubation Group

n = 43
(4) “Control” Group

Note. These sample sizes were calculated after removal of participants, described in the results
section of this chapter.
Materials
All materials used in Study 1 were used in Study 2, with additional problems for
participants to solve, going beyond assessing problem solving to assess analogical problem
solving. For intermediary tasks between these new problems, participants completed measures
of verbal ability. It also included additional variations to the digit tracking task to more precisely
examine differences among different induction phase characteristics.
Verbal Ability
Participants completed a word fluency test (WFT) and a verbal comprehension test
(VCT). Previous research indicated that these measures are important for analogical problem
solving (e.g., Corkill & Fager, 1995), and it might be possible that successfully solving the
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problem may differ as a function of verbal ability. The scores provided by these measures were
included as a control variable when analyzing problem solving success.
The WFT (Ekstrom et al., 1976) consists of two three-minute tests that require
participants to produce as many words as they can beginning or ending with a certain string of
letters (e.g., valid words starting with “re-” might include “reduce,” “reprimand,” or “regal”;
valid words ending in “-ate” might include “rate,” “equate,” or “sedate”). Participants’ WF score
is the number of correct words that they produce in the time limit.
The VCT (Ekstrom et al., 1976) assesses participants’ knowledge of word meanings by
presenting a test word with five multiple choice words. Among these five words, participants
must select the most closely related choice to the test word. For example, if the test word
“jovial” was presented, and choices “refreshing, scare, thickset, wise, and jolly” are available, a
correct response would be to select “jolly.” The VC test is 6 minutes in length and contains 24
items.
Digit Tracking Task
For Study 2, the digit tracking task had two possible levels of the independent variable –
guided eye movements (guided or fixed). Those who are randomly assigned to the guided level
of the guided eye movements variable did their digit tracking task with letters and numbers
appearing in the center of the diagram, and at various points at the outside in a triangular fashion
with repeated visits to the center of the screen. Those randomly assigned to the fixed level of the
guided eye movements variable did their digit tracking task with letters and numbers appearing
only in the center of the diagram. The procedure is largely the same as Study 1 with regard to
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digits appearing and a number randomly appearing in each set. Participants were instructed to
click the mouse whenever they saw a number appear, and this response time was recorded.
Problem Solving
In addition to the radiation problem, participants were tasked with solving the problems
entitled “Red Adair” and “The General.” Their text are as follows (as written in Gick and
Holyoak 1983; excerpts from pp. 36-38; last sentence added to each to prompt problem solving
process):
Red Adair: “An oil well in Saudi Arabia exploded and caught fire. The result was
a blazing inferno that consumed an enormous quantity of oil each day. After initial
efforts to extinguish it failed, famed firefighter Red Adair was called in. Red knew
that the fire could be put out if a huge amount of fire retardant foam could be
dumped on the base of the well. There was enough foam available at the site to do
the job. However, there was no hose large enough to put all the foam on the fire
fast enough. The small hoses that were available could not shoot the foam quickly
enough to do any good. It looked like there would have to be a costly delay before
a serious attempt could be made. Using the available hoses and flame retardant,
how might Red Adair put out the fire?”
The General: “A small country was ruled from a strong fortress by a dictator. The
fortress was situated in the middle of the country, surrounded by farms and villages.
Many roads led to the fortress through the countryside. A rebel general vowed to
capture the fortress. The general knew that an attack by his entire army would
capture the fortress. He gathered his army at the head of one of the roads, ready to
launch a full-scale direct attack. However, the general then learned that the dictator
had planted mines on each of the roads. The mines were set so that small bodies of
men could pass over them safely, since the dictator needed to move his troops and
workers to and from the fortress. However, any large force would detonate the
mines. Not only would this blow up the road, but it would also destroy many
neighboring villages. It therefore seemed impossible to capture the fortress. After
learning of the mines, what strategy can the general take to overtake the dictator’s
fortress?”

Although the radiation problem includes a diagram when presented to participants, the
additional problems in Study 2 did not include a diagram so as not to implicitly prime

124

participants to retrieve or recall the radiation problem. Including diagrams could unintentionally
initiate the analogical reasoning process (as per Gick, 1985; Gick & Holyoak, 1983), and the
present study aimed to investigate analogical reasoning independent of any cuing effects. Thus,
these problems were presented in narrative form with a new piece of scratch paper provided for
each problem. Since there were three problems in this study, participants were provided with
three pieces of scratch paper; one for each problem. After each problem was solved, participants
were instructed to deposit their scratch paper into an envelope matched to their participant
number. This was for data storage purposes, as well as to prevent their scratch paper from one
problem being used on another problem and potentially priming their responses.
Design
To examine the influence of context, embodied aid, and spatial ability, the present study
used a 2 (problem context) x 2 (guided eye movements) completely between design, using
spatial ability as a continuous moderating variable for additional analyses. Problem context had
two levels: whether the participant sees the radiation problem before or after the induction phase.
Guided eye movements also had two levels: participants either had guided eye movements or
fixed eye movements during the digit tracking task.
There were several dependent variables. For each problem, there are multiple points
where participants are prompted to provide a solution to the problem. Each of these points
generated a binary dependent variable – did the participant solve the problem successfully? Did
the participant solve the problem successfully after receiving a hint? On the transfer problems,
participants were asked to describe similarities between the radiation problem and one or more
transfer problems. These narrative descriptions provided qualitative data that were analyzed to
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judge whether participants noticed the convergence similarities among problems (e.g., they
noticed that the problems all required a combining of weaker forces at a central target).
In line with the analysis techniques of previous studies (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980;
1983), all groups were compared using a Chi-Square test to examine whether any of the groups
significantly differ with respect to solution rates before and after hints on each of the problems.
To further address research questions with spatial ability, these data were analyzed using
regression techniques to examine the influences of each variable and the interactions among the
variables on solution success. These analyses were conducted for each step of the procedure
where solutions are generated (e.g., initial solutions, hinted solutions). Because the DV is binary
(a solution is either provided or not provided), logistic regression analyses were used to examine
problem solving success. The regressions were analyzed in several blocks as outlined below (see
Table 5).

Table 5. Regression analysis plan for study 2.
Block 1 (Main effects and Moderator)
IV1: Problem Context
IV2: Embodied Aid
M: Spatial Ability
Block 2 (2-way interactions/moderations)
Context * Embodied Aid
Spatial Ability * Context
Spatial Ability * Embodied Aid
Block 3 (3-way interaction/moderations)
Embodied Aid * Context * Spatial Ability

Logistic regression was the main form of analysis for the present study, and one of the
most interpretable effects from a logistic regression analysis is the odds-ratio (or Exp(B) value).
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In essence, the odds-ratio provides a multiplier of sorts for a given effect. Grant and Spivey
(2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007; 2009) identified that their guided eye movement
manipulations resulted in problem solving success rates that were between 2 to 4 times greater
than those with fixed eye movements. To err on the conservative side, a power analysis is
provided with a low-end estimate odds-ratio of 2, with all other values set to default (see Figure
17). This required approximately 40 participants per group, for a total required sample size of
160 for Study 2.

Figure 17. Power analysis for logistic regression analysis used in Study 2.
Procedure
The initial procedure was similar Study 1, except there were no free-viewing or baseline
groups. As in Study 1, all participants performed a simple training task showing them how to
perform the tracking task on their computer before beginning the study. Participants were
randomly assigned to a “problem before” or a “problem after” digit-tracking condition (both
levels of the problem context variable). Participants randomly assigned to the “problem before”
conditions received the radiation problem before the digit-tracking task. They were permitted to
read it for as long as they liked and clicked a “next” button when they were ready to proceed to
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the digit-tracking task. Those assigned to the “problem after” conditions began their study with
their randomly assigned digit-tracking task.
For the digit tracking task, participants were randomly assigned to one of two possible
conditions – guided eye movements (where the digit tracking task occurs with letters and digits
appearing in and out of the center of the radiation problem diagram, in a triangular fashion), or
unguided movements (where the digit tracking task occurs with a diagram present, but letters and
numbers only appear in the center of the diagram). This task lasted for a duration of 4 minutes,
consisting of eight 30-second tracking tasks.
After completing the digit-tracking task, all participants saw the radiation problem and
attempted to solve it, providing as many solutions as possible within a 10-minute limit. This
procedure was identical to the solution phase in Study 1, including provision of the convergence
solution at the conclusion of the solution phase.
Once participants completed the solution phase, they completed the VCT to serve as an
intermediary task before proceeding to attempt solving “Red Adair.” Once they attempted
solving “Red Adair,” they were asked to describe whether they noticed any differences and/or
similarities between “Red Adair” and the radiation problem. At that point, they were instructed
to attempt providing a solution again to “Red Adair,” even if it was the same one they provided
before. According to theories of analogical reasoning, prompting participants to recall the
radiation problem serves to facilitate the “retrieval” process of analogical reasoning, and should
increase the rates at which participants solve the problem.
After providing solutions for “Red Adair,” participants completed the two parts of the
WFT as another intermediary task and then proceeded to solve “The General.” After providing
their solution to the general, participants were asked to describe whether they noticed any
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differences and/or similarities among “The General,” “Red Adair,” and the radiation problem.
At this point, they were instructed to attempt providing a solution again to “The General,” even if
it was the same one they provided before. After they provided this solution, they were presented
with the solution to the radiation problem (“convergence solution”). Then, they were instructed
to attempt to apply the radiation problem’s solution to “The General,” even if they had to repeat
any of their previous solutions. In doing so, this step facilitated the “retrieval” and “mapping”
processes of analogical reasoning, which should further increase the rates at which participants
solve the problem. A figure outlining the procedure of Study 2 is presented below (see Figure
18). The average time participants spent in this study was approximately 1 hour 20 minutes, for
which they received course credit.
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Figure 18. Outline of the procedure for study 2. Different conditions are denoted by differently
colored boxes.
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Results
For an overview of the results addressing each study’s research questions, please refer to
Appendix D.
Data Prescreening
Participants Removed from Analyses
To summarize the forthcoming sections, a total of 161 participants were retained for
analysis. Five participants were removed because they saw an episode of Grey’s Anatomy that
featured a problem similar to the Radiation Problem, 12 participants were removed due to poor
tracking task performance, and four were removed for christmas-treeing their responses to the
spatial ability measures. The total number of participants excluded for Study 2 was 12 (some
participants failed multiple pre-screening checks).
Grey’s Anatomy
On March 1st, 2018, season 14 episode 13 of Grey’s Anatomy was aired by the American
Broadcast Company. In this episode, one of the characters developed a brain tumor. The
doctors debated over how best to treat it using lasers. They initially proposed using a single laser
to kill the tumor but were worried about damaging the patient’s brain tissue. Later in the
episode, another doctor proposes using multiple weaker lasers to attack the tumor while sparing
the brain tissue (Fremont, 2018). The events of this episode very clearly mirror the solution to
the radiation problem, and this episode happened to be aired during the middle of data collection
for Study 2. Several participants indicated that they were fans of Grey’s Anatomy, but only 5
participants reported seeing the problem on that specific episode of Grey’s Anatomy. Those 5
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participants were excluded from all analyses, and an additional logistic regression was performed
on the remaining participants to assess whether viewers of Grey’s Anatomy fared any better on
solving the radiation problem than non-viewers. This regression was not statistically significant,
χ2(1, N = 140) = 1.20, p = .27. Note that 21 cases were not included in this analysis because
their data were collected prior to March 1st, 2018, and they were not asked whether they watched
Grey’s Anatomy.
Tracking Task Reaction Times
Before analyzing Study 2’s data, participants’ performance on the tracking task was
assessed. Only those whose tracking accuracy was 75% or greater were retained for analyses.
Accuracy was determined by excluding participants whose reaction times were greater than three
standard deviations above the mean value, which was roughly 1000 milliseconds after the
stimulus was presented. Participants were also excluded if their reaction was recorded prior to
the onset of the stimulus. Twelve participants were removed from analyses based on these
criteria.
A two-way ANOVA was performed using eye movement guidance and problem context
as the predictors of tracking task reaction time. The overall model was not statistically
significant (F(3,157) = 2.55, p = .058, η2p = .047). Digit tracking task means and standard
deviations are provided in Table 6. These tracking times are similar to those found in previous
studies which had participants perform a similar tracking task (Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009).
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Table 6. Tracking Task Reaction Times (Means and Standard Deviations) for Study 2
Condition
Problem First, Guided
Skip to Guided
Problem First, Fixed
Skip to Fixed

M
633ms
627ms
565ms
559ms

SD
161ms
156ms
160ms
153ms

Coding the Convergence Solution
As in Study 1, participants’ written responses were coded following the coding scheme in
Table 3. However, participants were required to draw their solutions on scratch paper to more
closely match the methodology of Thomas & Lleras (2007; 2009), where their participants traced
their solution to the radiation problem on a diagram of the radiation problem. These drawings
were coded using the same scoring criteria as in Thomas & Lleras (2007; 2009). Participants’
scratch paper drawings were considered correct if they depicted two or more lines converging on
a central point. Participants were judged as having solved the problem with the convergence
solution if either of their written or sketched responses met the criteria described above (for
drawings) and in Appendix B (for written solutions). Examples of sketches deemed acceptable
according to this coding scheme are provided below in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Examples of drawings that would be coded as having satisfied the requirements for
the convergence solution as per Thomas & Lleras’s (2007; 2009) guidelines.
Hypothesis Testing
To assess the hypotheses pertinent to Study 2, a logistic regression analysis was
performed to predict the likelihood of a participant providing the convergence solution based on
when they saw the problem (either before or after digit-tracking), and what kind of digit-tracking
task they performed (either with embodied eye movements or fixed eye movements). To first
evaluate these effects independently, two logistic regressions were performed with each main
variable (problem context or eye movement guidance) as a singular predictor. The results were
not significant for problem context (χ2 (1, N =161) = 0.46, p = .50, Nagelkerke R2 = .004), but
they were significant for eye movement guidance (χ2 (1, N =161) = 5.86, p = .016, Nagelkerke R2
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= .05). The significant result for eye movement guidance favored the guided eye movements
conditions, such that those whose eye movements were guided in a pattern that embodied the
convergence solution were twice as likely to solve the radiation problem than those who were in
the fixed eye movements condition (Wald = 5.774, p = .017, Exp(B) = 2.19, Observed Power =
.96).
To test whether there was an interacting effect between the two experimental variables, a
logistic regression was performed in two blocks, with each variable (problem presentation and
eye movement guidance) entered in the first block and their product term entered in the second
block. In the first block, the overall model was statistically significant (χ2 (2, N =161) = 6.27, p
= .043, Nagelkerke R2 = .052), and the variable for eye movement guidance did significantly
improve prediction odds (Wald = 4.81, p = .028, Exp(B) = 2.1), indicating that those whose
digit-tracking task guided their eye movements in a pattern physically similar to the convergence
solution had roughly 2 times greater odds of generating that solution to the problem when
controlling for problem presentation. In the second block, the overall model was not statistically
significant χ2 (3, N =161) = 6.37, p = .095, Nagelkerke R2 = .05, and adding the product term of
the conditions did not result in a significant increase of variance explained (Δχ2 (1, N =161) =
0.10, p = .76, Nagelkerke ΔR2 = .00). Regression coefficients are provided in Table 7.
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Table 7. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Experimental Variables Predicting Solution Rates
for the Radiation Problem.
Variable
B
S.E. Wald Exp(B)
Block 1 Constant
-0.89 0.29 9.50** 0.41
Eye movement Guidance 0.78 0.33 5.70* 2.19
Problem Context
0.21 0.33 0.42
1.24
Block 2 Constant
-0.84 0.33 6.34* 0.43
Eye movement Guidance 0.68 0.46 2.18
1.98
Problem Context
0.11 0.47 0.05
1.11
Guidance*Context
0.20 0.66 0.10
1.23
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. Note that Guidance was coded 0 = Fixed eye movements, 1 = guided
eye movements. Problem Context was coded 0 = skip straight to tracking task, 1 = read problem
before tracking task.

Two of the conditions in this study were nearly identical to the conditions in Thomas and
Lleras’s (2007; 2009) studies. Although there were slight changes to their methodology to allow
other research questions to be explored in the present study, it is worth comparing the effects of
their nearly-equal conditions to those in the present study. These two conditions of interest were
the Perceptual Simulation Group and the Simple Incubation group in the present work. A
logistic regression revealed that those in the Perceptual Simulation group were significantly more
likely to produce a solution to the radiation problem than the Simple Incubation group (χ2(1, N =
79) = 5.124, Nagelkerke R2 = .11, p = .024), and they had roughly three times greater odds of
answering the problem correctly (Wald = 4.91, p = .027, Exp(B) = 3.35, Observed Power = .97).
The comparison between these two groups appears to replicate the embodied effect found in
previous work in terms of effect size and direction (Grant and Spivey, 2003; Thomas and Lleras,
2007; 2009).
The prior analyses do not statistically support an incubation effect increasing solution
success rates, and they do not support any one condition having a greater success rate when
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compared against all others. However, when examining the eye movement guidance variable
alone, those who performed guided digit-tracking tasks performed significantly better than those
who performed the fixed digit-tracking task. These results fail to support the perceptual
simulation hypothesis but lend provisional support to the attentional priming hypothesis. In the
next section, spatial ability variables are analyzed to test these hypotheses further.
Spatial Ability
Prior to including spatial ability as a covariate or interacting variable in any of the
previously analyzed logistic regression models, it is prudent to examine the independent effects
of spatial ability. Neither spatial measure alone significantly predicted a greater likelihood of
solving the radiation problem (Paper folding test χ2 (1, N =161) = 0.53, p = .47, Nagelkerke R2 =
.01; Card Rotations Test χ2 (1, N =161) = 0.01, p = .94, Nagelkerke R2 = .00). Neither of these
results supports the spatial ability hypothesis. These models were also tested with Red Adair,
where PFT performance was a significant predictor of success, but CRT performance was not
(PFT χ2 (1, N =158) = 4.20, p = .041, Nagelkerke R2 = .04; Card Rotations Test χ2 (1, N =158) =
0.01, p = .91, Nagelkerke R2 = .00). Lastly, these models were tested with The General, where
PFT performance was a significant predictor of success, but CRT performance was not (PFT χ2
(1, N =161) = 3.97, p = .046, Nagelkerke R2 = .05; Card Rotations Test χ2 (1, N =161) = 0.74, p
= .39, Nagelkerke R2 = .01). These results lend partial support to Hypothesis 3, that those with
higher spatial ability will tend to perform better on each problem.
Following the structure of the previously proposed analysis plan in Table 5, two more
logistic regression analyses (one for each spatial ability measure) were performed in three blocks
for each of the problems. For this analysis with the paper folding test, the model was not
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significant at any of the blocks (final model χ2 (7, N =161) = 9.32, p = .23, Nagelkerke R2 = .08).
When running the same model with the card rotations task as the spatial ability measure, this
model exhibited similar null effects (final model χ2 (7, N =161) = 9.254, p = .24, Nagelkerke R2
= .08).
The previous models were also tested with solution rates for Red Adair. Both models
exhibited similar null effects as the analyses with the radiation problem (PFT final model χ2 (7, N
=158) = 10.14, p = .18, Nagelkerke R2 = .09; CRT final model χ2 (7, N =158) = 6.34, p = .50,
Nagelkerke R2 = .06). Lastly, these models were tested with solution rates for The General.
Both models replicated the null effects of both previous problems (PFT final model χ2 (7, N
=161) = 10.84, p = .15, Nagelkerke R2 = .13; CRT final model χ2 (7, N =161) = 7.87, p = .34,
Nagelkerke R2 = .10). As a whole, these analyses fail to support Hypotheses 3a and 3b, showing
that spatial ability and its interactions did not have much impact on problem solving performance
in the context of the experimental variables.
Noticing the Analogy
In Study 2, participants were also asked if they noticed similarities among the problems
at two separate timepoints in the study. This was intended to facilitate the analogical transfer
process by prompting participants to assimilate multiple solutions together. However, it also
offers a means of assessing spatial ability hypotheses. Due to the spatial nature of the analogical
solutions, those with higher spatial ability should see the structural and spatial similarities
between analogues more readily. Also, participants with higher verbal ability should be more
likely to recognize the similarities between the problem (based on results from Corkill & Fager,
1995). To test this idea, forward logistic regressions were performed examining the predictive
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strength of spatial and verbal ability measures at two timepoints: when participants were
prompted to describe similarities between the Radiation Problem and Red Adair (after attempting
Red Adair), as well as when participants were prompted to describe similarities among all three
problems. Participants’ responses were judged as correct if they referred to all problems having
a similar underlying theme of combining multiple weaker forces into one larger force.
Fifty-two out of 161 participants noticed the convergence analogy between the Radiation
Problem and Red Adair, but the logistic regression analysis did not support that any of the spatial
or verbal ability measures were significant predictors of noticing the convergence analogy
between these two problems. Ninety-seven out of 161 participants noticed the convergence
analogy across all three problems, but as before, the logistic regression analysis did not support
that any of the spatial or verbal measures were significant predictors for noticing the
convergence analogy among all three problems.
Transferring to Analogical Problems
Prior analyses for Study 2 showed a significant effect of digit-tracking eye movement
guidance, such that embodied eye movements improved the rate at which a participant would be
likely to solve the radiation problem. An additional aim of Study 2 was to test whether this
embodied effect transferred when problem solvers attempted to solve analogically similar
problems. Although the solution rates were significantly different for the radiation problem,
solution rates were roughly equivalent for Red Adair (χ2(3, N = 161) = 1.865, p = .601) and The
General (χ2(3, N = 161) = 5.186, p = .159). The solution rates for each group are depicted
graphically in Figure 20.

139

Problem Solving Solution Rates
100.00%

% Correct Solutions

80.00%
Average
60.00%

G1
G2

40.00%

G3
G4

20.00%

0.00%
Radiation Problem

Red Adair

The General

Figure 20. Problem solving solution rates for each group and each problem.
The radiation problem was the initial problem, attempted after the digit-tracking task. Red Adair
and The General were the two transfer problems. Note: G1 = Problem first + guided eye
movements, G2 = Skip to guided eye movements, G3 = Problem first + fixed eye movements,
G4 = Skip to fixed eye movements
To assess whether embodied priming effects transferred into analogical problem solving,
several conditional analyses were conducted for all four groups for success rates for each
problem dependent on every combination of problems solved. For example, someone who does
not solve the radiation problem, but was in an embodied eye movements group, should have
better performance on later problems if the embodied effect aids in transfer as hypothesized.
Additionally, those who have more time to think about the problem may have a better likelihood
of constructing the convergence schema to transfer to later problems, evincing a benefit for
incubation. To evaluate this idea, problem solving success rates were compared across all four
groups with all possible combinations of solution patterns analyzed. In all cases, there were no
significant differences among the groups (all ps > .10). Solution rates and chi square tests for
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each of the four groups is provided in a bracket format in Figure 21. In no case did any one
group appear to perform better than any other group, suggesting that there were no benefits for
eye movement guidance or incubation, or their interaction.
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Solution Rates for Analogical Problem Solving in Study 2
Radiation Problem

Red Adair

The General
Problem + Guided
Solved Problem + Fixed
47
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed
χ2(3, N = 40) = 1.914, p = .59
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
2
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

Problem + Guided
Solved Problem + Fixed
49
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

Solved
65

Problem + Guided
Problem + Fixed
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

χ2(3, N = 161) = 6.35, p = .1
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
96
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

14
12
14
9

21
13
18
13

χ2(3, N = 64) = 2.68, p = .44
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
15
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

6
1
4
4

18
27
21
30

Problem + Guided
Solved Problem + Fixed
66
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

15
18
12
21

χ2(3, N = 94) = 3.28, p = .35
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
28
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

3
8
9
8

Problem + Guided
Solved Problem + Fixed
61
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed
χ2(3, N = 15) = 3.54, p = .32
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
5
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed
Problem + Guided
Solved Problem + Fixed
61
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed
χ2(3, N = 66) = 1.67, p = .64
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
5
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed
Problem + Guided
Solved Problem + Fixed
21
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed
χ2(3, N = 28) = 1.70, p = .64
Problem + Guided
Unsolved Problem + Fixed
7
Skip to Guided
Skip to Fixed

Figure 21. Solution rates for the Radiation Problem and both transfer problems for each
combination of solution rates. No group had an advantage over any other group for each
problem. Total N = 161, but 3 participants did not attempt problem 2; therefore, N = 158 for
results in Red Adair and The General.
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Creativity in Written Solutions
To assess whether eye movement guidance or problem presentation context resulted in
differences identifiable through creativity variables, five 2 (Eye movement guidance) x 2
(Problem Context) factorial ANOVAs were performed on scores of Originality, Flexibility, and
Elaboration, Total Solutions, and Redundant Solutions (see Appendix E for a MANOVA of
these analyses). For Originality, there were no significant differences among any of the variables
or their interactions, F(3, 157) = 0.87, p = .32, η2p = .022 (see Figure 22).

1.2

Originality Score
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0.8
0.6

After
Before

0.4
0.2
0
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Fixed

Condition

Figure 22. Originality scores for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. There were no significant differences among the groups.
For Flexibility, there also were no significant differences among any of the variables or
their interactions, F(3, 157) = 1.95, p = .12, η2p = .036 (see Figure 23).
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Figure 23. Flexibility scores for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. There were no significant differences among the groups.
For Elaboration, there was a significant difference attributable to both main effects, but
not their interaction, F(3, 157) = 6.27, p < .001, η2p = .11. The main effect for eye movement
guidance favored those who received the guided digit-tracking task, whose solutions contained
significantly more detail (character length M = 516.91, SD = 276.38) than those who received the
fixed digit-tracking task (M = 403.51, SD = 214.72; F(1, 157) = 8.52, p = .004, η2p = .05). The
main effect for problem context favored those who saw the problem before their digit-tracking
task, whose solutions contained significantly more detail (character length M = 517.92, SD =
266.38) than those who received the fixed digit-tracking task (M = 401.15, SD = 224.87; F(1,
157) = 8.99, p = .003, η2p = .05; see Figure 24). These results lend partial support to the
attentional priming hypothesis, as well as the incubation hypothesis.
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Figure 24. Elaboration score each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
The guided condition had significantly higher elaboration scores than the fixed condition, and
those who saw the problem before their tracking task had greater elaboration scores than those
who only saw the problem after their tracking task.
For Total Solutions, the overall ANOVA model was not significant, F(3, 157) = 2.24, p =
.09, η2p = .041 (see Figure 25).
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Figure 25. Total Solutions provided for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean. Those who saw the problem before their tracking task generated significantly more
solutions than those who only saw the problem after their tracking task.
For Redundant Solutions, the overall ANOVA model was not significant, F(3, 157) =
1.54, p = .21, η2p = .028 (see Figure 26).
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Figure 26. Redundant Solutions provided for each condition. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean. Those who in the guided condition generated significantly more redundant
solutions than those in the fixed condition.
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Mediating Effects
Several individual difference and performance variables were collected that may relate to
problem solving success. If any of these variables shows a relationship with problem solving
success, it is possible that the effects of the experimental manipulations could be better explained
by a confounding variable. To assess this possibility, several independent-samples t-tests were
conducted to examine whether any of the following variables were higher among those who
solved the problem and those who did not: Uniqueness, Number of Unique Solutions,
Elaboration, Total Number of Solutions, Age, Gender, Class Rank, Self-reports of liking to solve
puzzles, whether a participant’s major was a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering,
Mathematics) major, whether a participant’s major was medical related, Verbal Performance
score (word beginnings, word endings, and vocabulary), and Spatial Performance score (on the
PFT and the CRT).
The results of the t-tests are provided in Table 8. Four variables were identified that were
significantly different between those who solved the problem and those who did not:
Elaboration, Age, STEM Major, and self-reports of liking to solve puzzles.
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Table 8. Means, Standard Deviations, t-test Results, and Cohen’s d Effect Sizes for Variables of
Interest Between Those Who Solved the Radiation Problem and Those Who Did Not.
Solved Radiation
M
SD
t(159)
d
Problem?
Originality
No (n = 96)
0.79
0.94
1.95a
0.30
Yes (n = 65)
0.54
0.71
Flexibility
No
3.26
1.32
0.98
0.16
Yes
3.06
1.17
Elaboration
No
417.04
245.28
-2.58*
0.41
Yes
519.60
251.75
Total No. Solutions
No
3.86
1.55
0.33
0.05
Yes
3.78
1.49
Redundant Solutions
No
0.60
0.91
-0.68
0.10
Yes
0.72
1.32
Age
No
19.92
2.23
2.42a*
0.37
Yes
19.22
1.42
Gender
No
1.41
0.49
-0.69
0.11
Yes
1.46
0.50
Class Rank
No
2.76
1.05
0.78
0.13
Yes
2.63
0.99
“I like solving puzzles”
No
3.51
0.98
-2.34*
0.37
Yes
3.89
1.06
STEM Major
No
0.66
0.48
-2.06*
0.33
Yes
0.80
0.40
Med. Related Major
No
0.30
0.46
-0.74
0.13
Yes
0.36
0.48
Word Beginnings Score
No
14.58
5.28
-1.60
0.25
Yes
16.02
6.00
Word Endings Score
No
16.13
4.70
-1.61
0.26
Yes
17.38
5.12
Vocabulary Score
No
7.42
3.20
-0.70
0.11
Yes
7.79
3.34
CRT Score
No
52.82
19.07
0.31
0.05
Yes
51.89
18.76
PFT Score
No
9.88
4.15
-0.54
0.09
Yes
10.25
4.53
Note. *p < .05, aadjusted df were used as Levene’s test indicated a violation of the equality of variance
assumption. d = Cohen’s d effect size (provided as absolute values). Significance of statistical tests
was determined based on Bonferroni corrections for familywise error rate in each family of tested
variables, where appropriate (i.e., creativity variables, verbal ability variables, spatial ability variables).

To further test whether these significantly different variables confounded the main effects
observed before, a mediation analysis was conducted for each variable. Because eye movement
guidance was the only significant experimental predictor of solution rates in the radiation
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problem, it is included as the predictor in each model. Indirect effects were assessed using
Hayes’s PROCESS macro version 2 for SPSS (Hayes, 2012), which generated bias corrected and
accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals using 5,000 samples. Logistic regression models were
tested by entering eye movement guidance in the first block, and the mediating variable of
interest in the second block.
A mediation model where elaboration mediates the relationship between eye movement
guidance and problem success rates tests the idea that eye movement guidance engenders a
creativity boosting effect, which may incidentally increase solution rates if participants are
primed to generate more unique solutions. The logistic regression model was significant in
block 1 (χ2 (1, N = 161) = 5.86, p = .016, Nagelkerke R2 = .05), with eye movement guidance as
a significant predictor for solution rates. The model was also significant in block 2 after the
addition of the elaboration variable (χ2 (2, N = 161) = 10.15, p = .006, Nagelkerke R2 = .08),
with elaboration as a significant predictor for solution rates, but eye movement guidance no
longer a significant predictor. The indirect effect of condition on problem solving success was
estimated at B = 0.16, 95% CI (.02, .44). Because the 95% confidence interval did not include
zero, this effect was judged significant at p < .05. This mediation model suggests that the
improvement in solution rates due to eye movement guidance is better explained by a
concomitant increase in creativity (as measured through elaboration). Logistic regression
coefficients are provided below in Table 9, and a diagram illustrating this relationship is depicted
in Figure 27.
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Table 9. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing Elaboration as Mediator
Variable
B
S.E. Wald
Exp(B)
Block 1 Constant
-0.79 0.24 11.00** 0.46
Eye movement Guidance 0.79 0.33 5.74*
2.19
Block 2 Constant
-1.36 0.38 13.09** 0.26
Eye movement Guidance 0.65 0.34 3.67
1.91
Elaboration
0.14 0.07 4.08*
1.15
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. To simplify regression coefficient estimation, Elaboration was
calculated in units of 100.

Figure 27. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the model of eye movement guidance
predicting solution rate, mediated by creativity. The top shows the total effect of eye movement
guidance on solution rate. The bottom shows the mediation model, with the indirect effect in
parentheses and the direct effect above it. The indirect effect was estimated using 5,000 sample
bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping procedure. *p < .05.
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A mediation model where age mediates the relationship between eye movement guidance
and problem success rates tests the idea that the problem solving benefits of guiding eye
movements only arose due to an age difference between the fixed and guided eye movements
conditions. Both eye movement guidance and age independently predicted variance in problem
solving success (χ2 (2, N = 161) = 11.26, p = .004, Nagelkerke R2 = .09), but no indirect effect
was supported (95% CI: -0.23, 0.12). It should be noted that age was not different by condition,
but it was a significant negative predictor of problem solving success rates on the radiation
problem, such that younger participants were more likely to generate the convergence solution to
the radiation problem (see Table 10).

Table 10. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing Age as Mediator
Variable
Block 1 Constant
Eye movement Guidance
Block 2 Constant
Eye movement Guidance
Age
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

B
-0.79
0.76
3.66
0.80
-0.23

S.E.
0.24
0.33
2.01
0.34
0.10

Wald
11.00**
5.34*
3.31
5.78*
4.87*

Exp(B)
0.46
2.14
38.79
2.24
0.80

Next, a mediation model where STEM Major mediates the relationship between eye
movement guidance and problem solving success rates tests the idea that students in STEM
majors are more likely to solve the problem, regardless of how their eyes are guided during the
digit-tracking task. The overall model was significant in block 1 (χ2 (1, N = 161) = 5.86, p =
.016, Nagelkerke R2 = .05), as well as block 2 after the addition of STEM major as a variable (χ2
(2, N = 161) = 9.70, p = .008, Nagelkerke R2 = .08). However, STEM major was not a
significant predictor of problem solving success when controlling for eye movement guidance,
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indicating the presence of a mediating effect to be unlikely. It should be noted that Hayes’s
(2012) PROCESS macro cannot estimate indirect effects with dichotomous mediating variables,
but the fact that eye movement guidance maintained its statistical significance from block 1 to
block 2 leaves little evidence for the presence of a mediating effect of STEM major (see Table
11).

Table 11. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing STEM Major as Mediator
Variable
Block 1 Constant
Eye movement Guidance
Block 2 Constant
Eye movement Guidance
STEM Major
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

B
-0.79
0.79
-2.33
0.78
0.74

S.E.
0.24
0.33
0.70
0.33
0.38

Wald
11.00**
5.74*
11.11
5.55*
3.67

Exp(B)
0.46
2.19
0.10
2.18
2.08

Lastly, a mediation model where self-reports of liking to solve puzzles mediates the
relationship between eye movement guidance and problem solving success rates tests the idea
that the degree to which someone likes solving puzzles explains more of the difference in
solution rates than eye movement guidance. The overall model was significant in block 1 (χ2 (1,
N = 161) = 5.86, p = .016, Nagelkerke R2 = .05), as well as block 2 after the addition of their
self-reports as a variable (χ2 (2, N = 161) = 11.99, p = .002, Nagelkerke R2 = .10). Like the
previous mediation analysis with age, both variables uniquely predicted variance in problem
solving success rates, but no mediating effect was supported (95% CI: -0.21, 0.11; see Table 12).
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Table 12. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing Self-Reports of Liking to Solve
Puzzles as Mediator
Variable
B
S.E. Wald
Exp(B)
Block 1 Constant
-0.79 0.24 11.00** 0.46
Eye movement Guidance 0.79 0.33 5.74*
2.19
Block 2 Constant
-2.33 0.70 11.11
0.10
Eye movement Guidance 0.85 0.34 6.33*
2.33
Self-Reports
0.41 0.17 5.78
1.51
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. Self-Reports of the degree to which one likes solving puzzles was
rated on a Likert-type scale of 1-5.

Discussion
In this section, I briefly describe results from Study 1 and Study 2 and describe how they
impact the design of Study 3. In study 1, there were no group differences in solution rates for the
radiation problem and no group differences in metrics for creativity. In short, the data from
Study 1 yielded no results of significance. This prompted a methodological re-evaluation to
ensure that Study 2 could more accurately test the embodied effect from previous studies. By
requiring participants to draw their solutions, in addition to describing them, the embodied effect
was successfully replicated in Study 2. Additionally, there were significant effects for creativity
variables that lent support to the Incubation and Attentional Priming hypotheses.
Guiding Eye Movements
The results of Study 2 support the existence of the embodied effect found in previous
studies (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009), as evidenced by the significantly
greater solution likelihoods for those who were in the guided eye movement conditions
compared to the fixed eye movement conditions. This effect was similar in magnitude from
previous studies and would suggest that guiding eye movements aids in problem solving by
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fostering a perceptual simulation of the convergence solution. However, solution rates appeared
to be related to one creativity variable that was significantly different between the guided and
fixed eye movements conditions. Those in the guided eye movements had significantly higher
Elaboration scores on their written solutions to the radiation problem, and Elaboration was
higher in those who solved the problem compared to those who did not.
To ensure that the improved solution rates from eye movement guidance were uniquely
due to guidance, and not a concomitant increase in creativity, the mediation analysis with
Elaboration revealed that these effects were in fact highly related. Because eye movement
guidance no longer significantly predicted solution rates after inclusion of the mediating
variable, it can be argued that this creativity boosting effect mediates the benefits of eye
movement guidance on performance. In broader terms, guiding eye movements improved
creativity which led to an increase in solution rates for the Radiation problem. These effects lend
evidence to support the Attentional Priming hypothesis, which states that guiding eye
movements does not foster a perceptual simulation of the radiation problem but increases
creativity that leads to better problem solving performance. Additionally, the suppressing effect
of this mediating relationship provides evidence against the Perceptual Simulation hypothesis,
which states that the improvements in problem solving success are due to guiding eye
movements independent of any creativity effects. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the effect of
eye movement guidance was no longer significant after accounting for creativity, but this
reduction in effect size was about 20% (Unstandardized coefficient from 0.79 to 0.65). Although
the mediated direct effect was not deemed significant in statistical analyses, it may still represent
meaningful variance in problem solving success explained from eye movements.

154

Incubation
The general results from the experimental variables did not support that an incubation
effect aided in problem solving. Participants who saw their problem before the tracking task and
then saw the problem again during the solution phase did not fare any better than participants
who performed their tracking task and proceeded to the solution phase. These results suggest
that there was no benefit of incubation for problem solving success rates. However, it should be
noted that there was an incubation effect for creativity measures, which is discussed in the next
section.
Examining Creativity
In Study 2, there were significant effects for creativity that supported the Incubation
hypothesis, as well as the Attentional Priming and Flexibility hypotheses (partially). It is
interesting to note that these effects did not emerge in Study 1, which had a few conditions that
overlapped with Study 2. Despite nearly similar conditions, the stark difference in effects may
have alternative explanations. Because participants were required to draw their solutions in
Study 2, it is possible that this additional feature in the problem solving process may have
engendered a more descriptive written approach to problem solving. These effects are revisited
in Study 3.
Analogical Problem Solving
Although there was a noticeable difference in performance on the radiation problem,
solution rates were practically equal for the two analogical transfer problems. This lack of
differences in transfer problem performance does not support that embodied priming transfers to
later analogical problem solving. Even when comparing solution rates based on prior solution
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success, there still appears to be no benefit of embodied priming on analogical transfer.
However, there are some methodological aspects of Study 2 that may have limited the ability to
test whether embodied priming transfers to later analogical problems.
Specifically, participants were provided answers to each problem after they attempted to
solve it. Having access to the answer (or an example of a convergence solution) is key to
transferring the problem to an analogically related one (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983), so it
is possible that providing answers to participants may have clouded any embodied effects that
might have aided in analogical transfer. Embodied theories of cognition would suggest that
perceptual simulations should enhance schema formation, so those whose eye movements are
guided should have a convergence schema that is more readily accessible for problem solving
than those whose eye movements are not. This greater ease of access should manifest itself in
greater solution rates for later problem solving. To test this possibility, participants did not
receive solutions to any problem in Study 3.
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The Importance of Drawing Solutions
Comparing the results of Study 1 and Study 2, it would appear that requiring participants
to draw their solutions is key to replicating the embodied effect from prior research. However,
the effect of drawing solutions raises new research questions related to embodied cognition.
Although the data from study 2 mirrored the embodied problem solving effect from previous
studies, the data do not fully confirm that it is exclusively an embodied effect. Aside from the
potential mediating effects of creativity, the fact that participants in previous work drew their
solutions on a diagram of the radiation problem (which their eyes were guided around) could be
a cue or a demand characteristic that led them to draw the pattern they had been tracing with
their eyes. One research question to be addressed in study 3 is whether this is a cue or demand
characteristic – would problem solvers fare just as well by drawing their solutions on blank
scratch paper? If this is an embodied effect as claimed in previous studies, eye movement
guidance would add perceptual information into a problem solver’s mental representation,
leading them to be better able to solve the problem. If truly an embodied effect, it should be
independent of the presence of a diagram when problem solvers draw their solutions.
Embodying the Solution to Improve Mental Representations
Beyond only scratch paper, there is an additional way of testing whether this effect is
embodied that was assessed in Study 3. The analogical problem solving literature suggests that a
robust mental representation is key to successfully solving problems (Chi et al., 1989; Chi &
Glaser, 1985). Embodied theories of cognition would support that adding perceptual information
(as could be conferred by guided eye movements) to a mental representation should make it
more robust than what written information alone could engender. Thus, those whose eye
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movements are guided in the form of the convergence solution should have a more robust mental
representation that leads to a greater likelihood of analogical transfer for later problem solving.
In Study 2, problem solvers were significantly more likely to draw a convergence
solution if their eye movements were guided in that pattern. However, when solving analogical
problems thereafter, there were no significant group differences for drawn or written solutions.
If this effect is embodied, it should have led to greater solution rates for analogical problems.
But Study 2’s design may have limited my ability to assess this perspective. In study 2,
participants received solutions to each problem after their solution attempts. The analogical
problem solving literature suggests that knowing the solution to a problem is a necessary
prerequisite before one can successfully transfer it to an analogical problem. It is possible that
providing the solution may have masked any potential benefits of “embodying” the solution
through eye movements. Thus, for Study 3, no solutions were provided to participants to assess
whether the embodied effect carries through to analogical problems.
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY 3
Method
For study 3, the general procedure is identical to that of Study 2 with minor changes to
the design. Instead of manipulating problem presentation context, this study sought to better
understand the effects of scratch paper on solution rates. Specifically, scratch paper was
manipulated in conjunction with eye movement guidance. In Study 2, the scratch paper had
simple diagrams of the radiation problem on which participants drew their solutions, aligning
with previous studies who had participants trace their solutions on diagrams of the radiation
problem (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009). In Study 3, this variable was
manipulated such that participants either received the same scratch paper (with diagrams), or
they received blank scratch paper upon which they drew their solutions. This methodological
change was implemented in Study 3 to better understand the effects of scratch paper on problem
solving.
The other major methodological change is the removal of solution provision. To better
estimate whether diagrams or eye movement guidance aided in spontaneous analogical transfer,
participants no longer received solutions to the problems after attempting to solve them.
Participants
For the third study, 158 participants volunteered their time. The mean age was 19.13
years (SD = 3.02), and there were 59 males, 96 females, and 3 who preferred not to respond. The
ethnic makeup was 47.6% Caucasian/White, 22.4% Hispanic, 10.5% Asian, 22.4%
Black/African American, and 7% Other. Regarding major, 67.8% of participants in this sample
were majoring in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) areas, and 31.4% of
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participants were majoring in a medical-related concentration. The class rank makeup of the
sample was 74.6% Freshmen, 9.9% Sophomores, 8.5% Juniors, 5.6% Seniors, and 1.4% 5th year
or higher. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 groups, described below in Table 13.
Although this sample size was smaller than the sample from Study 2, this smaller sample still
provided sufficient statistical power (Power = .95) to detect an effect for eye movement guidance
at the same level of significance as was observed in Study 2 (at p = .016)

Table 13. Groups and Sample Sizes in Study 3

Diagrams on Scratch Paper Blank Scratch Paper
Embodied Eye Movements

n = 37
(1) Guided + Diagrams

n = 34
(2) Guided + Blank

Fixed Eye Movements

n = 36
(3) Fixed + Diagrams

n = 36
(4) Fixed + Blank

Note. These sample sizes were calculated after removal of participants, described in the results
section of this chapter.
Materials
All materials for Study 3 are identical to those in Study 2, with the addition of two
different kinds of scratch paper for solving the radiation problem. These pieces of scratch paper
were either blank, or contained the diagrams used in the radiation problem to assess whether the
presence of diagrams influences problem solving success. Additionally, to better test research
questions from an embodied perspective, participants no longer received solutions after they
attempted to solve each problem, and they were no longer required to re-evaluate their solutions
after their first attempt.
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Design
To answer additional research questions about the influence of diagrams, embodied aid,
and spatial ability, Study 3 had a 2 (diagram presence) x 2 (guided eye movements) completely
between design, using spatial ability as a continuous moderating variable. Diagram presence had
two levels: whether the participant draws their solutions on scratch paper using a diagram, or
whether the participant draws their solutions on completely blank scratch paper when solving the
radiation problem. Guided eye movements also had two levels as in Study 2.
Procedure
The procedure was largely the same as in Study 2, with a few differences. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions and underwent all the same procedures as in
Study 2, except they did not receive hints, and they did not receive solutions to the problems
after they completed them. This change was made to better estimate whether embodied effects
transfer to later analogical problem solving by eliminating the analogical transfer benefit from
the provision of prior solutions. The average time participants spent in this study was
approximately 1 hour 5 minutes, for which they received course credit.
Results
For an overview of the results addressing each study’s research questions, please refer to
Appendix D.
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Data Prescreening
Participants Removed from Analyses
A total of 15 participants were removed from the forthcoming analyses. Five participants
failed the criteria for tracking task accuracy (described in the next section), nine participants
were removed for Christmas-treeing in the spatial and/or vocabulary measures, two participants
were removed for having seen the radiation problem before, and one participant was removed for
having seen the radiation problem on Grey’s Anatomy. Note that these numbers are greater than
the total of 15 because a few participants met multiple removal criteria.
Tracking Task Reaction Times
Before analyzing Study 3’s data, participants’ performance on the tracking task was
assessed. Only those whose tracking accuracy was 75% or greater were retained for analyses.
Accuracy was determined by excluding participants whose reaction times were greater than three
standard deviations above the mean value, which was roughly 1000 milliseconds after the
stimulus was presented. Participants were also excluded if their reaction was recorded prior to
the onset of the stimulus. Five participants were removed from analyses based on these criteria.
A two-way ANOVA was performed using eye movement guidance and diagrams as the
predictors of tracking task reaction time. The overall model was not statistically significant
(F(3,139) = 1.36, p = .144, η2p = .038). Digit tracking task means and standard deviations are
provided in Table 14. These tracking times are also like those found in previous studies which
had participants perform a similar tracking task (Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009).
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Table 14. Tracking Task Reaction Times (Means and Standard Deviations) for Study 3
Condition
Guided, Blank
Guided, Diagrams
Fixed, Blank
Fixed, Diagrams

M
614ms
625ms
564ms
562ms

SD
116ms
179ms
143ms
135ms

Hypothesis Testing
A logistic regression was employed to test the Embodiment hypothesis – comparing those
whose eye movements were guided to those whose were not. This effect was not statistically
significant, (χ2 (1, N =143) = 0.00, p = .985, Nagelkerke R2 = .00), suggesting that the guided
digit-tracking task conferred no benefit to problem solving compared to the fixed digit-tracking
task (Wald = 0.20, p = .655, Exp(B) = 1.16, Observed Power = .07). Next, a logistic regression
was performed to test the Visual Aid hypothesis, which compares the effect of diagrams versus
blank scratch paper on solution success rates. This effect was significant (χ2 (1, N =143) = 6.48,
p = .011, Nagelkerke R2 = .06), such that those who drew their solutions on scratch paper
containing diagrams were about two-and-a-half times more likely to have generated the
convergence solution to the radiation problem (Wald = 6.29, p = .012, Exp(B) = 2.45, Observed
Power = .99).
To test the demand characteristic hypothesis, a logistic regression combining the two
previously analyzed variables and their product term was conducted. This hypothesis asserts that
the embodied effect found in previous studies arose out of demand characteristics. By guiding
one’s eyes in a pattern tracing the convergence solution on the diagram which was to be sketched
upon, solution rates should increase due to an apparent visual correspondence, rather than
embodiment alone. This regression was tested in two blocks, with the main effects entered
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simultaneously in the first block, and their product term entered in the second block. This
hypothesis was not supported, but the overall model was significant due to a significant effect for
diagrams (χ2 (3, N =143) = 8.42, p = .038, Nagelkerke R2 = .08). The effect of diagrams was the
only significant predictor of convergence solution success. Regression coefficients for all
variables are provided in Table 15.
Table 15. Logistic Regression Coefficients, Wald Statistics, and Odds Ratios for Demand
Characteristic Hypothesis Test
B
S.E.
Wald
Exp(B)
Guidance
0.55
0.54
1.03
1.73
Diagrams
1.40
0.52
7.23**
4.05
Diagrams*Guidance
-1.00
0.72
1.92
0.37
Constant
-1.29
0.40
10.40**
0.28
Note. All terms consumed 1 degree of freedom in the analysis. Guidance was coded 0 = fixed
eye movements, 1 = guided eye movements. Diagrams was coded 0 = blank scratch paper, 1 =
scratch paper with diagrams. *p < .05, **p < .01

Spatial Ability
As before, both spatial ability measures were entered into their own logistic regression
model to predict solution success rates. Neither spatial measure alone significantly predicted a
greater likelihood of solving the radiation problem (Paper folding test χ2 (1, N =142) = 0.92, p =
.34, Nagelkerke R2 = .01; Card Rotations Test χ2 (1, N =142) = 1.25, p = .26, Nagelkerke R2 =
.01). For Red Adair, the Paper Folding Test did not significantly predict a greater likelihood of
success (χ2 (1, N =142) = 2.19, p = .14, Nagelkerke R2 = .02); However, performance on the
Card Rotations Test was a significant positive predictor of success in solving Red Adair (χ2 (1, N
=142) = 6.25, p = .012, Nagelkerke R2 = .06). Lastly, for The General problem, neither spatial
measure significantly predicted a greater likelihood of success (Paper folding test χ2 (1, N =142)
= 0.02, p = .90, Nagelkerke R2 = .00; Card Rotations Test χ2 (1, N =142) = 0.61, p = .44,
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Nagelkerke R2 = .01). These results offer limited support for an effect of spatial ability, although
it is worth noting that success on Red Adair was predicted by one measure of spatial ability.
As in the previous studies, higher-order analyses of spatial ability interacting with the
experimental variables were performed next to assess Hypotheses 3a and 3b. For the radiation
problem, no models were significant for the PFT or the CRT (PFT final model χ2 (7, N =142) =
13.11, p = .07, Nagelkerke R2 = .12; CRT final model χ2 (7, N =142) = 11.07, p = .14,
Nagelkerke R2 = .10).
For Red Adair, the models with CRT were not statistically significant (CRT final model
χ2 (7, N =142) = 8.44, p = .30, Nagelkerke R2 = .09), however, there was a significant model
with the PFT. The model with all possible interactions was not statistically significant (PFT final
model χ2 (7, N =142) = 8.72, p = .27, Nagelkerke R2 = .09), but there was a simpler model that
evinced a significant interacting effect for PFT scores and the diagrams variable. This regression
was not statistically significant at Block 1 (χ2 (2, N =142) = 3.02, p = .22, Nagelkerke R2 = .03),
but in Block 2, there was a significant increase in variance explained as a function of adding the
product term of Diagrams and PFT scores, (Δχ2 (1, N =142) = 4.61, p = .03, ΔNagelkerke R2 =
.05), yielding an overall model that was significant χ2 (3, N =142) = 7.82, p = .05, Nagelkerke R2
= .08). Regression coefficients for this analysis are provided in Table 16 below. To better
understand the nature of this interacting effect, the conditional effect of PFT scores on Red Adair
solution rates was tested at 1 SD below, Mean, and 1 SD above the mean values of PFT scores.
This effect was only significant at higher levels of PFT scores (z = -2.12, p = .03, 95% CI: -2.67,
-0.11). The nature of this effect was such that high levels of spatial ability predicted a greater
likelihood of solving Red Adair, but only in the condition that did not receive diagrams see
Figure 28 for a graphic depiction of these effects).

165

Table 16. Logistic Regression Model for Paper Folding Test Score and Diagrams Predicting
Solution Rates for Red Adair
Variable
B
Block 1 Constant
0.57
PFT Score
0.08
Diagrams
-0.36
Block 2 Constant
-0.75
PFT Score
0.22
Diagrams
1.86
Diagrams*Score -0.24
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. PFT = Paper Folding Test.
blank scratch paper, 1 = scratch paper with diagrams.

S.E. Wald Exp(B)
0.59 0.93 1.76
0.05 2.05 1.08
0.40 0.83 0.70
0.85 0.79 0.47
0.09 5.93* 1.25
1.12 2.75 6.45
0.12 4.36* 0.79
The diagrams variable was coded 0 =

Probability of Solving Red Adair

1

0.8

0.6
Blank
0.4

Diagrams

0.2

0
Low
Medium
High
Paper Folding Test Score
Figure 28. Slope estimates for probability of solving Red Adair as a function of scratch paper
condition (either blank scratch paper or scratch paper with diagrams) and paper folding test
score. The conditional difference in solution probability was significant at high paper folding
test scores.
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Lastly, these models were also tested for The General problem. Neither spatial measure
was a significant variable for any tested models (PFT final model χ2 (7, N =142) = 4.78, p = .69,
Nagelkerke R2 = .05; CRT final model χ2 (7, N =142) = 1.59, p = .98, Nagelkerke R2 = .02).
Noticing the Analogy
In Study 3, participants were not prompted to summarize similarities between the
Radiation Problem and Red Adair. This was intentional to withhold from aiding in the
analogical problem solving process and to better assess spontaneous analogical transfer.
However, participants were asked if they noticed any similarities among all three problems after
attempting the final problem. It was hypothesized that spatial ability and verbal ability may play
a role in the formation of the convergence schema. To test this hypothesis, a logistic regression
was performed on all measures of spatial ability and verbal ability using the forward method.
Unfortunately, not one of them was statistically significant. Fifteen out of 139 participants
recognized the common convergence schema across all three problems (3 participants did not
attempt this question), so it is possible that there simply were not enough people who noticed the
similarities to adequately make predictions with the cognitive ability measures.
Transferring to Analogical Problems
Prior analyses for Study 3 showed a significant effect of diagram presence, such that
those who drew their solutions on diagrams with scratch paper would be more likely to solve the
radiation problem. An additional aim of Study 3 was to continue to test whether this embodied
effect transferred when problem solvers attempted to solve analogically similar problems. Since
Study 3 did not provide answers or hints for any of the problems, a clearer test of whether
embodied effects carry through to transfer problems can be performed. A priming task that is
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supposed to facilitate a perceptual simulation of a problem’s structure should enrich one’s mental
representation of the problem, which leads it to be a more accessible analogy to be transferred to
structurally similar problems. Although the solution rates were significantly different for the
radiation problem, solution rates were roughly equivalent for Red Adair (χ2(3, N = 143) = 0.87, p
= .834) and The General (χ2(3, N = 143) = 0.93, p = .817). These data do not support that the
embodied effect of eye movement guidance transferred to later analogical problems (Analogical
Boost Hypothesis). The solution rates for each group are depicted graphically in Figure 29.

Problem Solving Solution Rates
100.00%

% Correct Solutions

80.00%
Average
60.00%

G1
G2

40.00%

G3
G4

20.00%

0.00%
Radiation Problem

Red Adair

The General

Figure 29. Problem solving solution rates for each group and each problem.
The radiation problem was the initial problem, attempted after the digit-tracking task. Red Adair
and The General were the two transfer problems. Note: G1 = Guided + Diagrams, G2 = Guided
+ Blank, G3 = Fixed + Diagrams, G4 = Fixed + Blank.
As in Study 2, participants’ solution rates were analyzed for every solution combination
of the analogical problems. As previously mentioned, there was a significant difference for the
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Radiation Problem; however, there were no significant differences among the groups at any stage
of the problem solving process for any combination of solution patterns (see Figure 30).
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Solution Rates for Analogical Problem Solving in Study 3
Radiation Problem

Red Adair

Guided + Diagrams
Solved Guided + Blank
35
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

10
7
13
5

χ2(3, N = 48) = 1.69, p = .64
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
13
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

2
4
4
3

12
11
17
8

Guided + Diagrams
Solved Guided + Blank
12
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

3
2
5
2

17
13
23
11

χ2(3, N = 64) = 862, p = .84
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
16
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

5
2
6
3

χ2(3, N = 16) = 1.60, p = .66
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
4
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

2
0
1
1

19
21
13
26

Guided + Diagrams
Solved Guided + Blank
60
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

14
16
9
21

Guided + Diagrams
Solved Guided + Blank
43
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

11
11
5
16

5
5
4
5

χ2(3, N = 60) = 1.76, p = .62
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
17
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

3
5
4
5

Guided + Diagrams
Solved Guided + Blank
9
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

3
3
2
1

χ2(3, N = 19) = 2.15, p = .54
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
10
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

2
2
2
4

Guided + Diagrams
Solved Guided + Blank
48
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

Solved
64

Guided + Diagrams
Guided + Blank
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

χ2(3, N = 143) = 9.38, p = .025
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
79
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

The General

χ2(3, N = 79) = 0.71, p = .87
Guided + Diagrams
Unsolved Guided + Blank
19
Fixed + Diagrams
Fixed + Blank

Figure 30. Solution rates for the Radiation Problem and both transfer problems for each
combination of solution rates. Significant χ2 tests are highlighted. No group had an advantage
over any other group for each transfer problem. Total N = 143.
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Creativity in Written Solutions
To assess whether eye movement guidance or diagrams resulted in differences
identifiable through creativity variables, five 2 (Eye movement guidance) x 2 (Diagrams)
factorial ANOVAs were performed on scores of Originality, Flexibility, and Elaboration, Total
Solutions, and Redundant Solutions (see Appendix E for a MANOVA of these analyses). For
Originality, the overall model was significant, F(3, 139) = 5.03, p = .002, η2p = .098, and it was
driven by a significant main effect of diagrams, F(1, 139) = 12.02, p = .001, η2p = .080 (see
Figure 31). In this case, those in the diagrams condition were more likely to have higher scores
of Originality.
1.4

Originality Score

1.2
1
0.8
Diagrams

0.6

Blank
0.4
0.2
0
Guided

Fixed

Condition

Figure 31. Originality scores for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. Those in the scratch paper with diagrams conditions had significantly higher originality
scores than those in the blank scratch paper conditions.
For Flexibility, the overall model was significant, F(3, 139) = 2.67, p = .050, η2p = .054,
and it was driven by a significant main effect of diagrams, F(1, 139) = 6.97, p = .009, η2p = .048.
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This effect was in favor of the scratch paper with diagrams condition, who showed higher

Flexibility Score (No. Unique Solutions)

Flexibility scores than those in the blank scratch paper conditions (see Figure 32).
4
3.5
3
2.5
2

Diagrams

1.5

Blank

1
0.5
0
Guided

Fixed

Condition

Figure 32. Flexibility scores for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. The diagrams condition had significantly higher Flexibility scores than the blank scratch
paper conditions.
For Elaboration, the overall model was not statistically significant (F(3,139) = 1.66, p =
.179, η2p = .035), and there were no significant differences among the main effects or their
interaction (see Figure 33).
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600

Elaboration Score

500
400
300

Diagrams
Blank

200
100
0
Guided

Fixed

Condition

Figure 33. Elaboration score each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
There were no significant differences across the groups.
For Total Solutions, the overall ANOVA model was statistically significant, F(3, 139) =
3.67, p = .014, η2p = .073, and there was a significant main effect for Diagrams (F(1, 139) =
10.87, p = .001, η2p = .073). Those whose scratch paper contained diagrams (M = 3.93, SD =
1.61) generated significantly more solutions than those who only saw the problem after their
tracking task (M = 3.08, SD = 1.42; see Figure 34).
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4.5

Total Number of Solutions

4
3.5
3
2.5
Diagrams

2

Blank

1.5
1
0.5
0
Guided

Fixed

Condition

Figure 34. Total Solutions provided for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error
of the mean. Those whose scratch paper contained diagrams generated significantly more
solutions than those whose scratch paper was blank.
For Redundant Solutions, the overall ANOVA model was not significant, F(3, 139) =
2.29, p = .081, η2p = .047 (see Figure 35).

Total Number of Redudant Solutions

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

Diagrams

0.3

Blank

0.2
0.1
0
Guided

Fixed

Condition

Figure 35. Redundant Solutions provided for each condition. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean. Those who in the guided condition generated significantly more redundant
solutions than those in the fixed condition.
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Mediating Effects
As in Study 2, the same individual difference and performance variables were collected
that may relate to problem solving success. The previously mentioned independent-samples ttests were conducted to identify whether those who solved the radiation problem were different
on any variable than those who did not solve it. The results of the t-tests are provided below in
Table 17. Three variables were identified that were significantly different between those who
solved the problem and those who did not: Flexibility, Elaboration, and Total Solutions provided.
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Table 17. Means, Standard Deviations, t-test Results, and Cohen’s d Effect Sizes for Variables
of Interest Between Those Who Solved the Radiation Problem and Those Who Did Not.
Solved Radiation
M
SD
t(141)
d
Problem?
Originality
No (n = 79)
0.61
0.74
1.84
0.30
Yes (n = 64)
0.88
1.00
Flexibility
No
2.73
1.24
3.12**
0.52
Yes
3.41
1.33
Elaboration
No
354.75
193.72
3.54**
0.60
Yes
491.05
254.25
Total No. Solutions
No
3.13
1.44
3.36a**
0.56
Yes
3.98
1.62
Redundant Solutions
No
0.39
0.63
1.48a
0.25
Yes
0.58
0.83
Age
No
18.84
1.75
1.19a
0.21
Yes
19.49
4.08
Gender
No
1.58
0.50
1.03a
0.17
Yes
1.67
0.48
Class Rank
No
2.47
0.93
0.34
0.06
Yes
2.52
1.01
“I like solving puzzles”
No
3.19
1.06
1.08
0.19
Yes
3.37
0.81
STEM Major
No
0.66
0.48
0.57
0.10
Yes
0.70
0.46
Med. Related Major
No
0.41
0.49
-0.56
0.09
Yes
0.36
0.48
Word Beginnings Score No
13.23
4.56
0.44
0.07
Yes
13.59
5.31
Word Endings Score
No
15.53
5.45
0.43
0.07
Yes
15.92
5.46
Vocabulary Score
No
5.88
3.37
1.36
0.23
Yes
6.61
2.91
CRT Score
No
46.62
17.49
0.91
0.15
Yes
49.29
16.98
PFT Score
No
9.48
3.67
1.20
0.20
Yes
10.21
3.55
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, aadjusted df were used as Levene’s test indicated a violation of the equality
of variance assumption. d = Cohen’s d effect size (provided as absolute values). Significance of
statistical tests was determined based on Bonferroni corrections for familywise error rate in each family
of tested variables, where appropriate (i.e., creativity variables, verbal ability variables, spatial ability
variables).

As in Study 2, a mediation analysis was conducted for each variable to assess potential
confounding effects on experimental variables. Because diagram presence was the only
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significant experimental predictor of solution rates in the radiation problem for Study 3, it is
included as the predictor in each model.
A mediation model where Flexibility mediates the relationship diagram presence and
problem success rates tests the idea that diagrams facilitate a creativity boosting effect that leads
problem solvers to generate more solutions, which may incidentally increase the likelihood that
participants generate the convergence solution. The logistic regression model was significant in
block 1 (χ2 (1, N = 143) = 6.90, p = .009, Nagelkerke R2 = .06), with diagrams as a significant
predictor for solution rates. The model was also significant in block 2 after the addition of the
Flexibility variable (χ2 (2, N = 143) = 13.75, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .12), with Flexibility and
Diagrams both as significant predictors for solution rates. The indirect effect of condition on
problem solving success was estimated at B = 0.21, 95% CI (.04, .53). Because the 95%
confidence interval did not include zero, this effect was judged significant at p < .05. This
mediation model suggests that the improvement in solution rates due to Diagrams is still
meaningful, but also partially explained by a concomitant increase in creativity (as measured
through Flexibility). Logistic regression coefficients are provided below in Table 18, and this
relationship is depicted graphically in Figure 36.

Table 18. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing Flexibility as Mediator
Variable
Block 1 Constant
Diagrams
Block 2 Constant
Diagrams
Flexibility
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

B
-0.67
0.90
-1.70
0.73
0.36
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S.E.
0.25
0.35
0.49
0.36
0.14

Wald
7.18**
6.72**
12.10**
4.22*
6.43*

Exp(B)
0.51
2.45
0.18
2.08
1.44

Figure 36. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the model of diagrams predicting solution
rate, mediated by creativity (Flexibility). The top shows the total effect of diagrams on solution
rate. The bottom shows the mediation model, with the indirect effect in parentheses and the
direct effect above it. The indirect effect was estimated using 5,000 sample bias-corrected and
accelerated bootstrapping procedure. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Next, a mediation model was tested where Elaboration was the mediator. This model
tests the idea that a boost in creativity (as indicated by more detailed responses) better explains
an increase in solution rates than diagrams. As before, this model was significant in block 1 (χ2
(1, N = 143) = 6.90, p = .009, Nagelkerke R2 = .06), with diagrams as a significant predictor for
solution rates. The model was also significant in block 2 after the addition of the Flexibility
variable (χ2 (2, N = 143) = 13.75, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .12), with Flexibility and Diagrams
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both as significant predictors for solution rates. The indirect effect of condition on problem
solving success was estimated at B = 0.18, 95% CI (.01, .51). Because the 95% confidence
interval did not include zero, this effect was judged significant at p < .05. As with the Flexibility
model, this model suggests that the improvement in solution rates due to Diagrams is still
meaningful, but also partially explained by a concomitant increase in creativity (as measured
through Elaboration). Logistic regression coefficients are provided below in Table 19, and this
model is depicted graphically in Figure 37.

Table 19. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing Elaboration as Mediator
Variable
B
S.E. Wald
Exp(B)
Block 1 Constant
-0.67 0.25 7.18** 0.51
Diagrams
0.90 0.35 6.72** 2.45
Block 2 Constant
-1.70 0.42 15.65** 0.19
Diagrams
0.78 0.36 4.76*
2.19
Elaboration 0.26 0.08 9.52** 1.29
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. To simplify regression coefficient estimation, Elaboration was
calculated in units of 100.
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Figure 37. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the model of diagrams predicting solution
rate, mediated by creativity (Elaboration). The top shows the total effect of diagrams on solution
rate. The bottom shows the mediation model, with the indirect effect in parentheses and the
direct effect above it. The indirect effect was estimated using 5,000 sample bias-corrected and
accelerated bootstrapping procedure. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Finally, a mediation model was tested where Total Solutions was entered as the mediator.
This tests the idea that one’s likelihood of solving the radiation problem is better explained by a
boost in number of solutions generated, rather than from any benefit of diagrams. As before, this
model was significant in block 1 (χ2 (1, N = 143) = 6.90, p = .009, Nagelkerke R2 = .06), with
diagrams as a significant predictor for solution rates. The model was also significant in block 2
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after the addition of the Total Solutions variable (χ2 (2, N = 143) = 14.33, p = .001, Nagelkerke
R2 = .13), with Total Solutions as a significant predictor for solution rates, but diagrams no
longer a significant predictor. The indirect effect of condition on problem solving success was
estimated at B = 0.27, 95% CI (.07, .63). Because the 95% confidence interval did not include
zero, this effect was judged significant at p < .05. Because the inclusion of Total Solutions into
this model reduced the significance of Diagrams as predictor, this model supports Total
Solutions as a better explanation of the effect of Diagrams on solution success rates. Regression
coefficients are provided in Table 20 below, and this model is depicted graphically in Figure 38.

Table 20. Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Testing Total Solutions as Mediator
Variable
B
S.E. Wald
Exp(B)
Block 1 Constant
-0.67 0.25 7.18** 0.51
Diagrams
0.90 0.35 6.72** 2.45
Block 2 Constant
-1.69 0.47 12.88** 0.19
Diagrams
0.67 0.36 3.45
1.96
Total Solutions 0.32 0.12 6.99** 1.38
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. To simplify regression coefficient estimation, Elaboration was
calculated in units of 100.
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Figure 38. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the model of diagrams predicting solution
rate, mediated by creativity (Total Number of Solutions). The top shows the total effect of
diagrams on solution rate. The bottom shows the mediation model, with the indirect effect in
parentheses and the direct effect above it. The indirect effect was estimated using 5,000 sample
bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping procedure. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Discussion
Failure to Replicate
Altogether, the results of Study 3 are unusual. Two conditions from Study 2 were
replicated in Study 3 (the guided and fixed eye movements with diagrams conditions), but the
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previously found embodied effect of guiding eye movements improving solution rates did not
replicate. It is possible that there are individual differences in the samples from Study 2 and
Study 3 that may explain why this effect seemed to disappear in Study 3. In particular, Study 2
and Study 3’s data were collected during different semesters (Spring and Summer, respectively).
The following chapter examines these individual differences between both studies and examine
whether they were influential in predicting problem solving success rates.
Spatial Ability
There were several notable effects of spatial ability on the problem solving process in
Study 3. There was a general benefit of spatial ability for performance on Red Adair, but there
was also a significant moderating effect of spatial ability and diagrams on this same problem.
The results suggested that in the absence of diagrams on scratch paper, spatial ability was a
significant predictor of success on Red Adair. However, when diagrams were present on
participants’ scratch paper, their spatial ability was not relevant for performance. Recall that
scratch paper was available for all three problems, but the diagrams vs. blank scratch paper
manipulation only occurred for the Radiation Problem (all subsequent scratch papers were
blank). So, this effect is potentially a latent benefit of diagrams aiding in convergence schema
formation. The nature of this effect is likely that diagrams even the playing field between low
and high spatials, helping them to visualize the spatial aspects of the convergence solution that
aid in schema construction.
On the other hand, those who used blank scratch paper had to rely on their spatial ability
to be successful on later problems, as they had no diagrams to aid in visualizing the convergence
schema. Those in the blank scratch paper condition who had higher spatial ability scores were
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most successful on the first transfer problem. This could highlight a suppressing effect of
diagrams aiding in convergence solution schema formation for high spatials. In other words,
those higher in spatial ability may be better able to construct mental models of spatial solutions
when they are not provided with a diagram as a starting point.
Analogical Problem Solving
Study 3 again failed to support that any of the experimental manipulations impacted the
analogical problem solving process. Prior solution rates, eye movement guidance, and diagram
presence all failed to predict meaningful differences in transfer problems. Because the embodied
effect found in Study 2 did not replicate in Study 3, these data are limited in that an embodied
effect on analogical transfer cannot be eliminated. However, taken together with the results of
Study 2, there is not strong evidence to support that eye movement guidance helps problem
solvers embody the convergence solution as identified through analogical transfer.
Similarly, there were no significant predictors of participants noticing the convergence
schema across all three problems. Compared to Study 2, there were a substantially fewer
number of participants who did notice the common schema across all three problems, and it is
possible there simply was not enough statistical power to make predictions about recognizing the
convergence schema in Study 3. However, as mentioned in the previous section, spatial ability
may have impacted analogical transfer from problem 1 to problem 2, but it is unclear whether
spatial ability impacts analogical transfer for the first transfer problem, or if that problem in
particular benefits from spatial ability.
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Influence of Diagrams on Creativity and Problem Solving Success
In Study 3, there was a consistent significant effect of diagrams that emerged with both
solution rates on the radiation problem, as well as creativity scores on written solutions.
Previous research supports that diagrams are useful during problem solving (e.g., Beveridge &
Parkins, 1987; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Pedone et al., 2001), however, the diagram in the present
study was very simple and did not contain any information about the solution to the problem. In
these previously cited studies, each diagram contained some perceptual information (e.g.,
directional arrows, shading, etc.) that helped convey how the tumor was to be x-rayed. The
present study’s results support that the diagrams facilitated creativity, helping problem solvers
generate a greater variety of solutions, as well as more original solutions.
The post-hoc analyses suggest that the beneficial effects of diagrams on problem solving
may be better explained by diagrams improving creativity. It is reasonable to think that scratch
paper with diagrams might give participants additional information (compared against blank
scratch paper) that could help guide their responses toward the convergence solution. However,
the post-hoc mediation analyses support that diagrams were partially more likely to aid in
convergence solution formation because they primed more creative solutions to the radiation
problem. Flexibility, Elaboration, and Total Solutions were all greater among those who solved
the radiation problem, and Elaboration and Total Solutions appeared to be stronger predictors of
success than diagrams because their addition into the logistic regression models weakened the
predictive strength of diagrams. Flexibility and Total solutions were also greater in the diagrams
conditions, further highlighting the lack of independence of these effects.

185

It is also possible that these diagrams serve as a visual aid that helps problem solvers
construct a mental representation of the problem. Previous research indicates that more detailed
mental representations are helpful for problem solving (Chi et al., 1989; Chi & Glaser, 1985), so
this is one possible explanation for how the diagrams aid in problem solving. It could also be
possible that detailed mental representations allow problem solvers to generate more solutions,
which could be another way to make sense of the mediating effects described in the previous
sections.
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CHAPTER SIX: COMPARING STUDY 2 AGAINST STUDY 3
Methodology for Group Comparisons (Study 2 vs. Study 3)
In both Study 2 and Study 3, there were two conditions that saw the radiation problem,
underwent a guided or fixed eye movements digit-tracking task, and then attempted to solve the
radiation problem using scratch paper with diagrams. These conditions in Study 2 showed a
significant embodied effect replicating effects found in previous literature. However, these same
two groups showed essentially zero difference in Study 3. There are several possibilities as to
why this might be the case. First, I examine variables that were different between those who
solved the radiation problem, and those who did not. Next, I examine demographic differences
between the two studies, as well as individual difference measures and performance measures.
In the following sections, I highlight which variables influenced solution rates, which
demographic variables were different between the two studies, and then assess whether they
differentially affected solution rates in Study 2 and Study 3. Any variable identified as
influential for problem solving success that is also significantly different between the two groups
could hold an explanation underlying the replication issue. Finally, I examine posterior
probabilities for these effects based on re-analyses of previous studies’ available data (from
Thomas & Lleras, 2007; 2009).
Variables Related to Problem Solving Success
Several t-tests were completed to examine variables that were different in those who
solved the problem compared to those who did not solve the problem. It is possible that a
variable that was influential in problem solving was differently distributed between the two
studies. These t-tests compare the following variables: Creativity-related variables (Originality,

187

Flexibility, Elaboration, Total Solutions, Redundant Solutions), Demographic variables (Age,
Gender, Class Rank, STEM Majors, Medical-Related Majors), Cognitive performance measures
(Verbal ability from Word Endings, Word Beginnings, and Vocabulary Tests, and Spatial Ability
from the PFT and CRT measures), Self-reports of liking to solve puzzles, whether they used
scratch paper for the radiation problem, and whether they solved the radiation problem.
Examining these variables could aid in understanding whether any meaningful variables for
problem solving were different in each study, and whether this difference impacted solution
rates. There were five variables significantly different between those who solved the radiation
problem and those who did not: Verbal ability (which was addressed in the previous section),
Elaboration, Self-reports of liking to solve puzzles, Vocabulary Test Score, PFT score, and
whether or not participants used the scratch paper. The results of these t-tests are displayed in
Table 21.
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Table 21. T-Tests for Differences in Demographic Variables Between Those Who Solved the Radiation Problem
and Those Who Did Not
Solved Problem?
M
SD
t(149)
d
Originality
No (n = 75)
0.89
0.96
0.88
0.15
Yes (n = 76)
0.76
0.88
Flexibility
No
3.31
1.31
-0.31
0.05
Yes
3.38
1.29
Elaboration
No
446.02
253.27
-2.10*
0.35
Yes
533.20
250.37
Total Solutions
No
3.92
1.55
-0.73
0.12
Yes
4.11
1.61
Redundant Solutions
No
0.60
0.91
-0.71
0.12
Yes
0.73
1.23
Age
No
19.46
2.27
-0.88
0.14
Yes
19.92
4.00
Gender
No
1.49
0.50
-1.25
0.21
Yes
1.59
0.50
Class Rank
No
2.59
0.99
-0.75
0.12
Yes
2.71
1.06
“I Like Solving Puzzles”
No
3.23
0.95
-2.98**
0.49
Yes
3.70
0.94
STEM Major
No
0.66
0.48
-1.27a
0.21
Yes
0.76
0.43
MED Related Major
No
0.33
0.47
0.13
0.02
Yes
0.32
0.47
Word Beginnings Score
No
13.77
4.82
-1.65
0.27
Yes
15.11
5.02
Word Endings Score
No
16.04
4.93
-0.96
0.16
Yes
16.85
5.41
Vocabulary Score
No
6.47
3.56
-2.32*
0.38
Yes
7.79
3.29
CRT Score
No
47.83
18.92
-0.53
0.09
Yes
49.41
16.91
PFT Score
No
9.04
4.00
-2.27*
0.38
Yes
10.51
3.81
Problem 1 Scratch
No
0.89
0.31
-2.49*
0.39
Paper Used
Yes
0.98
0.12
Problem 1 Solved
No
464.44
133.35
-1.45
0.24
Yes
494.46
114.39
Note. *p < .05, aadjusted df were used as Levene’s test indicated a violation of the equality of variance
assumption. d = Cohen’s d effect size (provided as absolute values). Significance of statistical tests was
determined based on Bonferroni corrections for familywise error rate in each family of tested variables, where
appropriate (i.e., creativity variables, verbal ability variables, spatial ability variables).
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Variables Different by Study
Next, several independent samples t-tests were performed to check whether the
participants in Study 2 were different from those in Study 3. These t-tests mirror the previous
tests, except that the groups are compared by study instead of problem solving success. Means,
standard deviations, and the results of these group comparison tests are provided in Table 22.
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Table 22. T-Tests for Differences in Demographic Variables Between Study 2 and Study 3’s Replicated Guided
and Fixed Conditions
Study
M
SD
t(149)
d
Originality
2 (n = 79)
0.70
0.91
-1.85
0.30
3 (n = 72)
0.97
0.92
Flexibility
2
3.38
1.25
0.29
0.05
3
3.32
1.33
Elaboration
2
517.92
266.38
1.62
0.26
3
451.08
238.15
Total Solutions
2
4.09
1.53
0.62
0.10
3
3.93
1.61
Redundant Solutions
2
0.71
1.23
0.57
0.09
3
0.61
0.83
Age
2
19.83
2.12
0.72
0.12
3
19.46
3.96
Gender
2
1.44
0.50
-2.37*
0.39
3
1.63
0.49
Class Rank
2
2.78
1.05
1.94
0.32
3
2.46
0.97
“I Like Solving Puzzles”
2
3.56
1.02
1.47
0.24
3
3.32
0.91
STEM Major
2
0.68
0.47
-0.33
0.05
3
0.71
0.46
MED Related Major
2
0.25
0.44
-1.73a
0.30
3
0.39
0.49
Word Beginnings Score
2
15.03
5.14
1.54
0.25
3
13.78
4.76
Word Endings Score
2
16.85
4.97
1.01
0.17
3
16.00
5.30
Vocabulary Score
2
7.76
3.21
2.59**
0.42
3
6.31
3.68
CRT Score
2
49.67
18.24
0.84
0.14
3
47.21
17.55
PFT Score
2
9.90
4.27
0.38
0.06
3
9.65
3.79
Problem 1 Scratch
2
0.94
0.25
0.11
0.02
Paper Used
3
0.93
0.26
Problem 1 Solved
2
0.42
0.50
-0.69
0.11
3
0.47
0.50
Note. *p < .05,**p <.01 aadjusted df were used as Levene’s test indicated a violation of the equality of variance
assumption. d = Cohen’s d effect size (provided as absolute values). Significance of statistical tests was
determined based on Bonferroni corrections for familywise error rate in each family of tested variables, where
appropriate (i.e., creativity variables, verbal ability variables, spatial ability variables).

The results show a significant difference in Gender and Vocabulary Test score between
Studies 2 and 3. The sample in Study 2 had more males than females, but this distribution was
reversed in Study 3. Since gender is also known to be an influence for solving the radiation
problem (favoring males; Antonietti & Gioletta, 1995), it could have been a factor in why the
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effect did not replicate. The sample in Study 2 also had a higher Vocabulary Test score
compared to Study 3. It is possible that verbal ability may relate to a greater likelihood of
problem solving success.
To test whether the group differences in these variables could account for the solution
rate differences between Study 2 and Study 3, two logistic regressions were performed in two
blocks: The first block included the variable of interest (either Vocabulary Test score or Gender)
along with the Study variable (Study 2 or Study 3), and the second block included the product
term of these two variables. This logistic regression model permits testing whether the group
differences differentially predicted success on the radiation problem as a function of Study.
For the first model with Vocabulary Test score, the first block was statistically significant
χ2(2, N = 149) = 6.80, p = .033, Nagelkerke R2 = .06), with only Vocabulary Test score
predicting success on the radiation problem. The product term of both variables was added to
the second block, but did not significantly increase variance explained Δχ2(1, N = 149) = 1.20, p
= .27, ΔNagelkerke R2 = .01), yielding an overall model that was statistically significant χ2(3, N
= 149) = 8.00, p = .046, Nagelkerke R2 = .07), but with no individually significant variables (all
ps > .28). Regression coefficients are provided in Table 23.
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Table 23. Logistic Regression Model for Vocabulary Test Score and Study Predicting Solution
Rates for the Radiation Problem
Variable
Block 1 Constant
Vocabulary Test Score
Study
Block 2 Constant
Vocabulary Test Score
Study
Study*Score
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

B
-2.16
0.13
0.42
-0.07
-0.16
-0.39
0.11

S.E.
1.03
0.05
0.35
2.15
0.27
0.82
0.10

Wald
4.43*
6.00*
1.46
0.00
0.37
0.23
1.19

Exp(B)
0.15
1.13
1.52
0.94
0.85
0.68
1.12

This same model was tested using Gender. Although there was a significant effect of
gender predicting problem solving success before entering it into the logistic regression model (p
= .05), the first block with Gender and Study was not statistically significant χ2(2, N = 148) =
1.87, p = .39, Nagelkerke R2 = .02), with neither Gender nor Study predicting success on the
radiation problem. The product term of both variables was added to the second block and did not
significantly increase variance explained Δχ2(1, N = 148) = 0.01, p = .94, ΔNagelkerke R2 =
.00), yielding an overall model that also was not statistically significant χ2(3, N = 148) = 1.87, p
= .60, Nagelkerke R2 = .017). In essence, although the Gender distribution was significantly
different between Study 2 and Study 3, this difference did not significantly impact the problem
solving success rate differences between Study 2 and Study 3 (see Table 24).
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Table 24. Logistic Regression Model for Gender and Study Predicting Solution Rates for the
Radiation Problem
Variable
Block 1 Constant
Gender
Study
Block 2 Constant
Gender
Study
Study*Gender
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

B
-1.6
0.38
0.19
-1.46
0.51
0.26
-0.05

S.E.
0.92
0.34
0.34
2.74
1.72
1.11
0.68

Wald
1.87
1.26
0.30
0.28
0.09
0.06
0.01

Exp(B)
0.28
1.47
1.20
0.23
1.66
1.30
0.95

Taken together, these results indicate that there was no differential effect for Verbal
Ability or Gender on problem solving success, suggesting that even though these variables were
significantly different between Study 2 and Study 3, this difference did not impact solution rates.
Examining Posterior Probabilities
In efforts to better understand what the lack of replication between Studies 2 and 3
implies for future research, posterior probabilities were examined. This analysis assumes a
conservative equal likelihood for null and alternative hypotheses prior to the results from
Thomas and Lleras (2007). This assumption is conservative, considering that Grant and Spivey
(2003) found evidence supporting Thomas and Lleras (2007)’s claims for an embodied effect of
eye movements; however, Grant and Spivey’s (2003) conditions were not directly comparable to
Thomas and Lleras (2007)’s, hence employing a conservative prior null hypothesis likelihood
estimate. Using logistic regression, comparing their closely related guided condition (n = 18)
and fixed condition (n = 18) solution rates yields a near-significant effect of eye movement
guidance on solution rates (p = .08, Observed Power = .88). Employing Bayes’ Theorem, the
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posterior belief in the null hypothesis given this result produces a posterior probability of p =
.083 that the null hypothesis is true.
This posterior probability (p = .083) was input into a new calculation integrating the
results from Thomas and Lleras (2009) with Bayes’ Theorem. Their closely related guided and
fixed conditions (both ns = 23) yield a significant effect of eye movement guidance on solution
rates (p = .04, Observed Power = .70). This produces a posterior probability of p = .005 that the
null hypothesis is true, given the data.
These calculations were performed in order to inform the prior probabilities for
examining Studies 2 and 3. When examining posterior probabilities for both present studies,
both studies independently suggest a low likelihood of a null effect given the data (posterior
probabilities p = .00009 for Study 2, and p = .047 for Study 3). Assuming the effects from
previous research are genuine, the results from the present work do not lend support to a null
effect of eye movement guidance on problem solving.
Comparing Solution Rates to Previous Research
One possible reason why the results of the present studies could have been different in
previous research would be if the solution rates were higher overall. If the studies in the present
samples were simply better at solving the radiation problem, the beneficial effects of guiding eye
movements might not be detectable. With regard to overall solution rates, Studies 2 (41%) and 3
(37%) were not out of the range of solution rates seen across all conditions in Grant and Spivey
(2003; 44%), Thomas and Lleras (2007; 36%), and Thomas and Lleras (2009; 26%). However,
it is worth noting that these solution rates are higher than the traditional 10% solution rate seen in
early studies (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983). However, there are two reasons why the solution
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rates in the present and relevant previous work should be higher. In the early studies, verbalizing
or writing were the only means of providing solutions. In the present studies, written and drawn
solutions were required, and in Grant and Spivey and Thomas and Lleras’s studies, drawn
solutions were required. This may explain a portion of the difference in that drawing a solution
is driven by fundamentally different processes (e.g., visuospatial) than writing or verbalizing a
solution. Additionally, incubation was not present in the early studies, which may have lowered
solution rates. In sum, the solution rates in the present work do not appear unreasonable
compared to relevant previous research.
Discussion
The results highlighted do not provide a clear answer as to why the embodied effect did
not replicate from Study 2 to Study 3. Gender and a measure of verbal ability were significantly
different between the two studies, but these variables did not differentially predict success in
solving the radiation problem for each study. It should be noted that there were very few
statistical differences in the samples between each study which could indicate that they were not
drastically different samples, or that some unmeasured variable drove the difference in effects.
An alternative possibility is that the embodied effect from previous literature that was replicated
in Study 2 is temperamental in nature or simply a small effect that does not replicate easily.
There is reason to believe that this may be the case, as several other studies have failed to find
embodied effects that aid in solving the radiation problem (e.g., Cooperrider & Goldin-Meadow,
2014; Hostetter et al., 2016; Trowbridge, 2016). However, it should be noted that the analysis of
posterior probabilities that the null hypothesis was true (given the data) did not lend much
support to this claim. Instead, it would appear that a failure to replicate an embodied effect in
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Study 3 still left little overall support for a null effect of eye movement guidance on problem
solving. With that being considered, Study 2 should probably carry more weight in terms of
evidence for embodied effects on problem solving, but the mediating effect of creative thinking
should not be ignored.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL DISCUSSION
Implications for Analogical Problem Solving
The proposed research expands the literature on analogical problem solving by
incorporating eye-movement priming studies into an analogical problem solving paradigm to
assess whether the benefits of guided eye movements transfer to later problem solving. The data
from Studies 2 and 3 do not support that guiding eye movements in a pattern embodying a
problem’s solution aids in analogical transfer. However, in Study 2, these effects may have
been eliminated due to the provision of hints. Also, because of the replication issue in Study 3, it
may be that because the embodied effect never replicated in the first problem, it could not be
detected through analogical transfer in the transfer problems. Although the data do not support
an embodied benefit to analogical problem solving, they do not rule out this possibility. More
research is needed to determine if embodied priming can aid analogical transfer.
Implications for Embodied Cognition
It is worth noting that the results from Studies 2 and 3 conflict with one another. Two of
the groups in Study 2 (Perceptual Simulation Group and Simple Incubation Group) and two of
the groups in Study 3 (Guided + Diagrams and Fixed + Diagrams) were identical in terms of
methodology. However, the difference in solution rates for those groups in Study 2 were
significant, in favor of the perceptual simulation group, and in line with previous research,
whereas the groups in Study 3 were statistically equivalent. A more in-depth analysis of the
contrasting individual differences in the groups between these studies did reveal significant
differences in verbal ability. Verbal ability was higher in the Study 2 sample but did not
differentially predict solution rates in either sample. Considering that there were essentially no
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impactful differences in the samples of Study 2 and Study 3, it is possible that the embodied
effect of guiding eye movements is not as robust as would be expected based on Grant and
Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras’s (2007; 2009) claims. Another possibility is that there is
some additional unmeasured variable responsible for the stark difference in the results of the
present Studies 2 and 3.
Study 3’s results fail to support an initial embodied effect, and they also fail to support
any latent embodied effects that could be expected based on the expected effect of a perceptual
simulation improving one’s mental representation of a problem that aids in analogical transfer.
However, it is worth noting that the failure to elicit an initial embodied effect may have been the
reason that no latent embodied effects emerged in the data. Future research is needed to
determine whether the benefits conferred by guided eye movements are truly embodied in nature,
to the extent that they facilitate a perceptual simulation of the convergence solution.
Taking posterior probabilities into consideration, the most relevant results would be those
found in Study 2. For embodied cognition, Study 2 supports that the benefits of guiding eye
movements for solving the radiation problem are due to an embodied priming of creative
thinking – not necessarily because guiding eye movements fosters a perceptual simulation of the
convergence solution. It is possible that there is unique variance in both predictors of solution
rates (guiding eye movements and creative thinking), but the current results support that guiding
eye movements resulted in an increase in creative thinking, which led to an increase in solution
rates. These effects mirror those of previous attentional priming of creativity studies (e.g.,
Friedman et al., 2003; Wegbreit et al. 2012), which argue a general effect of visual attention on
creativity. Because creativity is a key element in success with the radiation problem (Dow &
Mayer, 2004; Gick & Holyoak, 1980), it is more plausible to argue that guiding eye movements
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influences creative thinking which increases solution rates. Without knowing the impacts of
guiding eye movements on creative thinking in previous studies, it is less reasonable to argue
that guiding eye movements in the pattern of the convergence solution fosters a perceptual
simulation of that solution.
Implications for Creativity
In all three studies, creativity effects were measured based on the written responses that
participants had provided. In Study 1, no meaningful creativity effects emerged due to the
manipulation. In Study 2, there appeared to be a benefit to creativity due to incubation as well as
eye movement guidance. In Study 3, broad creativity benefits emerged due to the manipulation
of diagrams, and it appears they mediated the association between diagrams and problem solving
success. It is possible that these creativity effects are concomitant with any benefits due to
guiding eye movements. However, it is interesting to note that these effects did not emerge until
participants were required to draw their solutions. It is possible that the act of drawing itself
facilitates creativity in problem solving.
At the time of this writing, the present work is the first to examine creative thinking using
solutions to the radiation problem. Both Study 2 and Study 3’s experimental manipulations
yielded differences in solution rates that were partially explained by a concomitant increase in
measures of creative thinking. One possibility is that the experimental manipulations from
previous studies (e.g., relevant analogies, diagrams, animations, gestures) may also have
benefited problem solving through creativity. Future research should explore whether the
traditional manipulations that benefit analogical problem solving may be intertwined with
creativity.
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It may appear as if creative thinking effects are more pronounced in Study 3 than in
Study 2, but it should be recognized that the reason for this difference is likely due to the
manipulation of the scratch paper variable. All groups had diagrams on their scratch paper in
Study 2, whereas half of the groups had diagrams and the other half had blank scratch paper in
Study 3. Thus, any differences in creativity in Study 3 could be due to blank scratch paper
stifling creativity.
One concern about creativity is that it is a difficult construct to measure (e.g., Piffer,
2012). The present study employed a divergent thinking style approach to measuring creative
thinking by coding and analyzing participants’ written responses to problem solving, based on
Guilford’s (1967) theories of divergent thinking. This approach is argued to be one of the more
feasible measures of creativity (Piffer, 2012), but Piffer critiques that it only measures a
relatively transitory state known as creative thinking rather than a trait of creativity. Based on
previous research that examined creative performance after short visual attention tasks (e.g.,
Friedman et al., 2003; Wegbreit et al. 2012), it is likely that the effects of creative thinking that
were observed in this study were due to the experimental manipulations, rather than simply traitbased creativity.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that there were a small number of participants who might
be more closely drawn to majors requiring creativity to be successful (e.g., fine arts, performing
arts, decorative arts, applied arts, or arts education; Silvia & Nusbaum, 2012). Silvia and
Nusbaum supported that those who majored in the previously described areas had more creative
accomplishments and were more creative in their day-to-day lives. It is likely that people who
choose to concentrate their studies in these areas exhibit creative traits, and participants in the
present studies holding these majors might also perform differently on creative thinking tasks,
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compared to non-arts majors. Participants’ major was further explored to better understand
whether those who majored in arts differed on the creative thinking measures, compared to those
who did not major in the arts.
Unfortunately, the present studies had only a total of 31 arts majors across all three
studies (Study 1 n = 10; Study 2 n = 12; Study 3 n = 9), and none of these participants were
significantly higher on any of the creative measures when compared to those concentrating in
non-arts majors (all ps > .15). Although the number of arts majors in each study was small, their
performance on measures of creative thinking in problem solving were not significantly better
than non-arts majors.
Disambiguating Embodied Priming and Creativity Priming
In Study 2, there appeared to be a significant effect of guiding eye movements, such that
those whose eye movements were guided in a pattern congruent with the convergence solution
were more likely to solve the radiation problem. Eye movement guidance also appeared to
generate significant differences on several creativity measures – Elaboration, Total Solutions,
and Redundant Solutions. Because the Attentional Priming hypothesis posited that the problem
solving benefits of guiding eye movements are actually due to a boost in creativity, a mediation
analysis was performed to disambiguate these effects. Elaboration was found to significantly
mediate the benefits of guiding eye movements. This lends support to eye movement guidance
facilitating increased creativity, rather than embodying the solution, which leads to better
problem solving success rates. It should be noted that this was the only creativity variable that
mediated this relationship, so it is possible there may be some unique effects of eye movement
guidance that fosters embodiment. Future research should seek to further disambiguate these
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concomitant effects by examining alternative manipulations of the tracking task (e.g., without a
diagram, in a different pattern) or similarly difficult insight problems that have a disparate spatial
solution (i.e., one not mirrored by the tracking task).
In Study 3, it is important to note that the differences in creativity scores tended to
mediate the relationship between the scratch paper conditions (diagrams vs. blank) and solution
rates on the radiation problem. The nature of these relationships was such that those in the
scratch paper with diagrams conditions showed higher measures of creativity than those in the
blank scratch paper conditions, and this difference in creativity explained the difference in
problem solving success rates between the two conditions. Although at first glance it appeared
that the scratch paper with diagrams conditions performed better on the radiation problem, it was
ultimately better explained by a concomitant increase in creativity. Qualitatively, these
mediating effects were much more consistent in nature than those from Study 2, and more
strongly suggest that scratch paper with diagrams improve solution rates through an
enhancement of creativity.
Implications for Spatial Ability
Across all three studies, there were not any consistent effects for spatial ability.
Considering the spatial nature of the radiation problem and its analogues, it is surprising that no
major effects emerged. However, it is worth noting that spatial ability appeared to influence
solution rates on the Red Adair in Study 3. Since participants did not receive solutions to
problems in Study 3, it is possible that this effect illuminates a benefit for the analogical
reasoning process of structure mapping. Those with higher spatial ability should theoretically be
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better able to visualize and link the structures between analogical problems, and this appeared to
improve solution rates – particularly for those who used blank scratch paper.
Spatial ability never emerged as a predictor of success on the Radiation Problem, but it
appears that spatial ability was a significant predictor of success on Red Adair in both studies.
This could suggest that those with higher spatial ability are more likely to spontaneously transfer
the solution from the Radiation Problem to Red Adair. Or more simply, spatial ability could
have been particularly influential for Red Adair. The present study did not counterbalance the
presentation order of the two transfer problems, as Corkill and Fager (1995) demonstrated that
the presentation order of transfer problems did not affect analogical transfer. If spatial ability is
more influential for Red Adair than The General, future research would see this variable as a
significant predictor of performance, no matter how far removed it was from the source problem.
However, if spatial ability is a meaningful predictor of analogical transfer, it would be a
significant predictor of performance on whatever transfer problem followed the source problem.
Lastly, it is worth recognizing that spatial ability was measured during the last portion of
the study, after any experimental manipulation had taken place. This position in the procedure
was chosen because of concerns that spatial tests could have primed spatial thinking, which
could have affected any of the problem solving tasks. Conversely, there is a similar possibility
that any differences observed in spatial ability were due to the manipulation occurring prior to
spatial ability measurement.
Liking to Solve Puzzles
In each study, participants answered a scaled Likert-type question to indicate the degree
to which they like solving puzzles. In Study 2, this variable was significantly different between
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those who solved the problem and those who did not (see Table 21). This variable uniquely
predicted variance in solving the radiation problem – it did not covary with any experimental
manipulations. Furthermore, this variable was not statistically different across the samples in
each study. This variable was intended as a simple variable to assess whether “liking” the task
explained all of the benefits seen by experimental manipulations. It is worth noting that liking to
solve puzzles could represent other potentially relevant factors that could have impacted problem
solving success. Need for Cognition (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1983) is a construct that
assesses the degree to which one enjoys engaging in thinking. People with higher Need for
Cognition may enjoy problem solving tasks which increases their likelihood of successful
problem solving. Liking to solve puzzles may also represent a motivational factor that increased
people’s likelihood of problem solving success. In general, this variable may represent affectrelated aspects of the individual that could impact learning and problem solving.
Practical Applications
Although the evidence is not strong for an embodied effect of improving problem
solving, there appears to be evidence for increased solution generation in problem solving as a
function of guiding eye movements and incubation. In Study 2, guiding eye movements
increased the number of solutions generated, like the attentional priming of creativity effects in
previous literature (e.g., Friedman et al., 2003). Additionally, there was a benefit for Incubation
in terms of solution elaboration, such that people who saw their problem before undergoing their
digit-tracking task, then resumed attempting to solve the problem were more likely to generate
more detailed solutions than those who only saw the problem after doing their digit-tracking
task. Practically, these results echo the traditional understanding of incubation effects (e.g.,
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Segal, 2004), that temporarily removing oneself from a problem can benefit solution generation
upon revisiting the problem.
There were also significant effects of diagrams on creativity in Study 3. Although
diagrams did help improve solution rates, it was because they increased creativity which
increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. These results suggest that diagrams
can improve problem solving success by enriching the attempted solutions during the problem
solving process. A possible cognitive mechanism for this effect could be that diagrams aid in the
formation of mental representations of problems, which facilitate greater flexibility in problem
solving. A practical application of these results is that learners and problem solvers could ease
their learning and/or problem solving processes by drawing out diagrams of the problems they
are trying to solve. This effect relates to Vygotsky’s theoretical concept of scaffolding (e.g.,
Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976) during learning, such that a diagram facilitates mental model
formation that aids in problem solving. This may also represent a traditional benefit of
multimedia learning (e.g., Mayer, 2002), such that diagrams combined with other material (e.g.,
problem text) enhance understanding.
With regard to the interaction between spatial ability and diagrams in Study 2 (see Figure
28), diagrams seemed to equalize performance differences among those with various levels of
spatial ability; however, those with the high levels of spatial ability were most likely to be
successful when they did not receive diagrams on their scratch paper during the radiation
problem. This may represent an expertise reversal effect (e.g., Kalyuga, 2009), such that the
scaffolding benefits of diagrams are too much information for those with high spatial ability,
who should be able to construct mental representations of the problem more easily on their own.
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This may explain why those with high spatial ability had lower performance when a diagram was
provided for them compared to when they did not receive a diagram.
In retrospect, it is possible that all of the aids to problem solving seen in previous
research (e.g., diagrams, animations, gesture interaction) that improved solution rates only did so
through an improvement in creativity. In the present studies, guiding eye movements improved
creative thinking which improved solution rates. Using diagrams during problem solving also
improved creative thinking which improved solution rates. At the time of this writing, the
present work is the only research to have examined creativity from a divergent thinking
perspective, and in two studies, creative thinking explained some or all of the problem solving
benefits of the experimental manipulations. Future research should consider the effects of
creative thinking during problem solving to better understand the ways in which aids to problem
solving benefit cognition. Furthermore, it may be valuable to revisit earlier factors that influence
problem solving success to better understand whether they facilitate creative thinking, or whether
there are unique aspects of analogies, diagrams, animations, and enacted gestures that contribute
to problem solving success.
Limitations and Future Directions
As previously mentioned, the embodied effect from Study 2 and previous literature did
not replicate in Study 3. The post-hoc analyses implicated a difference in verbal ability between
each study’s sample which was influential in problem solving, but the relationship between
verbal ability and problem solving was not significantly different between the Study 2 and Study
3 samples. It is possible that the disparate effects were driven by a variable that was not
measured in this study. One potential variable that may be relevant to this area of research is
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Need for Cognition (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1983). Self-report measures of “I like to Solve
Puzzles” were significantly related to problem solving rates, but they did not mediate any
relationships between experimental variables and problem solving success rates. This variable is
likely related to Need for Cognition, which may encompass similar effects that aid in problem
solving. Another potential area of interest may be in motivation. Those who rated themselves
higher on liking to solve problems may have been more motivated to solve each problem. This
aspect may not be captured by Need for Cognition, so an alternative motivation variable (e.g.,
success motivation) may be a useful variable for future work.
Again, a significant limitation is that the embodied effect did not replicate from Study 2
to Study 3. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the existence of this embodied
effect and whether it is a consistent, replicable effect. It should be mentioned that the present
work provides unfavorable evidence for the existence of an embodied effect. The only time the
effect successfully replicated (Study 2), it appeared to be mediated by creativity. Although there
were methodological reasons the effect may not have replicated in Study 1 (nearly all
participants chose not to draw their solutions), there is no identifiable reason why it should not
have replicated in Study 3. Taken together, the results of this study lend more support to the
attentional priming hypothesis – that guiding eye movements improves creativity – rather than
fostering a perceptual simulation of the problem. Future research is needed to continue
examining this effect, perhaps with a new set of analogical problems with different spatial
solutions or a new pattern of eye movement guidance that follows. Furthermore, future
researchers should not ignore creativity variables in their studies of problem solving, as it may
help researchers understand benefits to problem solving more comprehensively.
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It did not appear that there were any benefits for analogical transfer during problem
solving as a result of guiding eye movements. It is possible that this effect is not long lasting and
may need to be refreshed prior to solving other problems (e.g., re-run the tracking task before
attempting each problem). This could mean that perceptual simulations that aid in mental
representation construction are also short-lived. Future research should examine whether this
effect endures over time or if it is a transitory effect. It is also possible that any eye movement
guidance may need to be made more explicit in order for it to be helpful for problem solving and
analogical transfer.
Conclusion
The concept of guiding people’s eyes to influence the way they think is a potentially
potent implicit mechanism that could have its uses (e.g., learning, problem solving) or abuses
(marketing). This idea was espoused in previous studies (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas &
Lleras, 2007; 2009), but the present work found evidence against its existence through a
mediating effect as well as a failure to replicate. Across all three studies, the present work only
replicated the effect in one study, and it may have been dependent upon external factors rather
than experimentally replicated factors. If this embodied priming effect is legitimate, it is
possible that it is inconsistent or potentially not robust enough to emerge with slight
methodological changes. Regardless, this effect is worthy of future investigation while evidence
for embodied cognitive effects are still emerging.
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APPENDIX B: CONVERGENCE SOLUTION CODING SCHEME
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Coding the Convergence Solution
Adapted from Gick and Holyoak (1980)

A solution is considered a convergence solution for the radiation problem if it has:
1. Rays applied to tumor from different directions
2. At low intensity
3. Simultaneously

This coding scheme can be modified to be more abstract and suitable to analogous problems:

A solution is considered a convergence solution for the radiation problem analogies if it has:
1. Forces applied to central target from different directions
2. At low intensity
3. Simultaneously
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APPENDIX D: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES FOR EACH STUDY
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Study 1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Supported?

In Study 1, the following research questions were preliminarily tested:
What duration tracking task is appropriate to yield differences in solution rates?

No effect
found

Does spatial ability predict greater success in solving the radiation problem?
Hypothesis 3: Those with higher spatial ability will perform better on the radiation problem.

No effect
found

Hypothesis 3a: Those with higher spatial ability will perform better on the radiation problem,
independent of the effects of the experimental manipulations.

No effect
found

Hypothesis 3b: The benefits of the experimental manipulations will be more pronounced in those
with lower spatial ability, whereas they will not be different among those with higher spatial
ability.

No effect
found

Does a brief period of incubation aid in the problem solving process?
Hypothesis 4 (incubation): Participants who view a problem before undergoing a digit-tracking or
free-viewing task will perform better on the radiation problem than those who simply go straight
into attempting to solve it
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No effect
found

Study 2 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Supported?

In Study 2, the following research questions were tested:
Does guiding eye movements foster a perceptual simulation of the radiation problem that leads to
improved success rates?
Hypothesis 1 (Perceptual Simulation): Guiding eye
movements will lead to higher solution rates on the
radiation problem, independent of any attentional priming
effects on creativity.

Partial support, but effect was mediated by one
creativity variable

Does guiding eye movements prime creativity that incidentally results in an improvement in problem
solving success rates?
Hypothesis 2 (Attentional Priming): guiding eye
movements only primes creativity (not a perceptual
simulation of the problem), improving problem solving
success rates.

Full support from Elaboration, Partial support from
other creativity variables Total Solutions and
Redundant Solutions

Hypothesis 2a (Flexibility Hypothesis): guiding eye
movements prime divergent thinking, which results in a
greater quantity of solutions generated, leading to a
greater likelihood of solving the problem

Partial support - guiding eye movements did increase
solutions generated, but this increase did not lead to
improved problem solving performance

Does spatial ability predict greater success in solving the radiation problem?
Hypothesis 3: Those with higher spatial ability will
perform better on the radiation problem and analogical
problems.

Partial support - PFT was significant predictor of
success on Red Adair and The General, but not
radiation problem

Hypothesis 3a: Those with higher spatial ability will
perform better on the radiation problem and analogical
problems, independent of the effects of the experimental
manipulations.

No effect found

Hypothesis 3b: The benefits of the experimental
manipulations will be more pronounced in those with
lower spatial ability, whereas they will not be different
among those with higher spatial ability.

No effect found

Does a brief period of incubation aid in the problem solving process?
Hypothesis 4 (incubation): Participants who view a
problem before undergoing a digit-tracking or freeviewing task will perform better on the radiation problem
than those who simply go straight into attempting to
solve it.
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Partial support - those who saw their problem before
their digit-tracking task generated significantly more
solutions to the radiation problem than those who
saw it for the first time when they attempted to solve
it.

Study 3 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Supported?

In Study 3, the following research questions were tested:
Does guiding eye movements foster a perceptual simulation of the radiation problem that leads to
improved success rates?
Hypothesis 1 (Perceptual Simulation): Guiding eye movements
will lead to higher solution rates on the radiation problem,
independent of any attentional priming effects on creativity

No effect found

Hypothesis 1a (Analogical Boost): Those whose eye
movements are guided will be more likely to draw a
convergence solution to the subsequent analogical problems.

No effect found

Does guiding eye movements prime creativity that incidentally results in an improvement in problem
solving success rates?
Hypothesis 2 (Attentional Priming): guiding eye movements
only primes creativity (not a perceptual simulation of the
problem), improving problem solving success rates.

No effect found

Hypothesis 2a (Flexibility Hypothesis): guiding eye
movements prime divergent thinking, which results in a greater
quantity of solutions generated, leading to a greater likelihood
of solving the problem

No effect found

Does spatial ability predict greater success in solving the radiation problem?
Hypothesis 3: Those with higher spatial ability will perform
better on the radiation problem and analogical problems

Partial support - CRT was associated with Red
Adair Performance

Hypothesis 3a: Those with higher spatial ability will perform
better on the radiation problem and analogical problems,
independent of the effects of the experimental manipulations

No effect found

Hypothesis 3b: The benefits of the experimental manipulations
will be more pronounced in those with lower spatial ability,
whereas they will not be different among those with higher
spatial ability

Partial support using the PFT on Red Adair High spatials performed better in the condition
without diagrams, but those in the diagram
condition were roughly equal, regardless of
spatial ability

How does a diagram influence solution rates?
Hypothesis 5 (Demand Characteristic): Those who attempt to
solve the problem on scratch paper with the diagram of the
problem will be more likely to draw the convergence solution
to the radiation problem, but only for those whose eye
movements are guided
Hypothesis 6 (Visual Aid): The mere presence of a diagram on
scratch paper will boost solution rates, compared to those who
receive blank scratch paper.
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No effect found

Full support, but this effect was partially
mediated by creative thinking variables.

APPENDIX E: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR CREATIVITY
VARIABLES
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For each study, a multivariate analysis of variance was performed on the following
dependent variables of creativity: Flexibility, Originality, and Elaboration. Two other creativity
variables were not used – Total Number of Solutions and Redundant Solutions. Both of these
were created out of the Flexibility variable, and due to multicollinearity issues, they were not
included in the MANOVA analysis. These variables were assessed to better understand research
questions about creative thinking, and are discussed in their respective study’s analysis sections.
For Study 1, a MANOVA was used to compare whether any condition’s creative thinking
scores differed as a function of media type (guided, fixed, free-viewing) or duration (4 minutes,
or 7 minutes). There were no significant differences in creative thinking scores as a function of
media type (p = .17), duration (p = .47), or their interaction (p = .88).
For Study 2, a MANOVA was used to compare whether any condition’s creative thinking
scores differed as a function of guidance type (guided, fixed) or problem context (problem before
tracking, skip to tracking). There was a significant multivariate effect for guidance type, F(3,
167) = 4.34, p = .006, Wilks’ Λ = .93, η2p = .07, and a significant multivariate effect for problem
context, F(3, 167) = 3.69, p = .013, Wilks’ Λ = .94, η2p = .06. The interaction between both
variables was not statistically significant (p = .31). Upon further examining which creativity
variables drove these multivariate effects, eye movement guidance only significantly impacted
Elaboration scores, F(3, 169) = 8.23, p = .003, η2p = .05. The nature of this effect was such that
those in the guided eye movements conditions had significantly higher elaboration scores than
those in the fixed eye movements conditions. For problem context, there were significant
differences identified in Flexibility, F(3, 169) = 4.66, p = .032, η2p = .03 and Elaboration F(3,
169) = 7.36, p = .007, η2p = .04. In both cases, those who saw the problem before undergoing
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their digit tracking task had higher Flexibility and Elaboration scores than those who only saw
the problem after their tracking task.
For Study 3, a MANOVA was used to compare whether any condition’s creative thinking
scores differed as a function of guidance type (guided, fixed) or diagrams on scratch paper
(diagrams present, blank paper). The multivariate effect for guidance type was not statistically
significant (p = .34), but there was a significant multivariate effect for diagrams, F(3, 137) =
4.59, p = .004, Wilks’ Λ = .91, η2p = .09. The interaction between both variables was not
statistically significant (p = .61). Upon further examining which creativity variables drove these
multivariate effects, diagrams significantly impacted Flexibility scores, F(3, 139) = 6.97, p =
.009, η2p = .05 and Originality scores, F(3, 139) = 12.02, p = .001, η2p = .08. The nature of this
effect was such that those in the scratch paper with diagrams conditions had significantly higher
Flexibility and Originality scores than those in the blank scratch paper conditions.
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